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Abstract 
A popular notion in psychology today is that cognition is embodied, such that the physical 
body and its interaction with the environment actively shape cognitive processes. According 
to one theory of embodied cognition, Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; 
1999), people understand abstract concepts in terms of more concrete, physical domains. A 
conceptual metaphor that has been examined empirically is the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor (e.g., Meier & Robinson, 2004). This conceptual metaphor consists of an 
association between valence (good and bad) and verticality (up and down). The current 
project aimed to investigate whether the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor influences 
impression formation processes. This project consisted of four experiments in which reaction 
time, memory, and target evaluations were measured as dependent variables. Experiment 1 
examined whether the vertical location of behavioural information influenced reaction time, 
memory, and target evaluations. Experiment 2A examined whether the vertical location of 
trait words influenced reaction time. Experiment 2B examined whether the vertical location 
of trait words influenced memory and target evaluations. Experiment 3 examined the 
reproducibility of Meier and Robinson’s (2004) original effect. Across the set of experiments, 
I hypothesised that the vertical location of the stimuli would influence reaction time, 
memory, and target evaluations in metaphor-consistent ways. However, this hypothesis was 
not supported. The current climate in psychological science is now beginning both to 
emphasise the importance of negative results and to encourage replication. The findings of 
the present project are discussed within this changing climate, which will better serve the 
development and refinement of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Despite the negative results 
(i.e., p > .05), the four experiments are informative and provide direction for future research 
on conceptual metaphor and embodied cognition.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The last thirty years have seen a considerable shift in theories of cognition from what 
has been referred to as “first generation cognitive science” to what is now considered “second 
generation cognitive science” (Kövecses, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). During the mid to 
late 20th century, computational theory of mind1 (henceforth CTM; first generation cognitive 
science) rose to popularity and was recognised and widely embraced inside and outside of 
psychology circles (e.g., Fodor, 1975; Newell & Simon, 1972). This computational approach 
rests on the assumption that the mind is like a computer in the sense that the processes of the 
mind involve the rule-governed manipulation of internal symbols. Moreover, these symbolic 
processes of mind are held to be amodal, such that they are independent of sensory and motor 
systems associated with the body and its interaction with the world. In fact, in this approach, 
the body is relegated to an input and output device (Wilson, 2002). These assumptions, 
particularly those relating to the role of the body in cognition, have been challenged by an 
approach referred to as embodied cognition (EC), an approach that lies at the heart of second 
generation cognitive science.   
The central notion of EC (today) is that the physical body and its sensorimotor 
experiences with the environment actively shape cognitive processes such that the body has 
both a causal and a constitutive role in cognition (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Niedenthal, 
Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Wilson, 2002). Researchers in EC have 
subsequently turned away from amodal symbols, focussing instead on bodily states, 
simulation, situated action, and modal symbols. Accounts of EC reject the claim that the 
mind and body are independent and instead emphasise an interactive brain-body-environment 
system through which intelligent action is generated (Wheeler, 2005). Currently, much work 
in cognitive science attempts to explain the role of sensory and motor systems in conceptual 
																																								 																				
1 CTM should not be confused with Theory of Mind. That is, CTM refers to an approach that attempts to 
understand how the mind works (e.g., Fodor, 1975), whereas Theory of Mind refers to the ability of individuals 
to understand other people’s mental states (e.g., Premack & Woodruff, 1978).  
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processing. Although prominent in the last two to three decades, the notion of EC stretches 
back to the work of James, Dewey, Freud, Piaget, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Gibson.     
The aim of this introduction is to outline the background shift from first generation to 
second generation cognitive science, and then to introduce and explore a particular theory of 
EC known as Conceptual Metaphor Theory (henceforth CMT) with a view to applying CMT 
to the social phenomenon of impression formation. 
 A common approach to explaining EC is to begin by discussing why traditional 
theories such as CTM should be criticised and consequently why they are being replaced. 
This approach will be followed in order to map both the independent history of embodiment 
approaches and the move from first generation cognitive science to second generation 
cognitive science. Embodied cognitive science is not only a critical opponent of traditional 
theories, such as CTM, but also includes a rich research programme (Anderson, 2006). 
Following an account of traditional theories of mind, EC will be introduced and explored. A 
theory of EC known as CMT will subsequently be presented and then applied to impression 
formation.  
Computational Theory of Mind 
CTM has a long history. For instance, Hobbes (1651) in the 17th century believed 
rational thought to be computation. In Leviathan, Hobbes explains what he called 
ratiocination (i.e., rational thought) as the rule-governed processing of internal symbols that 
represent external objects. CTM has additional roots in the 1940s cybernetics movement, 
which saw the promotion of mathematical logic to understand the underlying processes of 
mental activity. This movement also saw the invention of the first digital computers. It was 
during the mid to late 20th century, however, with the advent of the digital computer, that 
CTM was established as the favoured theory of the mind (Fodor, 1975; Newell & Simon, 
1972). Put simply, this theory views the operation of the mind to be similar to that of a 
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computer. That is, the popular mind-as-a-computer metaphor refers to a distinction between 
the brain as the hardware and the mind as the software. CTM’s major assumption is that 
cognitive processes can be defined as computations, that is, as algorithmic operations that are 
performed on internal symbolic codes. Although the exact form or character of these symbols 
has been debated (e.g., Anderson, 1978; Pylyshyn, 1973), it is generally assumed that a 
symbol is some kind of internal representation of an external object. In other words, symbols 
are referents or ‘stand ins’ for the external environment and are manipulated by rule as part of 
cognitive processing. Fodor (1975) notably developed CTM in The Language of Thought 
(henceforth LOT). 
In LOT, cognition is the rule-governed manipulation of symbols in a language of 
thought. In other words, internal representations (i.e., symbols) are stored and manipulated in 
a system (i.e., thought) that is itself a language. Certain parallels can be drawn between a 
Fodorian account of cognition and human language. For instance, the mind stores symbols 
(just as language stores words); symbols can be combined into more complex symbolic codes 
(just as words are combined to form sentences); the combination of symbols into more 
complex symbolic codes is based on rule (just as in grammar, where the make-up of 
sentences is governed by syntax); and the meaning of symbolic codes are derived from their 
constituent symbols (just as in semantics, where the meaning of sentences is derived from the 
meaning of words). In this system, cognitive processes involve three stages: first, the 
transduction of input information from the external world into internal symbols as part of the 
language of thought; second, the rule-governed manipulation of these symbols; and third, the 
production of behavioural ouput. Fodor (1975) famously claimed that CTM was the “only 
game in town” (and more recently, 2008, declared that Representational Theory of Mind 
remains the “only game in town”). However, despite the implication that the only way to 
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understand cognition is via an account that includes internal representations (symbols), there 
are notable problems with any theory that postulates such internal mental entities.  
For instance, a problem is that internal representations are perhaps redundant and 
cannot actually do what they are claimed to do. According to CTM, the meaning of an 
external object is known indirectly via internal representations. However, to understand the 
meaning of the symbol “blue” for example, it is essential to know both the thing that is 
symbolised (the colour blue), and that “blue” is used as a symbol for that thing. Therefore, to 
know the meaning of “blue” presumes knowledge of the colour blue. In other words, direct 
knowledge presupposes the process of accessing and understanding the meaning of internal 
symbols. Gibson (1979) consequently argued, “Knowledge of the world cannot be explained 
by supposing that knowledge of the world already exists” (p. 253). Accordingly, the question 
arises as to how symbols acquire their meaning. This problem has been referred to as the 
semantic problem of mental representations, which Fodor (1985) famously admitted has not 
yet been solved: “[O]f the semanticity of mental representations we have, as things now 
stand, no adequate account” (p. 99). Evidently, it is not known how internal symbols come to 
represent external, independent objects (e.g., Harnad, 1990).  
Furthermore, according to CTM, cognition involves accessing and manipulating 
symbols that are inside the brain (Fodor, 1975). This assumption raises additional issues that 
are related to the homunculus problem. This problem refers to the inference that an inner 
homunculus (“little man”) who knows what symbols are and what they represent is required 
in order for CTM’s cognition to occur (McMullen, 2001). This problem is encapsulated by 
the following questions: who or what does the manipulating of internal symbols (a 
homunculus?)? How does the manipulator access the symbols in order to do the 
manipulating? The notion of a homunculus also leads to an infinite and vicious regress (Ryle, 
1949), which is a problem for both CTM and LOT. For example, in order to learn a language 
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one must invoke another language, such that one must know certain rules. Consequently, a 
language of thought presupposes another language, and that language presupposes another 
language, and so on (Heil, 1981). Therefore, it is unclear how an internal language is learned 
and understood.  
Despite the logical incoherence of internal mental entities such as representations, the 
view that CTM is the “only game in town” has been supported over the years with arguments  
that favour the claim (albeit a claim that turns out to be false) that no alternatives exist. This 
position has subsequently become known as the “What else could it be?” argument 
(Haugeland, 1978). Newell (1990) explained: 
   
[A]lthough a small chance exists that we will see a new paradigm emerge for mind, it 
seems unlikely to me. Basically, there do not seem to be any viable alternatives. This 
position is not surprising. In lots of sciences we end up where there are no major 
alternatives around to the particular theories we have. Then, all the interesting kinds 
of scientific action occur inside the major view. It seems to me that we are getting 
rather close to that situation with respect to the computational theory of mind (p.56).  
 
However, there do exist alternatives to CTM despite this claim made by supporters of the 
theory. One approach that has been identified as an alternative is Connectionism. 
Connectionism 
During the 1980s, connectionism gained prominence as a theory of mind (e.g., 
McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). This theory is based on the 
notion that theories of cognition should be modelled after the neural systems of the biological 
brain. This approach, like CTM, has a long history. It is customary to first acknowledge the 
contributions of Hebb (1949) and Rosenblatt (1962). However, connectionist assumptions 
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can be traced back to the 19th century. For example, Spencer (1855) believed that all mental 
phenomena are related to neural mechanisms and that intelligence develops from associations 
among psychological states. Other notables include James (1890), Freud (1895), and 
McCulloch and Pitts (1943; for a review of the history of connectionism see Walker, 1992).  
Connectionism, as it is known today, refers to interconnected networks that consist of 
simple units in the mind. Like CTM, connectionist networks also employ representations. 
However, in contrast with CTM, these representations are not symbolic, rather 
representations in a connectionist network refer to patterns of activation spread across a 
number of processing units. Put simply, then, experience leads to changes in the connections 
between units and these changes lead to learning (Munakata & McClelland, 2003).   
There is controversy, however, as to whether connectionism does provide a viable and 
novel theory of mind in opposition to CTM (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). The critics 
maintain that, although there are differences between CTM and connectionism, they both rest 
on the assumption of representationism (Bickhard, 1996). It is irrelevant as to whether 
representations are symbols or patterns of activation because both accounts are vulnerable to 
the same criticisms (Michell, 1988).  
Another alternative to CTM is EC. However, EC comes in several different versions. 
The version known as embodied cognitive science (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Clark, 1997) is 
perhaps more accurately defined as an extension of CTM, in that representations are retained. 
In contrast, the versions known as direct realism and radical embodied cognitive science 
(henceforth RECS) are genuine alternatives to CTM, in that they do not rest on the 
assumption of representationism. 
Roots of Embodied Cognition 
For centuries, philosophers have attempted to understand how the mind, which is said 
to contain thoughts, beliefs, attitudes and so on, is related to the external world. This 
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investigation is primarily motivated by an assumed, centuries old dichotomy between the 
mind and the body. This dichotomy was first laid out in Descartes’ Discourse on the Method 
(1637) and is known as Cartesian Dualism. It refers to a divide between two kinds of 
metaphysical substances; the mind and the body. That is, the mind is a non-physical (or 
immaterial) entity whereas the body is a physical (or material) entity. The question of 
precisely how these two different substances interact is today known as the mind-body 
problem.  
Accounts of EC, in contrast, do not explicitly adhere to a notion of a dichotomy 
between the mind and body. Instead, the mind is embodied, such that cognition first develops 
and is subsequently shaped by an active and ongoing interaction between the body and the 
environment. This notion can be traced back to the work of pragmatists such as William 
James (1890) and John Dewey (1925), American new realists, and later Eliminativists such as 
Gilbert Ryle (1949) and Richard Rorty (1979), who all affirmed that cognition cannot be 
understood as mirroring the world, but can be understood in relation to the whole animal and 
its actions. Famously, Dewey (1925) stated that “to see the organism in nature, the nervous 
system in the organism, the brain in the nervous system, the cortex in the brain is the answer 
to the problems which haunt philosophy” (p.198). In other words, the mind can be understood 
as being shaped by the situated and embodied nature of the organism. Moreover, Dewey 
claimed that abstract thought has roots in organism-environment interactions. Such 
interactions include perception and bodily movement in the environment. For Dewey, this 
meant a connectedness between rational thought and organic processes.  
EC also has roots in Phenomenology with the work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. 
For instance, Heidegger (1962) rejected Cartesianism and the assumption that we represent 
the world. Instead, Heidegger (1962) emphasised the actions and practices of being-in-the-
world as constituting cognition. Merleau-Ponty is also of particular note here as his work 
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features significantly in some of the contemporary approaches to embodied cognition. In 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty (1962) emphasises the importance of the body 
as it ‘gears’ us into a meaningful world, such that it is the body that is the source of meaning. 
The key argument in this work, which is particularly relevant for the current view of EC, is 
that mental states and processes are constituted by the body and its interaction with the world, 
such that mental processes are the result of brain-body-environment synergies.  
Finally, Gibson’s (1966, 1979) ecological psychology has also influenced current 
notions of EC. The antecedents of Gibson’s approach can be traced back to Aristotle, Reid, 
and the American new realists. Similar to the accounts already mentioned, Gibson rejected 
the principle tenets of CTM. For instance, according to Gibson, perception is direct, such that 
perception does not, as proposed by CTM, involve the elaboration of inadequate and 
impoverished sensory input via inferences, memories, and representations. Instead, 
perception is the detection of information which specifies the structure of the environment to 
the animal. More specifically, it is the detection of affordances, which are opportunities in the 
environment for action, that provide meaning for an animal in its environment. According to 
Gibson, sensory input is not impoverished. As a result, perception is a central resource in 
cognition due to its role in detecting important information in the environment which 
subsequently leads to the animal producing appropriate action. Thus, an interactive brain-
body-environment system that posseses perception-action couplings does not require internal 
representations of the world. Gibson’s theory is thus anti-representationalist and has led to 
what has been labelled RECS (Chemero, 2009).  
 What is clear from this brief survey of the foundations of EC is that there is a claim – 
shared by all of the approaches – that the body has a significant role in cognition. The 
differences in the various approaches relate to exactly how the body influences cognition. 
This question also appears in the contemporary EC literature, along with the major 
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disagreement concerning whether representations are required to explain cognition or 
whether they should be abandoned in an embodied account of cognition. In-house 
disagreement over representations has subsequently led to a divide among supporters of an 
embodied approach into representationalists and anti-representationalists, and to 
disagreement about what the term embodied cognition actually means and what it explains.	
Exploring the meaning of EC is important for two reasons; first, it allows for an identification 
of where EC is presently in the literature and where it is headed, and second, it provides an 
opportunity to clarify its definition particularly for the current thesis.	
What Exactly is Embodied Cognition?  
 In the last 30 years the concept of ‘embodied’ has been used frequently yet disparately 
throughout the cognitive science literature. For instance, there are terms such as: embodied 
mind (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991), embodied-embedded 
cognitive science (Wheeler, 2005), embodied action (Varela et al., 1991), embodied AI 
(Franklin, 1997), embodied cognitive science (Clark, 1997; Pfeifer & Scheier, 1999), radical 
embodied cognitive science (Chemero, 2009) and embodied cognition (Clark, 1997). 
Furthermore, there are a variety of areas in which research has been conducted in relation to 
what could be called an EC paradigm. These areas include: philosophy, artificial intelligence, 
neuroscience, cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, linguistics, cognitive 
neuropsychology, and social pychology. The current diversity in the claims of what 
‘embodied’ actually means and how it is used in the literature is clearly problematic for the 
field (Wilson, 2002). Consequently, attempts have been made to outline common themes or 
claims that are related to EC. 
 For instance, Wilson (2002) identified six different claims related to EC. These six 
claims are: (1) cognition is situated, (2) cognition is time-pressured, (3) we off-load cognitive 
work onto the environment, (4) the environment is part of the cognitive system, (5) cognition 
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is for action, and (6) offline cognition is body based. According to some scholars, treating EC 
as a single, unified theory is perhaps a mistake and the dominant claims, such as those 
identified by Wilson (2002), should be treated as independent projects (Shapiro, 2007, 2011; 
Wilson, 2002).  
 Shapiro (2011) identified three major themes of EC: (1) conceptualisation, (2) 
replacement, and (3) constitution. According to Shapiro (2011), these are the more prominent 
themes found in the EC literature and a failure to acknowledge these themes would lead to an 
inaccurate description of EC. Briefly, conceptualisation refers to the view that concepts in the 
mind allow us to understand our environment and to function adaptively. Replacement refers 
to the view which rejects internal representations and subsequently promotes the body’s 
interaction with the world in an attempt to understand cognition. Finally, constitution refers 
to the aforementioned notion that the body has a constitutive role in cognition rather than just 
a causal role. That is, the body and sensory and motor systems are actively involved in 
cognitive processes. Importantly, the first two themes relate to a divide in the EC community 
and require further examination.   
Conceptualisation: Embodied Cognition 
What the mainstream readily identify as EC draws some inspiration from the various 
assumptions discussed in Andy Clark’s (1997) Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World 
Together Again. Clark’s aim in this book was for the reform of representational theories of 
mind such as CTM. Clark agreed with the claim that intelligent action is generated from the 
active utilisation of both the body and the environment. That is, the brain, bodily action, and 
environmental structures operate collectively to fulfill the goals of what can consequently be 
called an embodied agent. Clark, however, opposes anti-representationalism. Instead, Clark 
(1997) insists that minds “still depend crucially on brains which compute and represent” (p. 
143). Thus, Clark argues that attempts to better understand embodied minds should develop 
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what he sees as a more encompassing representational account, rather than leaping to the 
promotion of a non-computational and non-representational account of cognition.  
Clark attempts to develop such an account by promoting the role of action-oriented 
representations in cognition. Clark first distinguished between two distinct notions of 
representation: 1) the idea that there exists in the mind internal representations, such as inner 
states and processes, whose role is to carry specific information to action-guiding systems, or 
2) the idea that internal representations are “action-neutral” encodings of aspects of the 
external world. Clark supports the former to the extent that the aspects of the real world that 
are represented by the brain can be geared to action. That is, representations can be action-
oriented. Thus, Clark’s more encompassing representations provide not only a description of 
the situation, but also guide appropriate action in response to the situation.  
According to Clark and Toribio (1994), internal representations are required because 
the environment does not always provide adequate information to guide behaviour. For 
instance, the ability to reason about the abstract, absent, non-existent, or spatio-temporally 
distant, must require some inner resource such as internal representation (Clark & Toribio, 
1994). A wholesale abandonment of traditional accounts of cognition would therefore be a 
mistake. Clark has consequently retained various elements from first generation cognitive 
science by re-emphasising the role of representations in computational processes in the mind. 
In fact, Clark suggested that ‘replacement’ views of representation are perhaps too narrow 
and restrictive. In particular, anti-representationalist accounts do not accurately separate the 
different notions of representation (Clark & Toribio, 1994).  
There are, however, problems with Clark’s reformist approach to cognition and the 
notion of action-oriented representations. The primary problem is that Clark’s approach to 
cognition is vulnerable to the same criticisms that are levelled at CTM. Clark’s distinction 
between internal representations that are action-oriented and those that are neutral merely 
	
	
13 
amounts to a red herring. That is, the debate about whether symbols are amodal or modal 
deflects attention from the more fundamental questions that are related to any kind of internal 
representation. How do internal representations acquire their meaning and how are they used 
or manipulated without adherence to the notion of a homunculus? In the case of action-
oriented (internal) representations that are geared to action, who or what has access to them 
so as to make use of that gearing? Clark’s account of cognition is only “embodied” in the 
sense that the internal representations are connected to the body’s actions. 
Another “embodied” theory of cognition that retains internal representations is 
Barsalou’s (1999) Perceptual Symbol Systems model (henceforth PSS). PSS, like Clark’s 
notion of action-oriented representations, rejects the abstract, amodal symbols of CTM. 
Instead, PSS promotes perceptual symbols or modal symbols as the building blocks of 
cognition.  
A challenge to first generation cognitive science and a possible catalyst for Barsalou’s 
PSS is the symbol grounding problem. This problem refers to how symbols acquire their 
meaning. Recall that according to CTM, modal representations of the world are initially 
transduced into amodal symbols that are later involved in computational processes in a 
language of thought that supports higher cognitive functions, such as memory and language. 
That is, representations are detached from the modal systems activated during interactions 
with the external environment via what is called a transduction process (a process which has 
yet to be clarified in this theory). Cognitive processes subsequently involve the rule-governed 
manipulation of these amodal symbols on the basis of their relationship with other amodal 
symbols. A question that has been asked is: How can the meaning of symbols be grounded in 
anything other than other meaningless symbols (Harnad, 1990)? This problem is captured by 
Searle’s (1980) Chinese Room thought experiment. 
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 Searle’s thought experiment involves an English-speaking individual locked in a 
room. This individual knows nothing about the Chinese language, either written or spoken. 
Through a slot in the wall a bundle of papers is handed to the individual. On these papers are 
Chinese symbols. Although the individual may hazard a guess that the symbols are Chinese, 
he/she would not be able to distinguish the Chinese symbols from Japanese symbols or other 
meaningless squiggles on a page. A second bundle of papers is then handed through the slot 
to the individual. On these papers are instructions written in English that provide rules for 
responding to the Chinese symbols written on the first bundle of papers. Responses are made 
with Chinese symbols. After a period of time the individual can successfully follow the 
instructions to produce Chinese symbols in response to the papers handed through the slot in 
the wall. It would appear from outside the room that whoever is returning the pages can 
understand Chinese. 
However, this is not an accurate conclusion. The individual in the room may have the 
ability to produce symbols in response to other symbols, but the individual does not 
understand the meaning of the symbols. In fact, Searle’s thought experiment illustrates that 
symbols do not acquire their meaning based on their relationship to other symbols. Evidently, 
the instructions given to the individual in the room are written by a cogniser who does 
understand the symbols – just like a computer programmer, which suggests that meaning is 
extrinsic and that cognition of both symbol and the thing symbolised is necessary. Searle uses 
this thought experiment to highlight a fundamental limitation of CTM insofar as it claims that 
computations in the mind involve rule-governed manipulation of symbols according to their 
syntactic relationship to other symbols, not according to their meaning. If the symbols are to 
be meaningful they need to be grounded in something other than additional symbols. 
According to Barsalou’s (1999) PSS, symbols can be meaningful if they are grounded 
in perception and action. PSS retains an important role for symbols in knowledge 
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representation and cognition. However, unlike CTM, symbols are not considered to be 
amodal and arbitrarily linked to their referents. Additionally, the essential transduction 
process of CTM from sensorimotor experience to amodal symbols is considered unnecessary 
for the foundation of knowledge in cognition. Instead, the underlying sensory, motor, and 
introspective states present during perceptual experience are partially stored as perceptual 
symbols. These perceptual symbols are neural representations in the sensory and motor 
systems in the brain that originally produced them. Furthermore, perceptual symbols that are 
related become integrated into a simulator whose role is to produce simulations. When 
knowledge of an object or event becomes relevant in thought, the original sensory, motor, 
and introspective states are partially simulated via the activation of perceptual symbols. For 
example, when you hear, read, or think about the word dog, all of the perceptual symbols 
related to this concept, such as size, colour, texture, shape, and sound, are partially re-
activated by simulators to produce a simulation in the modality-specific systems in the brain. 
This simulation process allows for an understanding of concepts and the ability to reason 
about such concepts.  
Concrete concepts are referents for things that are physically experienced via the 
perceptual system. For example, dog is a concrete concept because it consists of an 
integration of all the sensations that have been directly experienced during interactions with 
dogs. The same perceptual processes that allow one to experience the percept of a dog 
subsequently allow for an understanding of the concept dog. There are, however, concepts 
(i.e., abstract concepts) that cannot be directly peceived via bodily experience. Such concepts 
can pose a problem for Barsalou’s PSS and other theories of cognition that ground knowledge 
in modality-specific systems in the brain. For example, the concept truth is not physically 
experienced nor is it spatially constrained. That is, you cannot see, hear, taste, touch, or smell 
truth. Based on this distinction between concrete and abstract concepts, the relevant question 
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for supporters of a perceptual theory of cognition is: How are abstract concepts represented in 
the mind if not via perceptual experience? 
Supporters of the central principles of Barsalou’s PSS and the notion of perceptual 
simulation have indeed attempted to account for abstract concepts and how they are 
represented in the mind (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002). According to Barsalou (1999), perceptual symbol systems can directly 
represent all abstract concepts via three mechanisms, which are the simulation of an event 
sequence, selective attention, and introspective states. 
For instance, Barsalou (1999) provides an example of how the abstract concept truth 
is represented in the mind by perceptual symbols. Beforehand, Barsalou concedes that this 
example of representation does not encapsulate all senses of truth, but an everyday sense of 
truth, such as, whether a claim about the world is accurate. The example begins with the 
claim from a speaker that “There’s a balloon above a cloud outside”. In response to hearing 
this claim from the speaker, an agent will construct a perceptual simulation of a balloon 
above a cloud using various sensorimotor modalities in the brain. Next, the agent will attempt 
to perceive the relevant event (i.e., the balloon above a cloud). Next, the agent will determine 
whether the constructed perceptual simulation maps onto this event. If the perceptual 
simulation does map onto the perceived event the agent will conclude that the original claim 
is true.  
More specifically, the representation of truth in this instance is via three mechanisms. 
The first mechanism refers to the agent simulating the balloon above the cloud (i.e., the event 
sequence) to frame the concept. The second mechanism refers to selective attention which 
allowed the agent to focus on the relevant aspects of the event, which subsequently allowed 
the agent to map the perceptual simulation onto the perceived event. Finally, the third 
mechanism refers to the role of introspective states that allowed the agent to map the 
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perceptual simulation onto the perceived event, which then allowed for a conclusion to be 
made about the mapping and the event (i.e., whether the statement made by the speaker was 
true). If such processes are repeated for other event sequences eventually a simulator will 
develop for the truth concept. This simulator would then be activated to allow an agent to 
understand whether something is true. The truth or true concept in this account is grounded 
in the mapping between the simulation and the event. 
However, there is a fundamental problem with this account. According to Barsalou 
(1999), the agent maps a simulation of the event onto the perceived event. This activity 
suggests that the agent can directly perceive the event, otherwise mapping would not occur. 
Therefore, if the agent can directly perceive the event, then there is no need for any kind of 
internal simulation. In other words, the agent hears the linguistic token (“There’s a balloon 
above a cloud outside”) and, by virtue of understanding English, knows that the speaker is 
making a claim about the world. The agent can then look at the world to see if the claim is 
true. Consequently, internal simulation is not necessary due to the ability of the agent to 
directly perceive the world in response to the claim. The mapping between the internal 
simulation and the perceived event is itself problematic because the agent does not have 
access to the internal simulation or the mapping. This issue raises the question as to who or 
what maps the simulation to the perceived event, which suggests that PSS is vulnerable to the 
homunculus problem. Additionally, like Clark’s account of action-oriented representations, 
Barsalou’s attempt to develop an embodied account of cognition by promoting modal 
symbols serves as a red herring. It seems, then, that Barsalou’s PSS, like Clark’s account, is 
more accurately characterised as an extension of CTM, rather than being a genuine 
alternative. Such a genuine alternative is offered by RECS. 
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Replacement: Radical Embodied Cognitive Science 
 The term radical embodied cognitive science was originally coined by Clark (1997) 
who used it to contrast it with embodied cognitive science, which can be described as an 
extension of mainstream computationalism (i.e., representations, concepts). However, this 
term is currently used by Chemero (2009) as the name for a psychology that combines the 
seminal work of Gibson and the work of ecological psychologists (e.g., Turvey, Shaw, Reed, 
& Mace, 1981; Wilson & Golonka, 2013) and enactivists (e.g., Hutto & Myin, 2013; Varela 
et al., 1991). RECS not only rejects computationalism, it also rejects representationalism 
totally. It is thus anti-representationalist and it is because of this that the word ‘radical’ is 
used in conjunction with embodied cognitive science. However, Chemero (2013) disputes the 
label “radical” with its connotations of a departure from traditional approaches, on the 
grounds that, rather than being a recent reaction to and abandonment of computationalism, 
RECS actually continues a much earlier line of thinking that simply bypasses CTM and its 
logical problems. This line stems from James and ecological psychology. Hence, according to 
Chemero, it is EC that is a watered-down version of RECS by virtue of attempting to 
combine a Jamesian	psychology (i.e., Jamesian functionalism) with computationalism 
(i.e.,Wundtian structuralism). For a graphical depiction of this progression see Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Lineage of EC and RECS (Chemero, 2009). 
 The key assumption of RECS is that a thinking organism is embedded in an 
environment where perception leads to action and action leads to further perception 
(Chemero, 2009). The organism does not require representations of the environment to 
effectively interact with it (Chemero, 2009). To support these claims, researchers have turned 
to dynamical systems modelling to empirically test the assumptions found in Gibson’s 
ecological psychology. A dynamical system is any system that changes over time. These 
changes occur in accordance with dynamical laws which often take the form of differential 
equations. In a dynamical approach to cognition, the brain dynamically interacts with the 
body which dynamically interacts with an environment. Thus, cognition emerges from an 
interactive system comprising the brain, the body, and the environment. According to 
Chemero (2009), by using dynamical systems modelling researchers attempt to understand 
cognition as intelligent behaviour and attempt to understand how a whole system changes 
over time.  
A source of support for the “replacement” account is the collection of reactive real-
time mobile robots developed by Rodney Brooks. Traditional AI robots typically function by 
following what Brooks calls a sense-model-plan-act framework (Brooks, 1991a), in which 
sensory input is transformed by a central system (i.e., the computer) into symbolic codes 
which are then manipulated to produce motoric output for appropriate action. In this model 
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the body is an input-output device. In contrast, Brooks’s robots have a subsumption 
architecture (Brooks, 1986), which consists of a set of subsystems that independently produce 
behaviour by directly connecting sensory input to action. By sensing the environment 
regularly, the robot can successfully navigate a changing real world environment and assess 
the appropriateness of relevant goals in relation to the state of the environment.  
These behaviour-based robots support one of the more prominent assumptions of 
Gibson’s approach to perception; that is, these robots function appropriately in the 
environment without mediation from a central system or a world model. They are robust and 
respond quickly to unpredictable and constantly changing environments due to direct 
pathways that link sensory input to action. Consequently, they are not limited by the 
impracticality of a central system and a “representational bottleneck” that would restrict fast, 
real-time interactions with the environment (Brooks, 1991b). According to Brooks, this work 
provides preliminary evidence for adaptive behaviour without a central system or the concept 
of representations.  
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991), in their book The Embodied Mind: Cognitive 
Science and Human Experience, cited Brooks’ work with robots as an example of their 
enactive approach to cognition. Specifically, they see Brooks’s robots as being structurally 
coupled to the environment. In other words, the robots and the environment in which they are 
situated are inseparable. This notion is explored in what Varela et al. (1991) called embodied 
action: 
 
By using the term embodied we mean to highlight two points: first, that cognition 
depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various 
sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are 
themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural 
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context. By using the term action we mean to emphasize once again that sensory and 
motor processes, perception and action, are fundamentally inseparable in lived 
cognition. (p.173) 
 
Although it can be assumed that a supporter of CTM would not entirely disagree with the first 
point – that cognition depends on the body’s interaction with the world – it is the emphasis on 
a recurrent loop between perception and action that distinguishes the enactivist approach 
from CTM. It is this tight loop between perception and action that allows for the capacity to 
successfully interact with the environment. Specifically, an organism’s movement allows for 
new perceptions of the environment, which in turn produces and guides new action, which in 
turn determines new perceptions, and so on. Thus, cognition, perception, and action are not 
divided; instead, cognition is structured by perceptually guided action.   
The aim of Varela et al.’s (1991) book was to kick off a revolution based on a 
rejection of both computation and the concept of representation and a promotion of what they 
consider a middle path between realism and idealism. Briefly, realism asserts that the 
properties of the world are pregiven such that they exist independently of our perception, 
whereas idealism asserts that cognition projects its own world where the world reflects the 
make-up of the internal system. According to Varela et al. (1991) both realism and idealism 
rely on representation, such that in realism “representation is used to recover what is outer” 
(p.172), whereas in idealism representation “is used to project what is inner” (p.172). The 
enactive approach suggests that representation is not needed because organisms and the world 
are not separate and because the sensorimotor capabilities of the organism enact or “bring 
forth” the world. Varela et al. (1991) claim that by studying cognition as embodied action 
both realism and idealism are sidestepped.  
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However, there cannot be a middle path between realism and idealism. Evidently, 
Varela et al.’s (1991) central claim that an organism’s world is determined or brought forth 
by the nature of its sensorimotor activity seemingly coincides with idealism. This confusion 
about a false middle path perhaps reflects the authors’ misconception of realism. That is, 
Varela et al. (1991) perhaps follow a Fodorian position which claims to be realist because it 
really holds that cognitions exist, and that cognitions cannot be thought of without 
representations. However, a key principle of realism and approaches such as direct realism, is 
that cognition is not mediated by representations (Maze, 1983). That is, representationism 
involves epistemological mediation (idealism), whereas realism involves no epistemological 
mediation. There cannot be a middle path between mediated cognition and non-mediated 
cognition. Therefore, Varela et al.’s (1991) attempt to locate their enactive approach is 
misguided. It is important to clearly distinguish between realism and idealism in order for 
second generation cognitive science to avoid the problems that plague first generation 
cognitive science. Other alternatives to CTM, such as direct realism, are more clearly defined 
within the epistemological debate. 
 Direct realism rejects internal representations and idealist accounts of cognition 
(Maze, 1983). This approach to cognition has historical roots in Aristotle, Freud, British and 
American realists, such as Russell and Holt, and the philosopher John Anderson (1962). 
Although Maze (1983) agrees with Gibson’s theory of direct perception, the tradition of 
direct realism (developed by Anderson, 1962) is independent of Gibson. According to direct 
realism, cognition is the direct relation between the knower (subject) and the known (object; 
Maze, 1983). The knower is the living organism that consists of evolved motivational 
structures (instinctual drives) connected to the organism’s physiological perceptual systems – 
and it is these systems that are involved in cognitive relations with the enviornment. The 
instinctual drives are neurophysiological structures, rather than mental structures. The known 
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or objects of knowledge are objective situations (e.g., events). According to Maze (1983), 
cognitive processes such as perceiving, knowing, remembering, and so on are relations. That 
is, such processes are relations between bodily processes and the external environment. As 
Maze (1983, p. 84) put it: “To know something is to enter into a relation with it, rather than to 
possess some token that refers to it.” Direct realism rejects the notion that cognition is inner 
because objects of cognition are external to the subject. This account of cognition is a 
genuine alternative to CTM.  
Conceptual Metaphor	
Direct realism can potentially provide the framework for another account (i.e., in 
contrast to PSS) of the embodied nature of abstract thought – that is, Lakoff and Johnson’s 
(1980, 1999) Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Unlike PSS, CMT is open to its epistemological 
position, such that it could be situated and developed within a representationist framework or 
within a direct realist/RECS framework. If representationist approaches are logically 
problematic, then CMT’s amenability to a realist approach is a favourable asset. The 
historical context reveals that CMT does reflect a tradition via James, Freud, Piaget, and so 
on, that foregrounds the conscious and unconscious role of the body and its actions in 
cognition. This tradition converges with American new realists, Gibson’s ecological 
psychology, RECS, Radicalised Enactivism (Hutto & Myin, 2013), and direct realism. 
Despite not being explicitly framed and developed within an epistemological position at this 
stage, CMT has led to an explosion of empirical research investigating the role of metaphor 
in cognition. 
Metaphor has long been recognised as a linguistic tool used in art and rhetoric to 
compare one thing in terms of another. However, CMT has extended the role of metaphor 
beyond language to encompass thought in general (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). In CMT, 
metaphor is defined as understanding an abstract concept in terms of a more concrete 
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physical domain. In other words, abstract concepts are understood metaphorically by drawing 
on connections with physical and bodily experiences. These connections refer to cross-
domain mappings between a source domain and a target domain. Specifically, target domains 
are abstract and complex concepts that are difficult to understand due to not having an 
inherent physical actuality, whereas source domains are physical and embodied experiences 
of objects and situations. Cross-domain mappings produce a set of systematic 
correspondences between elements of the source domain and elements of the target domain. 
These mappings allow people to understand the target domain in terms of the source domain.  
 The preceding account is typically how conceptual metaphor is presented and 
explained in the literature. However, without identifying the temporal sequence of the 
acquisition of metaphorical thinking, this account paints conceptual metaphor as a useful tool 
that allows for understanding. Alternatively, conceptual metaphor can be explained in a more 
naturalistic, deterministic way. That is, people are caused to see and understand abstract 
things in more concrete terms because our more immediate and primary focus and experience 
is bodily. The association between abstract concepts and concrete, physical experience is 
“used constantly and automatically, with neither effort nor awareness” (Lakoff, 1993, pp. 
227-228). In other words, individuals’ biological structure and physical experiences may 
unconsciously influence their thinking about less immediate, more abstract concepts.  
For example, as depicted in Figure 2, the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY 
maps elements of the concept of journey onto elements of the abstract notion of love. 
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Figure 2. Cross-domain mapping produced by the LOVE IS A JOURNEY conceptual metaphor. 
 
The connections between elements of both domains are evident in everyday metaphoric 
expressions, such as: “our relationship is at a crossroads”, “it’s been a long, bumpy road”, 
“we’ve made a lot of headway”, “we’re spinning our wheels”, and “we’ve gotten off track”. 
The source domain elements that are mapped to target domain elements include: travelers to 
lovers, the journey to the relationship, obstacles to difficulties experienced in the relationship, 
intended destination of the journey to the expected overall goal of the relationship, and so on. 
These mappings are partial such that they highlight and hide certain elements of the source 
domain. That is, not all elements of the source domain are mapped onto the target domain. 
The focus remains on the elements that are consistent with the metaphor. For instance, the 
main focus of the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is progress. Of course, love is not only 
conceptualised as a journey but is structured by many physical objects and experiences such 
as physical force, closeness, illness, and numerous others.  
 Many abstract concepts are structured by several source domains. The different source 
domains that are mapped onto the target domain highlight and hide different elements, such 
that each source domain contributes a particular focus on the target domain. For instance, an 
additional conceptual metaphor that structures love is the LOVE IS A NUTRIENT metaphor. The 
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source domain in this instance allows for utilising knowledge of the positive effects of being 
well nourished, the desire for nourishment, and the negative effects of not being sufficiently 
nourished. The correspondences between the source domain and the target domain of this 
conceptual metaphor are evident in everyday metaphoric expressions, such as: “He’s starved 
for affection”, “I was given new strength by her love”, “She’s hungry for love”. This 
conceptual metaphor highlights and hides different elements of the source domain which 
results in a different focus compared to the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. The elements that 
are hidden in this conceptual metaphor include: the fact that we store nutrients in a cupboard 
or refrigerator and that some nutrients exit the body and so on. The main focus of the LOVE IS 
A NUTRIENT metaphor is desire and the consequences of having what is desired. The reason 
why several source domains such as journey and nutrient come to structure the love concept 
is that the latter consists of a variety of different aspects. People naturally and automatically 
draw on physical experiences with objects and the environment to understand, reason about, 
and communicate about abstract concepts (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
Since the 1980s, numerous cognitive studies have conducted linguistic analyses that 
have identified metaphoric expressions that exhibit systematic correspondences consistent 
with conceptual metaphors (e.g., Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980; Lakoff & Turner, 1989; Turner, 1987). These studies have examined abstract 
concepts such as emotion, morality, politics, time, power, mathematics, and economics. 
These studies have explored these concepts not only in English, but also in Chinese, 
Hungarian, Arabic, Japanese, Spanish, Dutch, Persian, French, Cora, and Swedish. Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980) claim that metaphoric linguistic expressions present in everyday 
language are manifestations of conceptual metaphors. They therefore use these metaphoric 
expressions to infer underlying conceptual metaphors. A key issue concerning CMT is 
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whether expressions found in everyday language actually do reflect conceptual metaphors or 
whether they simply reflect linguistic conventions and patterns. 
 According to McGlone (2007), the claim that linguistic expressions are manifestations 
of conceptual metaphor and that they imply the existence of conceptual metaphors is an 
example of “circular reasoning” (p. 115). For instance, we know that people think of love in 
terms of journey (i.e., a conceptual metaphor) because they use journey-related terminology 
(i.e., metaphoric linguistic expressions) to talk about love. McGlone (2007) and others (e.g., 
Ritchie, 2003) conclude that Lakoff and Johnson have developed a hypothesis (i.e., the 
existence of conceptual metaphors) based on data (i.e., metaphoric expressions) and then 
have used the same data to support the hypothesis. In other words, Lakoff and Johnson do not 
provide supporting evidence that is independent of the linguistic expressions that they used to 
form their initial hypothesis. On these grounds CMT has been labelled unfalsifiable due to 
the nature of the so-called data used to support conceptual metaphor (Vervaeke & Kennedy, 
1996). That is, there is a reliance on linguistic evidence and a subsequent lack of substantial 
non-linguistic evidence for conceptual metaphors and their role in cognition (McGlone, 2007; 
Murphy, 1996; Pinker, 2007).  
Despite these claims of circular reasoning and the apparent lack of evidence, there is 
growing literature in experimental psychology that provides non-linguistic evidence for 
conceptual metaphor. McGlone (2011) later agreed with Gibbs (2011) that studies in 
embodiment research do in fact examine the influence of conceptual metaphor on non-
linguistic behavior. For example, one study found that participants who held a warm cup of 
coffee judged a fictitious person as having a “warmer” personality (Williams & Bargh, 2008), 
which is consistent with the conceptual metaphor AFFECTION IS WARMTH. Another study 
found that participants rated people’s behaviour as more immoral when that rating was made 
in a dirty work area compared to a clean work area (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008). 
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Similarly, when asked to remember an immoral act, compared to a moral act, participants 
were more likely to select an antiseptic wipe rather than a pen as a free gift for their 
involvement in the experiment (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). These last two findings are 
consistent with the association between moral purity and physical cleanliness and the 
metaphors GOOD IS CLEAN and BAD IS DIRTY. These results support Lakoff and Johnson’s 
(1980) original hypothesis, which suggests that conceptual metaphors do shape cognition 
such that people both think and behave in metaphoric terms.  
GOOD IS UP. One conceptual metaphor that has been investigated in experimental 
psychology is the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor (which is accompanied by the BAD IS 
DOWN conceptual metaphor). This metaphor is represented by everyday expressions framed 
around a metaphoric association between evaluation and vertical spatial position (e.g., “they 
are at the top of their game”, which indicates positivity; “they played below their best”, 
which indicates negativity). Spatial concepts, such as up (e.g., sky) and down (e.g., ground), 
develop directly through concrete physical experience. Spatial concepts (e.g., up and down) 
are commonly defined based on an upright human body. In contrast, abstract evaluative 
concepts, such as good and bad, cannot be directly perceived through bodily experience. 
Instead, they are conceptualised indirectly through knowledge of the body and physical 
situations (e.g., verticality; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). In general, things that are up are 
considered to be good, whereas things that are down are considered to be bad. As with all 
conceptual metaphors, linguistic evidence for the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor can 
readily be identified. For instance, in film reviews, film critics give good films “thumbs up” 
and bad films “thumbs down”. In relation to mood, happy people are said to be “feeling up” 
and sad people are said to be “feeling down”. In Christianity, righteous people go up to 
heaven and sinners go down to hell. Such associations between evaluation and spatial 
location appear to be determined by correlations in experience. 
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The development of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor is argued to have followed 
the general process underlying all conceptual metaphor – that is, via the grounding of abstract 
concepts in sensory experience (Gibbs, 2006; Kövecses, 2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 
1999). Accordingly, the mapping between affect/evaluation/valence and verticality in the 
GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor has roots in early perceptual experience. It has been 
proposed that early sensorimotor experiences ground later abstract thinking in adulthood via 
the process of scaffolding (Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 2009). For example, for infants all 
good things such as food, protection, and care come from parents or caregivers who approach 
the infant from above (Tolaas, 1991). It is during early development that people are first 
exposed to such correlations in experience between positive affect and vertical space that is 
located above the self. In contrast, being down is often when one is ill or incapacitated. 
Moreover, dead things are typically found in lower space and are often buried below ground 
in Western cultures. Furthermore, when people are sad or depressed they typically hold a 
stooped posture in which the head tilts downward, whereas when people are happy they hold 
a more erect posture (Lafrance & Mayo, 1978). These experiences occur regularly and 
repeatedly such that they provide the experiential basis for the grounding of the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor.  
Numerous studies in experimental social psychology have examined this metaphor by 
adopting what is referred to as the metaphoric transfer strategy (Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 
2010). The key assumption of this empirical research strategy is that if people do utilise a 
more concrete, physical source domain (e.g., verticality) to understand a complex, abstract 
target concept (e.g., affect/valence), then manipulating how people experience the concrete, 
physical domain should have predictable effects on the processing of information related to 
the abstract concept. In other words, the manipulations should transfer across the cross-
domain mappings and produce metaphor-consistent changes in the processing of information 
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(e.g., attitude, judgement, memory, evaluation) about the abstract concept. This metaphoric 
transfer strategy has been utilised by several studies to examine the influence of the GOOD IS 
UP conceptual metaphor on processes such as memory, judgement, and person perception. 
There are also a number of early studies that did not explicitly examine conceptual metaphor 
but nevertheless provide empirical support and non-linguistic evidence for an association 
between affect and verticality.  
One example of a study that was not specifically designed with CMT in mind was an 
early study that aimed to examine the affective tone of lines in art to determine whether lines 
themselves hold an affective character or whether the affective character is suggested by the 
literary subject of the artwork (Lundholm, 1921). Participants were verbally given individual 
adjectives and were instructed to draw a single line that they believed expressed each 
adjective. They did this on a piece of paper using a pencil. There was a total of 48 adjectives 
that were divided into 13 groups. One group contained words with a positive meaning (merry, 
cheerful, gay, jolly, and joyous) and one group contained words with a negative meaning 
(sad, melancholy, mournful, doleful, and sorrowful). Lundholm (1921) found that 84% of the 
lines drawn in response to the negative adjectives had a downward direction. In contrast, 58% 
of the lines drawn in response to the positive adjectives had an upward direction. These 
findings suggest that the production of the lines was influenced in a metaphor-consistent way 
such that the lines were biased by the implicit associations between up and good and down 
and bad.  
Another early study examined the influence of emotional states (i.e., experiences of 
success and failure) on spatial localisation (Wapner, Werner, & Krus, 1957). This study had a 
test-retest design. First, participants were presented with a luminous square which was 
horizontally bisected by a black line. Participants were asked to instruct the experimenter to 
move the square so that the black line appeared at eye level (i.e., a subjective horizon). 
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Second, participants received their grade for a real-life mid-term examination. It was 
expected that participants who received an A would experience feelings of success, whereas 
participants who received an F would experience feelings of failure such as sadness. These 
expectations were supported by spontaneous behavioural expressions from participants (e.g., 
smiles, tears). Third, participants were again presented with the luminous square and asked to 
instruct the experimenter to move the square so that the black line appeared at eye level. The 
results indicated an upward shift in perceived horizon for the participants who received an A. 
In contrast, there was a downward shift in perceived horizon for the participants who 
received an F. Again, these findings suggest that perceptual judgements were influenced by 
feelings of happiness and sadness in a metaphor-consistent way.  
This notion of an impact of mood states on perceptual judgements was further 
examined in order to evaluate whether different levels of sadness and depression influence 
spatial perception at different degrees (Fisher, 1964). Participants’ mood states were first 
measured by having them describe the expressions of eight individually presented facial 
masks that each had a neutral expression. It was presumed that participants would project 
their own mood onto the neutral facial masks. Participant responses were scored between 0 
and 8 as to whether they used sadness-related terms such as sad, depressed, unhappy, tragic, 
crying, grieving, worried, and suffering. Participants then completed two tasks. The first task 
involved the autokinetic effect to explore participants’ possible preferences for upward or 
downward movement. Participants sat in a dark room and were instructed to trace the 
movement of a small point of light. Although this pinpoint of light appears to move it 
actually remains stationary. The second task was similar to the one used in the Wapner et al. 
(1957) study where a black line is adjusted in relation to participants’ eye level such that it 
horizontally bisects a luminous square. The results indicated that participants high in sadness 
displayed more downward directional responses in both the autokinetic task and the luminous 
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square task. Again, these findings suggest that mood states bias perceptual attention in a way 
that is consistent with the BAD IS DOWN conceptual metaphor.        
Meier and Robinson (2004) were the first to investigate this phenomenon empirically 
while explicitly identifying their focus to be that of the conceptual metaphor GOOD IS UP. 
They conducted two studies. In the first study they examined whether evaluation activates 
metaphor-congruent spatial locations. Participants were instructed to indicate for each of 100 
words whether the word had a positive or negative meaning by using a response box. Fifty of 
these words had a positive meaning and fifty had a negative meaning. The vertical position of 
these words on a computer screen was randomised so that they appeared individually at either 
the top or the bottom of the screen. The results indicated that participants categorised the 
positively-valenced words faster when the words appeared at the top of the screen (vs. bottom 
of the screen), whereas they categorised the negatively-valenced words faster when the words 
appeared at the bottom of the screen (vs. top of the screen). The authors concluded that the 
results suggested that evaluation of the words activated perceptual representations of 
verticality, which facilitated the processing of consistent pairings (i.e., positive–up, negative–
down) and inhibited inconsistent pairings (i.e., positive–down, negative–up). Such findings 
provide further non-linguistic evidence for the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor. 
In their second study, Meier and Robinson (2004) investigated whether evaluating the 
valence of a word can shift spatial attention up or down. As in their first experiment, 
participants were instructed to indicate for each of 100 words whether the word had a positive 
or negative meaning. However, in this experiment, words were presented in the centre of a 
computer screen and participants responded verbally by saying “positive” or “negative”. 
Immediately following this evaluation, the letter q or p appeared randomly either at the top or 
at the bottom of the screen. Participants were instructed to quickly press the “p” key on the 
keyboard if p appeared and to press the “q” key if q appeared. Results indicated that 
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discrimination of p and q was faster in upward locations if a positive word preceded the 
presentation of the letter, whereas discrimination of p and q was faster in downward locations 
if a negative word preceded the letter. These findings suggested that making an evaluation 
can shift spatial attention upward or downward in a metaphor-congruent direction. 
 Meier and Robinson (2006) further examined the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor by 
building on earlier studies (Fisher, 1964; Wapner et al., 1957) that investigated negative 
affect. Across two studies, they examined whether neuroticism and depressive symptoms are 
associated with a downward bias in spatial attention. In the first study, participants were 
exposed to 10 words. Five of these words were flower words and the other five words were 
insect words. These words appeared individually in the centre of a computer screen. 
Participants were instructed to say “flower” if the word that appeared on the screen was a 
flower or “insect” if the word that appeared was an insect. These two words were used as 
neutral stimuli. Immediately following a response to the word, the letter p or q appeared at 
the top or the bottom of the computer screen. Participants were instructed to press the “p” key 
if the letter p appeared and to press the “q” key if the letter q appeared on the screen. There 
were 160 trials such that each of the 10 words randomly appeared 16 times. Finally, 
participants completed Goldberg’s (1999) Neuroticism scale. Results indicated that 
neuroticism predicted the direction of spatial attention. That is, participants higher in 
neuroticism responded faster to the p and q letters when they appeared in lower space (vs. 
upper space).  
 In the second study, it was hypothesised that depression may be more strongly 
associated with vertical spatial attention compared to neuroticism due to the abundance of 
metaphors for depression that mention vertical location (i.e., down, low). In this study, the 
procedure remained identical to the first study except for three changes. The first change was 
that participants evaluated positive and negative words rather than flower and insect words. 
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They did this by saying “positive” if the word had a positive meaning and by saying 
“negative” if the word had a negative meaning. Second, participants completed 100 trials 
instead of 160 trials. Third, they completed the 21-item Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 
Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) as well as Goldberg’s (1999) Neuroticism scale. The results 
replicated the first study’s findings: Participants higher in neuroticism reponded faster to the 
p and q letters when they appeared in lower space (vs. upper space). The same association 
held for participants high in depressive symptoms. Further, the results indicated a stronger 
relation between participants high in depressive symptoms and a downward bias in spatial 
attention compared to participants high in neuroticism. The observed relation between 
negative affect (i.e., neuroticism and depression) and a downward bias in spatial attention 
provided further support for the BAD IS DOWN (and GOOD IS UP) conceptual metaphor. 
In an attempt to determine whether the association between evaluation and verticality 
can also affect memory, Crawford, Margolies, Drake, and Murphy (2006) examined how the 
valence of images can influence spatial memory for location. In one study, 60 images (30 
positive images and 30 negative images) were randomly presented in various vertical 
locations on a computer screen. Each image appeared individually for 4 seconds followed by 
a 2.5 second interstimulus interval. Following the presentation of the 60 images, participants 
were instructed to reproduce the location of each image from memory. That is, each image 
appeared in the centre of the screen and participants were instructed to move the picture back 
to the location where it previously appeared. The results indicated that memory for location 
was influenced by image valence, such that there was an upward bias for positive images and 
a downward bias for negative images. These findings suggested that performance on the non-
linguistic, spatial memory task was influenced by an association between affect and 
verticality.  
	
	
35 
A further study explored the association between spiritual concepts such as God and 
the Devil and verticality (Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 2007). In everyday 
discourse, God and Heaven are generally located in high positions and the Devil and Hell in 
low positions. In one of their six experiments, Meier et al. (2007) found that people were 
faster to respond to words related to God (e.g., lord) and the Devil (e.g., Satan) when they 
were presented in a high and low position, respectively, on a computer screen. Another 
experiment revealed that people rated photographed individuals as possessing a greater belief 
in God when the images were presented in a vertically high position, as opposed to a low 
position. These findings suggested that perceptual representations were activated by divinity-
related concepts such as God and the Devil. 
 Notably, previous studies (Crawford et al., 2006; Meier et al., 2007; Meier & 
Robinson, 2004) on the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor have relied on discrete stimulus 
materials such as individually presented words and images. These studies therefore have not 
utilised richer, more complex stimulus materials such as person descriptions. Such stimulus 
materials were, however, used in two experiments by Palma, Garrido, and Semin (2011), 
which examined the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor in person memory. In the first study, 
participants were presented with behavioural information about a childcare professional 
(positive target) or a skinhead (negative target) and were instructed to form an overall 
impression of the person. For each target, the presented information consisted of 12 relevant 
(i.e., stereotype-congruent) behavioural descriptions (i.e., friendly behaviours such as “He 
helped a friend to study for an exam” for the childcare professional and unfriendly behaviours 
such as “He always parks his car occupying two parking spaces” for the skinhead) and 12 
irrelevant (i.e., stereotype-neutral) behavioural descriptions (i.e., behaviours that were neutral 
for a childcare professional or a skinhead such as “He looked at the clock to see the time”). 
Six of each group of behaviours were presented one sentence at a time at the top of a large 
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screen (200cm × 220cm) and 6 were presented at the bottom of the screen. Following this 
impression formation task, participants completed a free recall task in which they were 
instructed to recall all of the behaviours that were presented in the impression formation task. 
Results indicated a recall advantage for relevant behaviours presented in compatible locations 
on the screen (i.e., positive behaviours at the top of the screen and negative behaviours at the 
bottom of the screen) than for relevant behaviours presented in incompatible locations. Palma 
et al. (2011) concluded that memory for person-specific behavioural information was 
influenced by the vertical spatial dimensions of up and down.  
In Palma et al.’s (2011) second study, verticality was manipulated via upward and 
downward arm movements. Participants stood in front of a bookcase that consisted of a top, 
middle, and bottom shelf. The middle shelf was adjusted so that it was at shoulder height for 
each participant. The top shelf and bottom shelf were positioned at equal distances from the 
middle shelf. On the middle shelf was a deck of cards. On these cards (10cm × 14cm) were 
the same behavioural descriptions that were used in the first study. Each card also had an 
arrow on it that indicated the shelf where the card should be placed after the behavioural 
description had been read. Participants were instructed that they had 8 seconds to pick up a 
card from the middle shelf, read the behavioural description, form an impression of the 
person, and place it on either the top or the bottom shelf (as listed on the card). After the 8 
seconds, participants were then instructed to pick up another card. This was repeated until all 
of the cards had been read and relocated to the top or bottom shelf. After this impression 
formation task, participants completed a free recall task in which they were instructed to 
recall the behaviours that were presented on the cards. Results indicated that recall was better 
for behaviours placed in compatible locations (i.e., positive behaviours placed on the top 
shelf and negative behaviours placed on the bottom shelf) than for behaviours placed in 
incompatible locations. These results suggested that the upward and downward arm 
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movements influenced memory for the behavioural information in a metaphor-consistent 
way.  
 Meier, Moller, Chen, and Riemer-Peltz (2011) also investigated the influence of the 
GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor on person perception. Specifically, the abstract concepts 
north and south were examined in a series of studies to determine their relation to verticality 
and affect. Previous findings had suggested that there is a strong tendency to communicate 
and reason about north and south in terms of up and down (Carreiras & Garling, 1990; 
Nelson & Simmons, 2009). This tendency occurs despite the fact that there is no actual 
relation between these cardinal directions and verticality. Meier et al. (2011) hypothesised 
that if there is a learned association between north and up and south and down then perhaps 
north is associated with positivity and south is associated with negativity. In one study 
(Experiment 2), participants rated the word ‘north’ as more positive than the word ‘south’. In 
a subsequent study (Experiment 3), participants were provided with a paper map of a fictional 
city. North was at the top and South was at the bottom of the map. Participants were asked to 
place an ‘x’ on the map to indicate where they would like to live in this fictional city. Results 
indicated that participants preferred to live in the top half (i.e., northern areas) of the city map 
compared to the bottom half (i.e., southern areas). These initial findings suggested that north 
and south are associated with good and bad which is consistent with the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor. 
 In their final study (Experiment 4), Meier et al. (2011) examined the effects of this 
evaluation cardinal direction association on person perception. Participants were randomly 
assigned to read either about an individual with high SES or about an individual with low 
SES. After reading the short description about the individual, participants were asked to place 
an ‘x’ on a paper map of a fictional city to indicate where they believed the individual lived. 
The map of the fictional city included labels that specified the directions of North, South, 
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East, and West. The results indicated that participants believed the high SES individual lived 
in the northern area of the city (i.e., top half of the map), whereas participants believed the 
low SES individual lived in the southern area of the city (i.e., bottom half of the map). These 
results suggest that north is more positive than south because north is generally seen as being 
up and up is generally associated with positivity. These findings further suggest that learned 
associations that are consistent with metaphors such as GOOD IS UP can influence evaluative 
behaviour in metaphor-consistent ways. 
The various studies on the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor reveal how abstract 
concepts are grounded metaphorically by perceptual experience. These findings support 
theory that suggests that abstract concepts such as good and bad are conceptualised by 
perceptual experience of verticality. Moreover, the empirical research that has investigated 
this conceptual metaphor has found that manipulating bodily states and the physical location 
of stimuli has metaphor-consistent effects on the processing of abstract concepts.  
The investigation of conceptual metaphor using more complex materials such as 
person descriptions is still in its infancy, and the limits of conceptual metaphor have not yet 
been established. Preliminary findings concerning the role of the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor in the social cognitive area of person perception (Meier et al., 2011; Palma et al., 
2011) are an encouraging starting point for the present thesis. This thesis aims to investigate 
further the influence of this metaphor on impressions or evaluations of a person. 
Impression Formation 
It is a natural process for people to evaluate and make sense of others in order to 
navigate their social worlds. People form impressions of others through a variety of 
processes, which typically include the integration of available information (Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990). Exposure to others via physical interactions, verbal descriptions, and even digital 
encounters in cyberspace lead to people forming impressions of others (e.g., Jacobson, 1999). 
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Impression formation is important and evolutionarily essential for everyday life (Schneider, 
Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1979). For instance, it is adaptive to be able to determine whether an 
approaching individual is trustworthy or untrustworthy, helpful or threatening, harmless or 
dangerous, and so on. The underlying principles involved in impression formation have been 
investigated since the early-to-mid 20th century. This investigation extends from impressions 
based on physical appearance (e.g., Thornton, 1944) to impressions developed from more 
complex information such as behaviours and traits (e.g., Asch, 1946). What information is 
used and how it is used when forming impressions of others is a primary focus in social 
cognition.  
Asch’s (1946) gestalt theory of impression formation suggests that the overall 
impression of an individual is shaped by central traits. That is, certain traits (i.e., central 
traits) such as warm and cold will have more of an influence on the overall impression of an 
individual compared to less significant traits (i.e., peripheral traits) such as polite and blunt. 
Seemingly, central traits overshadow peripheral traits in the configuration of final 
impressions. In contrast, according to Anderson’s (1965, 1971) cognitive algebraic models 
(i.e., the additive model and the averaging or weighted averaging model), all traits influence 
the final, overall impression of an individual. That is, each trait has a (weighted) value that 
can be combined with other traits to obtain an overall evaluation of an individual.  
However, the accounts of impression formation from both Asch and Anderson neglect 
several important factors, including the ideas that the same information can be processed in a 
top-down and bottom-up way, we have limited cognitive resources, and the perceiver has 
certain goals and motivations (Brewer, 1988). After Asch’s seminal paper and the 
development of Anderson’s algebraic models, researchers remained divided on what 
processes are involved in impression formation. That is, there was a division as to whether 
impression formation involves a top-down process (i.e., Asch’s configural, holistic account: 
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e.g., Burnstein & Schul, 1982) or a bottom-up process (i.e., Anderson’s information 
integration, attribute-oriented, piecemeal account: e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). However, 
over the past 25 years, the dominant accounts of impression formation promote a dual-
process model, which proposes that person information can be processed in both a top-down 
way and in a bottom-up manner (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & 
Pavelchak, 1986). Factors that may determine whether category-based or piecemeal 
processing occurs include a perceiver’s motivations (Brewer, 1988) and characteristics of 
stimulus information (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Pavelchak, 1989). These factors and the 
processes that they influence were further examined in the continuum model of impression 
formation (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). 
 According to Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) continuum model, category-based 
(configural, holistic) processes and piecemeal (attribute oriented) processes lie at opposite 
ends of a continuum. However, this model suggests that impression formation does not 
always exclusively involve one process over another. That is, impression formation may 
admit of degrees rather then involve absolute shifts to the left or right of the continuum. The 
model proposes a 6 stage sequence where both category-based and piecemeal processing are 
influenced by informational and motivational processes.  
Fiske and Neuberg’s (1990) continuum model outlines how the formation of 
impressions in everyday life can be shaped by informational and motivational factors and 
how impressions can be formed automatically. The automaticity of impression formation has 
been examined within the spontaneous trait inference literature (for a review see Uleman, 
Rim, Saribay, & Kressel, 2012). Spontaneous inferences are those that occur “without 
intentions or instructions, at the encoding stage of processing behavioual information” 
(Winter & Uleman, 1984, p. 237). For instance, it has been found that people infer traits (e.g., 
romantic) from behavioural descriptions (e.g., “Tonight is my anniversary. I have fixed a 
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candlelight dinner for my husband. I’m going to serve dinner on a table that I have set up in 
our bedroom”) without intention or awareness (Carlston & Skowronski, 1994). Although the 
automaticity and other cognitive, motivational, and emotional factors have been examined 
empirically (for reviews see Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000), 
there is little research that has investigated the role of embodied processes in impression 
formation. One study, for example, found that approach and avoidance (i.e., arm flexion and 
arm extension) influenced participants’ judgements as to whether people were trustworthy or 
untrustworthy, respectively (Slepian, Young, Rule, Weisbuch, & Ambady, 2012). This study 
provides both support for the notion that bodily processes influence impression formation and 
impetus for further investigation of conceptual metaphor and embodied processes that may 
underlie impression formation.   
Overview 
The experiments in the current project aim to investigate whether the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor influences impression formation processes. These processes will be 
indexed with various combinations of three dependent variables (reaction time, memory, and 
target evaluations). Experiment 1 examines whether the vertical location of behavioural 
information influences reaction time, memory, and target evaluations. Experiment 2A 
examines whether the vertical location of trait words influences reaction time. Experiment 2B 
examines whether the vertical location of trait words influences memory and target 
evaluations. Experiment 3 is a replication study of Meier and Robinson (2004), conducted to 
assess the reproducibility of their original effect. Across the set of experiments, I 
hypothesised that the vertical location of the stimuli would influence reaction time, memory, 
and target evaluations in metaphor-consistent ways. 
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Chapter 2: Pilot Study 1 and Experiment 1 
Pilot Study 1 
Overview 
The aim of Pilot Study 1 was to test the valence of 76 behavioural descriptions. The 
results of this pilot study determined the behavioural descriptions that were used in 
Experiment 1. 
Method 
Participants 
 Both pilot studies and all subsequent experiments were approved by the university’s 
Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC, approval code H10044; see Appendix A). For 
this pilot study, 103 U.S. participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) 
and received USD$0.50 for their participation. Recent research has indicated that respondents 
to online surveys through MTurk are demographically diverse and representative of the 
general population (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012). Data collected from such samples have 
also been found to be reliable (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). The average age of 
participants was 28.67 years (SD = 7.15, range = 18-57 years).  
Materials and Procedure 
  I created 76 behavioural descriptions (see Appendix B), 29 of which were about the 
successful adjustment to post-university life (e.g., “Alex has been described by the principal 
as a talented teacher”), 27 of which were about the unsuccessful adjustment to post-university 
life (e.g., “Casey has attended nine unsuccessful job interviews”), and 20 of which were 
neutral; that is, they were not related to adjustment to post-university life (e.g., “Ashley 
checks the mailbox after arriving home from work each day”). The names that were included 
in the behavioural descriptions were gender neutral. Seven screening questions (e.g., “What is 
the current month?”) were also included, as recommended by Prince, Litovsky, and 
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Friedman-Wheeler (2012), in order to protect against automated respondents on MTurk. 
Participants viewed these behavioural descriptions online and responded to questionnaires 
about the descriptions using Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, 2013). 
 Participants were told that they would read about several recent university graduates. 
They were asked to rate how positive or negative each behaviour was on a 9-point scale with 
endpoints labelled 1 (Extremely negative) and 9 (Extremely positive). Each survey page 
consisted of 10 randomly presented behavioural descriptions (rather than 1 behavioural 
description per page). After completing the ratings for the 76 behavioural descriptions, 
participants viewed a page that thanked them for their participation and provided a code with 
which they could claim the reimbursement to their Amazon.com account.  
Results 
 Three participants were excluded from the analyses due to failing at least one of the 
seven screening questions. A further three participants were excluded due to a failure to 
provide responses for any of the items. Thus, the final sample included 97 participants. 
 Behavioural descriptions with a mean score between 1 and 3.99 were classified as 
negative, descriptions with a mean score between 4 and 5.99 were classified as neutral, and 
descriptions with a mean score between 6 and 9 were classified as positive. Only one 
behavioural description’s ratings fell outside of its intended group (i.e., positive, neutral, or 
negative). This behavioural description (“Charlie is a cleaner at a local Walmart”) was 
intended as a negative description, but it had a mean score of 5.00, which indicates that it was 
considered neutral by participants. Nevertheless, it was retained within the negative 
behavioural description group for subsequent analyses.   
Participants rated the 29 positive behavioural descriptions (M = 7.17, SD = 0.85) 
significantly more positively than the 27 negative behavioural descriptions (M = 2.80, SD = 
0.94), t(96) = 25.36, p < .001, d = 4.88. Participants also rated the positive behavioural 
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descriptions significantly more positively than the 20 neutral behavioural descriptions (M = 
5.30, SD = 0.53), t(96) = 24.07, p < .001, d = 2.64. Participants rated the negative behavioural 
descriptions significantly more negatively than the neutral behavioural descriptions, t(96) = 
20.51, p < .001, d = -3.28.  
 The results indicated that a majority (i.e., all except one) of the behavioural 
descriptions had the originally intended valence. Thus, a selection of the behavioural 
descriptions generated from this pilot study were used in Experiment 1. Specifically, the 
behavioural descriptions that had the highest ratings for each valence category were selected 
for Experiment 1. 
Experiment 1 
Overview 
The overall aim of Experiment 1 was to replicate and extend Palma et al. (2011) and 
to extend Meier and Robinson (2004). The findings presented by these two studies suggest 
that the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor influences both the evaluation of words and 
memory for behavioural information. The present study aimed to test whether the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor influences not only reaction time and memory for behavioural 
descriptions, but also target evaluations. To do this, an impression formation task was used in 
which descriptions of six target persons were presented in various vertical locations. 
Exposure to behavioural descriptions and subsequent ratings of a target on a set of traits is a 
standard and direct way to measure impression formation (e.g., Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 
1980). Unlike previous research on the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor, stimuli in the 
current experiment were presented at the top, centre, and bottom of a projection. By adding a 
central location, this experiment could examine whether the metaphor-congruent effect is due 
to looking up, or looking down, or is due to a combination of both. Consequently, differences 
in the dependent variables were examined relative to a central position, rather than just 
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comparing relative up-down positions.   
On the basis of CMT, I proposed the following hypotheses: 
(1) Reaction time would be faster for behavioural information presented in metaphor-
congruent spatial locations (i.e., positive information in upper space and negative information 
in lower space) than in metaphor-incongruent spatial locations (i.e., positive information in 
lower space and negative information in upper space). 
(2) Memory recall and recognition memory would be better for behavioural 
information presented in metaphor-congruent spatial locations than in metaphor-incongruent 
spatial locations. That is, positive information would be better remembered when it appeared 
in upper space and negative information would be better remembered when it appeared in 
lower space.  
(3) Target evaluations would be more positive for the positive targets when 
behavioural information was presented in upper space (vs. lower space). Also, target 
evaluations would be more negative for the negative targets when behavioural information 
was presented in lower space (vs. upper space).  
Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-six (19 female, 7 male) introductory psychology students at the University of 
Western Sydney participated in the experiment in exchange for course credit. Participants 
were recruited through the University’s research participation system (SONA). There were no 
exclusion criteria for this experiment. The average age of participants was 21.61 years (SD = 
4.60, range = 18-37 years). A majority of participants identified as Middle Eastern (31%). 
Additionally, 23% were Caucasian, 23% were East and Southeast Asian, 11.5% identified as 
Other, and 11.5% of participants did not provide a response. English was the first language of 
58% of participants. The average self-rated English language proficiency of the remaining 
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42% of participants was 4.25 (SD = 1.04; range = 1-5; 1 = poor, 5 = superior). The average 
time they had been speaking English was 14.38 years (SD = 5.68).2  
Design 
 The experiment had a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 3 (verticality: top, centre, 
bottom) within-subjects design. A power analysis using G*Power 3.1 software  (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) revealed that a sample size of 26 participants would be 
required in order to detect a medium effect size with an alpha set at .05 and power set at .80. 
Materials 
 The descriptions were projected onto a white wall using a data projector. The size of 
the projected image was 150cm×120cm. Stimuli were presented using E-Prime software 
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). Questionnaires were presented using Qualtrics 
software (Qualtrics, 2013) on a University-issued MacBook Pro. A drafting chair was used 
for the purpose of raising or lowering the chair in order to align participants’ eye level with 
the centre of the projection.  
 Stimuli. The stimuli consisted of 48 behavioural descriptions from the pilot-tested 
stimuli. The 48 behavioural descriptions were grouped into 6 target persons (see Appendix 
C). Each target had a unisex name (i.e., Alex, Kelly) and was portrayed with eight sentences 
(behavioural descriptions). Three targets were positive and three targets were negative. 
Neutral information was also included to make the impression formation task more plausible. 
For the three positive targets, six of the eight sentences were positive behavioural 
descriptions and two sentences were neutral behavioural descriptions, whereas for the three 
negative targets, six of the eight sentences were negative behavioural descriptions and two 
sentences were neutral behavioural descriptions.   
Each behavioural description was displayed individually (in 18-point black Arial font 
																																								 																				
2	Responses from English as a second language (ESL) participants were not significantly different from English 
as a first language (EFL) participants across all of the experiments (all ps > .05).  
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on a white background, which translated to approximately 10cm in height on the projection). 
One positive target’s description was presented at the top of the projection, another positive 
target’s description was presented at the centre of the projection, and the other positive 
target’s description was presented at the bottom of the projection. Similarly, the vertical 
spatial locations for the presentation of the three negative targets’ descriptions were at the 
top, centre, and bottom of the projection. The vertical spatial location of the targets was 
counterbalanced. For example, 1/3 of the participants viewed Alex’s description at the top, 
1/3 of the participants viewed Alex’s description in the centre, and 1/3 of the participants 
viewed Alex’s description at the bottom of the projection. Both the order of the behavioural 
descriptions within each target and the order of behavioural descriptions across all targets 
was randomised. Prior to the presentation of each behavioural description, a fixation cross (+) 
was presented in the centre of the projection for 300ms. 
 The behavioural descriptions for the targets presented at the top of the projection 
appeared 60cm above the centre of the projection, whereas the behavioural descriptions for 
the targets presented at the bottom of the projection appeared 60cm below the centre of the 
projection. Therefore, the behavioural descriptions that were projected up and down were 
displayed at an equal distance from the centre of the projection. All of the behavioural 
descriptions were positioned across the full width of the projection.  
 Following the collection of the reaction time dependent measures, participants 
completed a 5-min filler task (e.g., Palma et al., 2011; see Appendix D) before completing the 
remaining dependent measures. Participants were instructed to cross off all instances of the 
letter ‘e’ (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998) in two printed pages of text 
describing eucalyptus (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eucalyptus). This is a relatively low load 
cognitive task compared to one in which participants have to also follow a set of rules (e.g., 
do not cross off an e that is adjacent to another vowel). 
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 Responses during the experimental phase were made using a keyboard that was 
placed on participants’ laps as they were seated. One key on the number pad was labelled 
with the symbol ‘-’ to indicate negative, one key was labelled ‘0’ to indicate neutral, and one 
key was labelled ‘+’ to indicate positive. These keys were counterbalanced, such that the 
positive key was on the right side of the neutral key for half of the participants and on the left 
side of the neutral key for the other half of participants.  
 Dependent variables. Reaction time was recorded directly via the E-Prime software. 
It was measured from the moment the behavioural description appeared on the screen (i.e., 
after the fixation cross) until participants responded with a button press. That is, participants 
evaluated each behavioural description by pressing the labelled keys on the number pad, after 
which a fixation cross appeared followed by the next behavioural description.  
Memory recall for each target was measured with an unexpected free recall task (see 
Appendix E). The instructions for the free recall task were: “Take a minute to think back 
about the people you read about. In the spaces provided list as many of each person’s 
behaviours as possible. Please don't spend longer than 1 minute on each person.” Responses 
were made in an open-ended format.   
 Recognition memory for each target was measured with a multiple-choice task (see 
Appendix F), which consisted of 48 items (i.e., 8 items for each target). The instructions for 
the multiple-choice task were: “Take a minute to think back about the people you read about 
in the descriptions. Which of the 6 people that you learned about performed each of these 
behaviours? Please select the name of the person that corresponds to each behaviour.” Each 
behavioural description was presented without the name (e.g., “has been described by the 
principal as a talented teacher.”). The multiple choice response options consisted simply of 
the names of each target.  
Target evaluations were measured with a scale modified from Lockwood and Kunda 
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(1997). The instructions for target evaluations were: “Take a minute to think back about the 
people you read about in the descriptions. We would like to ask you about your perceptions 
of these people. Using the corresponding scale, please rate what you think each person is like 
on the traits that follow.” Participants rated targets on 22 traits (see Appendix G). Ratings 
were made on a 7-point scale with endpoints labelled 1 (Not at all) and 7 (Very much). 
Ratings for the 12 positive items were averaged to form a positive evaluations subscale (α = 
.86) and ratings for the 10 negative items were averaged to form a negative evaluations 
subscale (α = .78) and the overall evaluation variable was created by subtracting the negative 
evaluations from the positive evaluations.  
Procedure 
 Participants were invited to take part in a study about the effects of distraction on 
visual and auditory perception. This cover story was used to minimise demand 
characteristics. Participants were tested individually. On arrival at the lab, participants were 
greeted by the experimenter who directed them to a drafting chair. Next, the experimenter 
had participants read an information sheet about the study (see Appendix A) and read and 
sign an informed consent form (see Appendix A). Upon obtaining consent, participants were 
given verbal instructions by the experimenter about the tasks (see Appendix H). Participants 
were then asked to position themselves in the drafting chair such that it was located in line 
with a piece of tape 180cm from the wall. The drafting chair was then raised so that 
participants’ eye level was in the centre of the projection on the wall. The keyboard was then 
placed on participants’ laps. The experimenter remained in the room to ensure that 
participants did not alter their physical position during exposure to the stimuli and also to 
monitor participants’ progress throughout the experiment.  
 Participants progressed through the instructions (which were projected onto the wall) 
by using a mouse to click ‘next’. This mouse was on a table positioned to the left side of 
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participants. The instructions included more information about the ostensible aim of the 
experiment. That is, participants read that the purpose of the current study was to investigate 
whether particular forms of distraction can affect visual perception and also whether there are 
benefits of reading web-based University of Western Sydney (UWS) news stories for 
university online services and possible applications for iPads. Participants then read that 
during the experimental phase they would read about six recent UWS graduates. Participants 
were told that the sentences they would read had been taken from online news articles from 
the UWS nUWS (pronounced “news”) webpage.  
 Participants first completed a practice phase to familiarise themselves with the task. 
Prior to the presentation of each practice sentence3 (e.g., “Ronald Weasley broke his leg after 
crashing his broomstick”; see Appendix C), a fixation cross (+) appeared in the centre of the 
projection for 300ms. In the practice trials five sentences appeared individually in the centre 
of the projection. Participants were instructed to read each sentence carefully and at their own 
pace so that they could form an overall impression of each person that they read about. 
Participants had to indicate whether the behaviour described in the sentence was positive, 
neutral, or negative using the number pad on the keyboard. Once a response was made, a 
fixation cross would appear in the centre of the projection and then the next behavioural 
description would appear.  
 Following the practice phase participants read that the experimental phase would 
begin next. They read that the experimental phase would be similar to the practice phase and 
that their task would be the same. Participants were then exposed to the 48 behavioural 
descriptions of the six targets.  
 After the experimental phase participants were repositioned behind a table and were 
given the 5-min filler task, which was completed using pen and paper. They then completed 
																																								 																				
3 There was no overlap between the sentences in the practice trials and the experimental trials. 
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the remaining dependent measures on a laptop at their own pace. Participants then provided 
demographic information including age, gender, and ethnicity (see Appendix I). Next, 
participants completed a suspicion probe (see Appendix J), which included several items 
related to determining whether participants were aware of the experiment’s aim and 
hypotheses (e.g., “Had you heard anything about the study before today?”). After completing 
these measures, participants were debriefed by the experimenter. The experimenter also 
verbally checked for suspicion and gave participants a debriefing form to read and take with 
them (see Appendix A). Participants were then thanked for their participation and assigned 
their experimental credit. 
Results 
No participants reported any suspicions about the experiment. Data screening was 
undertaken to ensure the accuracy of the data and to check the assumptions of analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). Data screening identified several cases with missing data on the memory 
recall, recognition memory, and target evaluations dependent variables. However, because 
less than 10% of the data were missing (5%), the scores were treated as though they were 
missing randomly (Allison, Gorman, & Primavera, 1993). Therefore, all available cases were 
retained for analysis. Assumptions of normality were satisfactory. Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for reaction times for the 
valence × verticality interaction (χ2(2) = 9.923, p = .007). Accordingly, the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was used for this analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).  
 A series of two-way valence (positive, negative) × verticality (top, centre, bottom) 
repeated measures ANOVAs with alpha at .05 were conducted to examine potential 
differences in reaction time, target evaluations, memory recall, and recognition memory.  
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Reaction Time 
Reaction time data for neutral descriptions were excluded from the analysis (25.00%). 
Next, trials with inaccurate responses (i.e., an incorrect response for the categorisation of a 
behavioural description) were excluded from the analysis (4.57% of trials). In order to 
normalise the distribution of the reaction time data, these values were subjected to a log 
transformation (Ratcliff, 1993). Next, trials that were 2.5 SDs above or below the grand 
latency mean (2.64% of trials) were replaced with the 2.5 SD value (e.g., Miller, 1991). 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. The analysis for reaction time revealed that 
although the main effect of valence was not significant, F(1, 25) = 0.18, p = .678, ηp² = .01, 
the main effect of verticality was significant, F(2,50) = 4.47, p = .016, ηp² = .15. Sidak post 
hoc comparisons revealed that the only pairwise comparison difference was that reaction 
times were faster for behavioural descriptions presented at the bottom of the projection 
compared to behavioural descriptions presented at the top of the projection (MDiff = -324.05, 
Sidak 95%, CI: -598.12-49.99). The predicted valence × verticality interaction was not 
significant, F(1.494, 37.351) = 1.33, p = .271, ηp² = .054.  
Two composite variables were created: a metaphor-congruent composite, which 
combined the trials of positive descriptions presented at the top of the projection with the 
trials of negative descriptions presented at the bottom of the projection; and a metaphor-
incongruent composite, which combined the trials of positive descriptions presented at the 
bottom of the projection with the trials of negative descriptions presented at the top of the 
projection. These two composite variables were created because the hypothesis was that 
reaction time would be faster for positive and negative behavioural information presented 
respectively at the top or the bottom of the projection compared to the opposite vertical 
presentation of positive and negative behavioural information. There was no significant 
																																								 																				
4 There were no differences among the positive targets or negative targets for reaction time (p > .05). 
Consequently, reaction time data were collapsed into one “positive” target category and one “negative” target 
category.   
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difference in reaction time for target descriptions presented in metaphor-congruent locations 
(M = 3588.54, SD = 714.33) compared to target descriptions presented in metaphor-
incongruent locations (M = 3698.91, SD = 940.39), t(25) = -0.84, p = .411, d = -.13.  
Table 1 
Reaction Time (ms) for Targets by Valence and Verticality 
Valence                                                                     Verticality 
                Up                        Centre                        Down                       Overall 
          M (SD)                     M (SD)                       M (SD)                      M (SD) 
Positive       3733.45 (934.93)        3816.22 (982.93)      3519.76 (958.42)         3689.81 (958.76) 
Targets    
Negative     3878.05 (1155.16)      3584.26 (818.29)      3443.63 (722.74)         3635.31 (898.73) 
Targets  
Overall       3805.75a (1045.05)      3700.24 (900.61)      3481.70b  (840.58) 
Note. Means with different subscripts within a given row are significantly different from one another (p < .05). 
 
Memory Recall 
 The data from the free recall task were not analysed due to the difficulty participants 
had in accurately listing the behaviours presented in the experimental phase. Across the 156 
recall sections (i.e., responses of 26 participants about the 6 targets), 29 included 1-4 
behavioural descriptions, 107 included 1-9 traits, 7 included a statement about not 
remembering, and 13 were blank. Of the 29 responses that included at least 1 behavioural 
description, a total of 47 behavioural descriptions were reported and 37 of these were 
incorrect. This poor recall performance will be discussed further in the Discussion section.  
 
 
	
	
54 
Recognition Memory 
The analysis for recognition memory revealed that the main effect of valence was 
significant, F(1, 20) = 11.63, p = .003, ηp² = .37. Sidak post hoc comparisons revealed that 
negative behaviours were more accurately identified than positive behaviours (MDiff = 0.78, 
Sidak 95%, CI: 0.30-1.23). The analysis revealed that the main effect of verticality was not 
significant, F(2, 40) = 1.82, p = .175, ηp² = .08. The predicted valence × verticality interaction 
was not significant, F(2, 40) = 1.49, p = .238, ηp² = .075. Descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table 2. There was no significant difference in recognition memory for target descriptions 
presented in metaphor-congruent locations (M = 1.34, SD = 1.49) compared to target 
descriptions presented in metaphor-incongruent locations (M = 1.74, SD = 1.57), t(24) =  
-0.96, p = .346, d = -.26. An error rate (i.e., incorrect responses for the multiple choice items) 
was calculated due to the acknowledged difficulty participants had in recalling the behaviours 
for each target. The error rate was 52.40%, which suggests that participants also had 
difficulty recognising the behaviours.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
5 There were no differences among the positive targets or negative targets for recognition memory (p > .05). 
Consequently, recognition memory data were collapsed into one “positive” target category and one “negative” 
target category.  	
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Table 2 
Recognition Memory for Targets by Valence and Verticality 
Valence                                                            Verticality 
           Up                     Centre                          Down                   Overall 
   M (SD)                   M (SD)                          M (SD)                  M (SD) 
Positive      1.10 (1.51)            1.48 (1.60)                    2.00 (2.05)            1.52a (1.72) 
Targets 
Negative     2.00 (1.61)           2.95 (2.09)                    1.95 (2.11)             2.30b (1.94) 
Targets   
Overall       1.55 (1.56)            2.21 (1.84)                    1.98 (2.03) 
Note. Means with different subscripts within a given column are significantly different from one another (p < 
.05). 
 
Target Evaluations 
 The analysis for target evaluations revealed a signficant main effect of valence, F(1, 
25) = 7.01, p = .014, ηp² = .22. Sidak post hoc comparisons revealed that positive targets 
overall were rated more positively than negative targets (MDiff = 0.671, Sidak 95%, CI: 0.15-
1.19). The main effect of verticality was not significant, F(2, 50) = 1.41, p = .254, ηp² = .05. 
The predicted valence × verticality interaction was not significant, F(2, 50) = 0.64, p = .532, 
ηp² = .036. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
6 There were no differences among the positive targets or negative targets for target evaluations (p > .05). 
Consequently, target evaluation data were collapsed into one “positive” target category and one “negative” 
target category.  	
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Table 3 
Target Evaluations for Targets by Valence and Verticality 
Valence                                                        Verticality 
           Up                      Centre                        Down                     Overall 
       M (SD)                  M (SD)                      M (SD)                    M (SD) 
Positive        4.91 (1.13)              5.04 (0.80)                4.90 (0.82)             4.95a (0.92) 
Targets   
Negative      4.24 (1.34)              4.53 (1.23)                 4.07 (1.02)             4.28b (1.20) 
Targets    
Overall         4.58 (1.24)              4.79 (1.02)                 4.49 (0.92) 
Note. Means with different subscripts within a given column are significantly different from one another (p < 
.05). 
 
Discussion 
The three hypotheses were not supported by the results. That is, positive behavioural 
information was not processed faster when it appeared at the top of the projection compared 
to when it appeared at the bottom, and negative behavioural information was not processed 
faster when it appeared at the bottom of the projection compared to when it appeared at the 
top. Positive and negative behavioural information was not better remembered when the 
information appeared in metaphor-congruent spatial locations. Positive targets were not rated 
more positively when they appeared at the top of the projection compared to when they 
appeared at the bottom, and negative targets were not rated more negatively when they 
appeared at the bottom of the projection compared to when they appeared at the top. In sum, 
these results are not consistent with those of Palma et al. (2011) and Meier and Robinson 
(2004), nor do they support CMT in general. However, before concluding that these results 
provide convincing disconfirming evidence, it is worth noting that the experiment contained a 
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number of methodological limitations which, taken together, are likely to have led to the 
negative results (i.e., ps > .05). There are four specific problems. 
First, it was not ideal to measure both reaction time and target evaluations in the same 
experiment. The instruction to “read each sentence carefully and at your own pace so that you 
can form an overall impression of each person that you read about” does not correspond with 
typical instructions for measuring reaction time. That is, instructions for a reaction time task 
typically ask participants to respond as quickly and accurately as possible (e.g., Meier & 
Robinson, 2004). The aim of measuring reaction time was to examine whether there was an 
automatic association between valence and verticality in the mind. However, inferences about 
the processing of positive and negative behavioural information were problematic due to the 
instructions that were used in the current experiment. 
Second, there was variance in both the content and the length of each behavioural 
description sentence (6-14 words). This suggests that perhaps traits would be more 
appropriate for a reaction time task rather than behavioural descriptions of varying lengths. 
That is, variance created by sentence length could be reduced if (single word) traits and more 
precise instructions were incorporated into the design of the experiment. 
Third, participants may have looked down to make a response on the keyboard, which 
would have disrupted the manipulation of ‘up’ and ‘down’. Reaction times may have also 
been slowed due to participants searching for the correct key to make a response. A solution 
to this issue would be to collect verbal responses in order to control the bodily states of 
looking up and looking down. 
Fourth, all the evidence points to the fact that the number of targets and behavioural 
descriptions was too high to accurately measure memory recall and recognition memory. The 
results for both memory recall and recognition memory reflect participants’ difficulty 
remembering the behavioural descriptions for each target. The capacity of short-term memory 
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is typically considered to be 7 ± 2 items (Miller, 1956). In the current experiment, the limited 
capacity of participants’ short-term memory would have been exceeded by the 48 behavioural 
descriptions (Cowan, 2000; Miller, 1956). Moreover, that load would have been increased 
due to the arbitrary names that were attached to the descriptions. Clearly, then, the total 
number of behavioural descriptions needs to be closer to the short-term memory capacity 
range. Notably, however, negative behaviours were more accurately identified than positive 
behaviours, which is consistent with previous literature (e.g., Palma et al., 2011; also see 
Kensinger, 2009, for a review). Nevertheless, the inability of participants to recall the 
behavioural descriptions may have also influenced target evaluations. That is, precise target 
evaluations would not be expected if participants were not able to recall the behaviours of 
each target.  
These limitations indicate that the testing of the proposed hypotheses was likely to 
have been compromised. That is, assessing reaction time, memory, and target evaluations in a 
single experiment, and doing so with the complex and extensive materials used in Experiment 
1, was likely to have interfered with the dependent variable data that were required to 
satisfactorily test the hypotheses of interest. I therefore decided to examine reaction time 
separately from memory and target evaluations. I also decided to reduce memory load both 
by minimising the complexity of the behavioural descriptions to single trait terms, and by 
reducing the number of targets from six to four. To address the possible confound introduced 
if participants looked down at the keyboard, a switch to verbal responses was made. Finally, I 
decided to omit the centre position on the projection and retain only the top and bottom 
locations, consistent with previous studies. 
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Chapter Three: Pilot Study 2 and Experiments 2A and 2B 
Pilot Study 2 
Overview 
The aim of Pilot Study 2 was to test the valence of 24 traits. The results of this pilot 
study determined the traits that were used in Experiment 2A and Experiment 2B.  
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and seven U.S. participants were recruited via MTurk and received 
USD$0.20 for their participation. The average age of participants was 29.65 years (SD = 
10.93, range = 18-99 years).  
Materials and Procedure 
 I selected traits that map onto the dimensions of warmth and competence because they 
are both fundamental to interpersonal perception (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). I selected 24 
traits from Rosenberg, Nelson, and Vivekananthan (1968; see Appendix K), 6 of which were 
related to competence (e.g., industrious), 6 of which were related to social warmth (e.g., 
helpful), 6 of which were related to incompetence (e.g., inefficient), and 6 of which were 
related to social coldness (e.g., moody). These traits were grouped into 4 target persons. Of 
these four target persons, two were positive targets (i.e., 1 competent target and 1 warm 
target) and 2 were negative targets (i.e., 1 incompetent target and 1 cold target). The traits 
were presented with the target person’s name (e.g., Alex: industrious). As in Pilot Study 1, 
six screening questions were also included. Participants viewed these traits online and 
responded to questionnaires about the targets using Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, 2013). 
 Participants were told that they would read about several recent university graduates. 
Each survey page consisted of a target’s 6 randomly presented traits. Participants were asked 
to rate how positive or negative each trait was on a 9-point scale with endpoints labelled 1 
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(extremely negative) and 9 (extremely positive). They were also asked to form an overall 
impression of each target. Following each block of traits, participants rated how likeable they 
considered the person on a 9-point scale with endpoints labelled 1 (not at all likeable) and 9 
(extremely likeable). Participants also rated how much they would like to spend time with the 
person on a 9-point scale with endpoints labelled 1 (not at all) and 9 (very much). After rating 
the 24 traits and providing overall impressions of the 4 targets, participants viewed a page 
that thanked them for their participation and provided a code with which they could claim 
reimbursement to their Amazon.com account.  
Results 
 Four participants were excluded from the analysis due to failing at least one of the six 
screening questions. A further 11 participants were excluded due to a failure to provide 
responses for any of the items. Thus, the final sample included 92 participants.  
 Traits with a mean score between 1 and 3.99 were classified as negative, traits with a 
mean score between 4 and 5.99 were classified as neutral, and traits with a mean score 
between 6 and 9 were classified as positive. All traits fell within each intended category (i.e., 
positive and negative).  
Participants rated the positive traits (M = 7.56, SD = 1.18) significantly more 
positively than the negative traits (M = 2.95, SD = 1.08), t(86) = 21.78, p < .001, d = 4.08. 
Participants rated the positive targets (M = 5.93, SD = 0.83) as significantly more likeable 
than the negative targets (M = 2.61, SD = 1.08), t(86) = 19.87, p < .001, d = 3.45. Participants 
reported wanting to spend more time with the positive targets (M = 5.69, SD = 1.07) than 
with the negative targets (M = 2.33, SD = 1.13), t(86) = 19.02, p < .001, d = 3.05. More 
specifically, participants rated the warm target (M = 7.67, SD = 1.29) more positively than the 
competent target (M = 7.44, SD = 1.16), t(85) = 2.58, p = .012, d = 0.19. Participants rated 
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the incompetent target (M = 2.77, SD = 1.25) more negatively than the socially-cold target (M 
= 3.09, SD = 1.15), t(85) = 2.67, p = .009, d = 0.27. 
These results indicated that all of the traits were rated as having the intended 
positivity or negativity. Thus, all of the traits generated from this pilot study were used in 
Experiment 2A and Experiment 2B.    
Experiment 2A and 2B 
Overview 
The overall aims of Experiment 2A and Experiment 2B were to examine reaction time 
separately from both memory and target evaluations, and to do so with adjustments to 
stimulus materials in the direction of reduced memory load and cognitive complexity. More 
specifically, the aim of Experiment 2A was to examine the influence of the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor on reaction time. Traits were used rather than behavioural descriptions 
in order to reduce variability in both reading speed and length of the stimuli. The traits were 
presented in various vertical locations. I predicted that reaction time would be faster for traits 
presented in metaphor-congruent spatial locations than in metaphor-incongruent spatial 
locations. That is, I predicted that reaction times would be faster when positive traits 
appeared at the top of the projection compared to when they appeared at the bottom of the 
projection. I also predicted that reaction times would be faster when negative traits appeared 
at the bottom of the projection compared to when they appeared at the top of the projection.  
The overall aim of Experiment 2B was to examine the influence of the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor on memory and target evaluations. To do this, an impression formation 
task was used in which the four targets were presented in two vertical locations. Experiment 
2B also used traits in order not to exceed short-term memory capacity and to reduce 
variability in stimulus complexity. I made the following predictions for Experiment 2B: 
(1) Memory recall would be better for traits presented in metaphor-congruent spatial 
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locations than in metaphor-incongruent spatial locations. That is, I expected that positive 
traits would be better remembered when they appeared in upper space (vs. lower space) and 
negative traits would be better remembered when they appeared in lower space (vs. upper 
space). 
(2) Recognition memory would be better for traits presented in metaphor-congruent 
spatial locations than in metaphor-incongruent spatial locations. That is, I expected that 
positive traits would be better recognised when they appeared in upper space (vs. lower 
space) and negative traits would be better recognised when they appeared in lower space (vs. 
upper space).  
(3) Target evaluations would be more positive for the positive targets when the traits 
appeared in upper space (vs. lower space). Conversely, target evaluations would be more 
negative for the negative target when the traits appeared in lower space (vs. upper space).  
Experiment 2A 
Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-nine (27 female, 2 male) introductory psychology students at the University 
of Western Sydney participated in the experiment in exchange for course credit. The average 
age of participants was 20.90 years (SD = 5.04, range = 18-38 years). A majority of 
participants identified as Middle Eastern (38%). Additionally, 28% were Caucasian, 10% 
were South Asian, 7% were East and Southeast Asian, 3% were African, and 14% identified 
as Other. English was the first language of 55% of participants. The average self-rated 
English language proficiency of the remaining 45% of participants was 4.31 (SD = 0.86; 
range = 1-5; 1 = poor, 5 = superior). The average time they had been speaking English was 
16.23 years (SD = 7.19). Participants were recruited through the university’s research 
participation system (SONA). There were no exclusion criteria for this experiment.   
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Design 
The experiment had a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (verticality: top vs. 
bottom) within-subjects design. The centre position from Experiment 1 was dropped in order 
to simplify the design and examine reaction time differences relative to up and down 
positions only. As in Experiment 1, a power analysis using G*Power 3.1 software (Faul et al., 
2009) revealed that a sample size of 26 participants would be required for this experiment.   
Materials 
The materials were largely the same as in Experiment 1, with the following 
differences. Traits, rather than behavioural descriptions, were projected onto a white wall 
using a data projector. A wireless lavalier microphone (PG185 Lavalier Microphone System) 
was used to capture participants’ verbal responses, rather than a keyboard. These verbal 
responses were recorded using the computer program Audacity 2.0.3 (Audacity Team, 2013).  
Stimuli. The stimuli consisted of the 24 pilot-tested traits described above. As in Pilot 
Study 2, the 24 traits were grouped into four target persons (see Appendix L). Two of the 
targets consisted of positive traits and two of the targets consisted of negative traits.  
The traits were presented in E-Prime (Schneider et al., 2002). Each trait was displayed 
individually with the target name (in 18-point black Arial font on a white background, which 
translated to approximately 10cm in height on the projection). One positive target was 
presented at the top of the projection and one positive target was presented at the bottom of 
the projection. Similarly, the vertical spatial locations for the presentation of the two negative 
targets’ traits were at the top and bottom of the projection. The vertical spatial location of the 
targets was counterbalanced. For example, 1/2 of the participants viewed Alex’s traits at the 
top and 1/2 of the participants viewed Alex’s traits at the bottom of the projection. As in 
Experiment 1, both the order of the traits within each target and the order of traits across all 
targets was randomised. Prior to the presentation of each trait, a fixation cross (+) was 
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presented in the centre of the projection for 300ms. As in Experiment 1, the stimuli presented 
at the top and bottom of the projection were equidistant from the centre (60cm).  
Dependent variable. Reaction time was recorded directly via the E-Prime software 
and was operationalised as the time between the presentation of the target name and trait 
(which co-occurred) until the onset of a verbal response.  
Procedure 
Participants were invited to take part in a study about the effects of distraction on 
visual perception. As in Experiment 1, this cover story was used to minimise demand 
characteristics. The procedure was largely the same as in Experiment 1, with the following 
difference: Participants read that during the experimental phase they would read about four 
recent UWS graduates.  
 Participants completed a practice phase to familiarise themselves with the task. Prior 
to the presentation of each target name and trait7 (e.g., “Superman: strong”; see Appendix L), 
a fixation cross (+) appeared in the centre of the projection for 300ms. In the practice trials, 
five target name and trait combinations appeared individually in the centre of the projection. 
Participants had to verbally indicate as quickly and as accurately as possible whether the trait 
was positive, neutral, or negative. Participants were instructed to say “good” if they thought 
the trait was positive, “neutral” if they thought the trait was neutral8, and “bad” if they 
thought the trait was negative. Once a verbal response was made, a fixation cross would 
appear in the centre of the projection and then the next target name and trait would appear.  
Following the practice phase, participants read that the experimental phase would 
begin. They were told that the experimental phase would be similar to the practice phase and 
																																								 																				
7 There was no overlap between the traits in the practice trials and the experimental trials.  
8	Although none of the traits were rated as neutral in Pilot Study 2, a neutral option was included to reduce 
instances of false responses. That is, participants could select neutral if they were unsure or believed that a trait 
was not clearly positive or negative. 
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that their task would be the same. Participants were then exposed to the 24 traits of the four 
targets.  
 After the experimental phase, participants provided demographic information 
including age, gender, and ethnicity. Next, participants completed the same suspicion probe 
as in Experiment 1. After completing the demographics and the suspicion probe, participants 
were debriefed. The experimenter verbally checked for suspicion and gave participants a 
debriefing form to read and take with them. Participants were then thanked for their 
participation and assigned their experimental credit. 
Results 
None of the participants reported any suspicions about the experiment. Data screening 
was undertaken to ensure the accuracy of the data and to check assumptions of analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). Data screening identified one case with unreadable data (i.e., verbal 
responses for this participant were not recorded properly). One participant was dropped due 
to providing responses that were 100% inaccurate. Trials with inaccurate responses were 
excluded from the analysis (32.87% of trials). This included, for example, trials where 
participants said “neutral” in response to a trait that was positive or negative. In order to 
normalise the distribution of the reaction time data, these values were subjected to a log 
transformation (Ratcliff, 1993). Next, trials that were 2.5 SDs above or below the grand 
latency mean (1.08% of latencies) were replaced with the 2.5 SD value (e.g., Miller, 1991). 
All other available cases were retained for analysis. Assumptions of normality were 
satisfactory. A two-way valence (positive vs. negative) × verticality (up vs. down) repeated 
measures ANOVA with alpha at .05 was conducted to examine potential differences in 
reaction time.  
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The analysis for reaction time revealed that the main effect of valence was significant, 
F(1, 25) = 16.35, p < .001, ηp² = .40. Sidak post hoc comparisons revealed that reaction times 
were faster for positive traits than for negative traits (MDiff = -359.50, Sidak 95%, CI:  
-542.62-176.38). The main effect of verticality was not significant, F(1, 25) = 0.02, p = .893, 
ηp² = .001. The predicted valence × verticality interaction was not significant, F(1, 25) = 0.61, 
p = .442, ηp² = .02. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4. There was also no significant 
difference in reaction times for traits presented in metaphor-congruent locations (M = 
2120.71, SD = 583.69) compared to traits presented in metaphor-incongruent locations (M = 
2147.04, SD = 609.08), t(26) = -0.50, p = .621, d = -.04.  
Table 4 
Reaction Time (ms) for Targets by Valence and Verticality 
Valence                                                           Verticality 
                 Up                                 Down                               Overall 
             M (SD)                            M (SD)                               M (SD) 
Positive            1913.77 (551.41)            1945.92 (560.43)                1929.85a (555.92) 
Targets 
Negative           2314.32 (752.89)            2264.36 (734.55)                2289.34b (743.72) 
Targets 
Overall             2114.04 (652.15)            2105.14 (647.49) 
Note. Means with different subscripts within a given column are significantly different from one another (p < 
.05). 
 
Discussion 
The hypotheses were not supported by the results. That is, positive traits were not 
processed faster when they appeared at the top of the projection compared to when they 
appeared at the bottom. Similarly, negative traits were not processed faster when they 
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appeared at the bottom of the projection compared to when they appeared at the top. These 
results are not consistent with those of Meier and Robinson (2004), nor do they support CMT 
in general. However, there are three aspects of the current experiment which may have 
contributed to the results, and would thus render premature any conclusion regarding failure 
of evidential support. 
First, because the focus was on evaluating the valence of trait terms, word length and 
word frequency were not controlled. As a result, variability in word length and frequency 
may have produced variability in the data, thus overshadowing any association between 
valence and verticality. The results therefore could possibly instead reflect an association 
between word length or word frequency and verticality.  
With respect to word length, although this was not controlled, post hoc analyses 
indicated that the number of letters was similar across the warm, competent, cold, and 
incompetent traits (i.e., all ps > .05). Nevertheless, the significantly faster reaction time for 
positive traits might be explained by the fact that the total number of syllables across the 
positive traits was 32, whereas the total number of syllables across the negative traits was 41.  
With respect to word frequency, in everyday language certain words occur more 
frequently than other words (Balota et al., 2007; Kučera & Francis, 1967). Words that occur 
more frequently are processed faster (Balota et al., 2007; Howes & Solomon, 1951; 
Unkelbach et al., 2010). For example, the word ‘intelligent’ occurs more frequently than 
‘industrious’ (Balota et al., 2007). Consequently, in Balota et al.’s (2007) study, ‘intelligent’ 
(M = 671.24 ms, SD = 172.65) was recognised faster than ‘industrious’ (M = 996.03 ms, SD 
= 431.87) in a lexical decision task and speeded naming task. The traits that were used in the 
current experiment did vary in frequency (see Appendix M; frequency range: 54-26425, 
higher scores indicate greater frequency; Balota et al., 2007). Therefore, there was variability 
across the stimuli that was due to failing to control for word frequency.  
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An additional aspect of the frequency issue is the fact that positive words are used 
more frequently in everyday discourse than equally familiar negative words (Matlin & Stang, 
1978). This phenomenon has been referred to as the Pollyanna hypothesis or the linguistic 
positivity bias (Boucher & Osgood, 1969; Rozin, Berman, & Royzman, 2010). Such a bias 
may be because in everyday life we experience more positive events than negative events 
which we then talk about (Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 2000). Another explanation is that positive 
information has a higher density in memory, whereas negative information is more precise 
and diverse. This is known as the density hypothesis, which refers to the notion that positive 
information is overall more similar to other positive information than negative information is 
to other negative information (Unkelbach, Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmuller, & Danner, 2008). The 
processing of positive information is facilitated because there is a greater association among 
positive units in memory (Unkelbach et al., 2008). Consequently, positive words are 
processed faster than negative words (Unkelbach et al., 2010). This density processing 
advantage for positive words may explain the main effect of valence in the current 
experiment. 
Second, target names were included in the current experiment because it was set up as 
a linking stage to the assessment of target evaluations in the next experiment. However, the 
repeated presentation of a target name with the set of traits was not necessary for the current 
experiment. The aim of this experiment was to examine reaction time for traits, not target 
evaluations of each target based on the traits, nor reaction time for target names and traits. 
The inclusion of the target names may have increased reaction time for categorising the traits 
across all of the trials. For instance, if participants consecutively viewed several traits 
belonging to Alex (e.g., “Alex: intelligent; “Alex: industrious”; “Alex: persistent”; “Alex: 
determined”), they then may have been distracted by the presentation of a trait belonging to 
another target (e.g., “Charlie: critical”). That is, the change in target name may have 
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distracted participants from responding to the trait alone. Additionally, the frequency of each 
target name in everyday language may have influenced the results. For instance, the name 
‘Alex’ occurs more frequently than the name ‘Charlie’ in everyday language (Balota et al., 
2007). Consequently, in Balota et al.’s (2007) lexical decision task and speeded naming task, 
the name ‘Alex’ (M = 586.21 ms, SD = 134.98) was recognised faster than the name ‘Charlie’ 
(M = 671.75 ms, SD = 177.06). The target names may have increased variability, which may 
have then reduced the interaction between the valence of the traits and verticality. Reaction 
time to the traits and subsequent inferences about the influence of the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor on reaction time would have been more precise and more valid if the target names 
had not been included during the experimental phase for the current experiment. 
It could be argued that the reaction time data may be imprecise due to the response 
mode. Typically, in reaction time tasks participants’ responses are collected using a manual 
response such as a key or button press (e.g., Meier & Robinson, 2004; Neely, Keefe, & Ross, 
1989). However, verbal responses were collected in the current experiment. Verbal responses 
have been found to have shorter reaction times compared to manual responses in tasks 
(Repovs, 2004; Sternberg, 2004). Verbal responses were used in the current experiment with 
the aim of controlling the physical bodily states of looking up and looking down. That is, had 
a keyboard or button box been used in the present experiment, then participants may have at 
some point during the experimental phase looked down at the keyboard or button box to 
reassure themselves that they were pressing the correct key or button. Participants looking 
down to search for the correct key would have also slowed reaction times. Therefore, verbal 
responses were considered to be an appropriate and valid measure of reaction time in the 
current experiment despite the commonality of manual responses in the literature (Repovs, 
2004; Sternberg, 2004). 
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These limitations suggest that the testing of the proposed hypotheses was likely to 
have been compromised.	Any conclusions about the influence of the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor on reaction time for positive and negative traits therefore are not comparable to the 
Meier and Robinson (2004) paper. These limitations would at least need to be acknowledged 
and rectified for future research if valid conclusions are to be made about the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor.  
Experiment 2B 
Method 
Participants 
 Two hundred and forty (194 female, 46 male) psychology students at the University 
of Western Sydney participated in exchange for either course credit (n = 237) or for an entry 
into a draw to win 1 of 2 $50 Coles/Myer gift cards (n = 3). The average age of participants 
was 21.44 years (SD = 5.89, range = 17-54 years). A majority of participants identified as 
Caucasian (33%). Additionally, 19% were East and Southeast Asian, 19% were Middle 
Eastern, 7% were South Asian, 6% were from the Pacific Islands, 3% were African, 2.5% 
were Latin, Central, and South American, 0.4% were from the Caribbean, 0.4% were 
Indigenous Australians, and 10% identified as Other. English was the first language of 65% 
of participants. The average self-rated English language proficiency of the remaining 35% of 
participants was 4.04 (SD = 0.80; range = 1-5; 1 = poor, 5 = superior). The average time they 
had been speaking English was 14.62 years (SD = 6.83). Participants were recruited through 
the university’s research participation system (SONA). There were no exclusion criteria for 
this experiment.   
 
 
 
	
	
71 
Design 
The experiment had a 4 (target: warm, competent, cold, incompetent) × 2 (verticality: 
top vs. bottom) between-subjects design9. This design was required to examine impression 
formation because an investigation of the influence of verticality on target evaluations would 
not be possible if participants read about a target whose traits appeared at the top and the 
bottom of the projection. A power analysis using G*Power 3.1 software (Faul et al., 2009) 
revealed that a sample size of 240 participants would be required in order to detect a medium 
effect size with an alpha set at .05 and power set at .80. 
Materials 
The materials were largely the same as in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2A. 
However, unlike Experiment 1 and Experiment 2A, neither a keyboard nor a wireless lavalier 
microphone were used because reaction time was not measured. 
Stimuli. The stimuli consisted of the same 24 traits used in Pilot Study 2 and 
Experiment 2A.  
The traits were presented in E-Prime (Schneider et al., 2002). Each trait was displayed 
individually with the target name for 8 seconds (in 18-point black Arial font on a white 
background, which translated to approximately 10cm in height on the projection). The order 
of the traits within each condition was randomised. For example, in one of the conditions, all 
of the traits for the warm target were individually presented at the bottom of the projection, 
whereas in another condition, all of the traits for the same target were individually presented 
at the top of the projection. Prior to the presentation of each trait, a fixation cross (+) was 
presented in the centre of the projection for 300ms. As in Experiment 2A, the traits presented 
at the top and bottom of the projection were equidistant from the centre (60cm). Participants 
																																								 																				
9	The four targets consisted of the same traits used in Experiment 2A. However, the traits were grouped in terms 
of warm, competent, cold, and incompetent to examine any differences in type of positive target and type of 
negative target. Pilot Study 2 results indicated that the positive targets were significantly different from each 
other, and the negative targets were signficantly different from each other.   
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completed the same 5-min filler task that was used in Experiment 1. 
Dependent variables. Target evaluations were measured using the same two items 
that were used in Pilot Study 2. Memory recall was measured with a similar free recall task 
that was used in Experiment 1 (see Appendix N).  
Recognition memory was measured with a 12-item sliding scale task (Griffiths & 
Mitchell, 2008; see Appendix O). Participants were presented with each trait and asked 
whether they remembered seeing each of the traits earlier. Each trait was presented next to a 
sliding scale with endpoints labelled Definitely NO (0) and Definitely YES (100). A midpoint, 
Not sure (50), was also included. Participants were instructed to drag a marker on the scale to 
the left or to the right. The sliding scale allowed participants to indicate their confidence in 
their response. The 12-items consisted of the six traits previously viewed during the 
experimental phase (e.g., incompetence-related traits) and six other similarly-valenced traits 
that were not presented (e.g., cold-related traits).  
Procedure 
Participants were invited to take part in a study about the effects of distraction on 
visual and auditory perception. As in the previous two experiments, this cover story was used 
to minimise demand characteristics. The procedure was largely the same as in Experiment 
2A, with the following differences: Participants were only exposed to one of the four targets 
and they learned that during the experimental phase they would read about a recent UWS 
graduate.  
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight conditions. That is, 
participants viewed 6 traits about a competent, warm, incompetent, or cold target person that 
were either presented at the top or the bottom of the projection. Participants were instructed 
to read each trait carefully and at their own pace, so that they could form an overall 
impression of the person. They were also instructed to maintain focus on the trait for however 
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long it was displayed (8 seconds) and not to respond in any way. A fixation cross appeared in 
the centre of the projection for 300ms prior to the presentation of each trait.  
 After exposure to the traits, participants completed the filler task and then the 
dependent measures. Participants then provided demographic information including age, 
gender, and ethnicity. Next, participants completed the same suspicion probe as in the 
previous experiments. After completing the demographics and the suspicion probe, 
participants were debriefed. The experimenter verbally checked for suspicion and gave 
participants a debriefing form to read and take with them. Participants were then thanked for 
their participation and assigned their experimental credit or entered into the draw to win the 
gift card (as applicable). 
Results 
None of the participants reported any suspicions about the experiment. Data screening 
was undertaken to ensure the accuracy of the data and to check assumptions of analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). Data screening identified several cases with missing data on the memory 
recall and recognition memory dependent variables. However, because less than 15% of 
participants had missing data (1.25%), and because less than 10% of the data was missing 
(0.67%), the scores were treated as though they were missing randomly (Allison et al., 1993). 
Therefore, all available cases were retained for analysis. Assumptions of normality were 
satisfactory.  
 A series of two-way target (warm, competent, cold, incompetent) × verticality (top, 
bottom) between-subjects ANOVAs with alpha at .05 were conducted to examine potential 
differences in target evaluations, memory recall, and recognition memory.  
Target Evaluations 
A composite variable for target evaluations was created by combining the two target 
evaluation items (Cronbach’s α = .91). The analysis for target evaluations revealed that the 
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main effect of target was significant, F(3, 232) = 202.38, p < .001, ηp² = .72. Sidak post hoc 
comparisons revealed that the warm target was rated more positively than the competent 
target (MDiff = 0.933, Sidak 95%, CI: 0.45-1.42), the incompetent target (MDiff = 3.68, Sidak 
95%, CI: 3.20-4.17), and the socially cold target (MDiff = 3.48, Sidak 95%, CI: 3.00-3.97). 
The competent target was rated more positively than the incompetent target (MDiff = 2.75, 
Sidak 95%, CI: 2.26-3.24) and the socially-cold target (MDiff = 2.55, Sidak 95%, CI: 2.06-
3.04). There was no significant difference in ratings between the incompetent target and the 
socially cold target. The main effect of verticality for target evaluations was not significant, 
F(1, 232) = 0.02, p = .898, ηp² = .00. The predicted target × verticality interaction for target 
evaluations was not significant, F(3, 232) = 0.07, p = .545, ηp² = .009. Descriptive statistics 
are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5 
Target Evaluations by Target and Verticality 
Target                                                              Verticality 
                Up                                 Down                             Overall 
            M (SD)                            M (SD)                            M (SD) 
Competent               5.05 (0.71)                       5.08 (0.91)                     5.07a (0.81) 
Warm                       6.12 (0.84)                       5.88 (0.87)                    6.00b (0.85) 
Incompetent             2.38 (1.06)                       2.25 (1.05)                    2.32c (1.05) 
Cold                         2.38 (1.19)                       2.65 (1.27)                    2.52c (1.22) 
Overall                     3.98 (1.91)                      3.97 (1.86) 
Note. Means with different subscripts within a given column are significantly different from one another (p < 
.05). 
 
Memory Recall 
The analysis for memory recall revealed that the main effect of target was significant, 
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F(3, 232) = 6.87, p < .001, ηp² = .08. Sidak post hoc comparisons revealed that competent 
traits were better remembered than incompetent traits (MDiff = 1.02, Sidak 95%, CI: 0.40-
1.64), warm traits were better remembered than incompetent traits (MDiff = 0.73, Sidak 95%, 
CI: 0.11-1.35), and socially cold traits were better remembered than incompetent traits (MDiff 
= 0.72, Sidak 95%, CI: 0.10-1.34). There was no significant difference between warm traits 
and socially cold traits. The analysis revealed that the main effect of verticality was not 
significant, F(1, 232) = 1.72, p = .191, ηp² = .007. The predicted target × verticality 
interaction was not significant, F(3, 232) = 0.71, p = .548, ηp² = .009. Descriptive statistics 
are shown in Table 6. There was also no significant difference in memory recall for target 
traits presented in metaphor-congruent locations (M = 3.02, SD = 1.32) compared to target 
traits presented in metaphor-incongruent locations (M = 2.85, SD = 1.34), t(238) = 0.97, p = 
.332, d = .13.  
Table 6 
Recall Memory for Traits by Target and Verticality 
Target                                                              Verticality 
                Up                                Down                             Overall 
            M (SD)                           M (SD)                            M (SD) 
Competent               3.20 (1.35)                      3.47 (1.20)                      3.33a (0.81) 
Warm                      3.13 (1.48)                       2.97 (1.35)                      3.05a (1.41) 
Incompetent            2.07 (1.20)                       2.57 (1.17)                      2.32b (1.20) 
Cold                        2.90 (1.27)                       3.17 (1.21)                      3.03a(1.24) 
Overall                    3.98 (1.33)                       3.97 (1.23) 
Note. Means with different subscripts within a given column are significantly different from one another (p < 
.05). 
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Recognition Memory 
 For the recognition memory analysis, participants’ recognition ratings for traits were 
converted into a sensitivity value (d’). This was done using the principles of signal detection 
theory (Green & Swets, 1966). That is, the recognition ratings were organised into hits, 
misses, false alarms, and correct rejections. The d’ value (or d-prime) refers to the difference 
between hits and false alarms. This value is calculated by subtracting the z-score for false 
alarms from the z-score for hits [i.e., d' = z(H) - z(F)]. A high d’ value indicates high 
sensitivity and good recognition memory.   
 The main effect of target was significant, F(3, 231) = 2.70, p = .047, ηp² = .03. Further 
Sidak post hoc comparisons revealed that there were no significant differences among the 
targets. The main effect of verticality was not significant F(1, 231) = 0.21, p = .651, ηp² = 
.001. The predicted target × verticality interaction was not significant, F(3, 232) = 0.77, p = 
.512, ηp² = .01. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 7. There was also no significant 
difference in recognition memory for target traits presented in metaphor-congruent locations 
(M = 2.22, SD = 0.64) compared to target traits presented in metaphor-incongruent locations 
(M = 2.13, SD = 0.69), t(237) = 1.07, p = .287, d = .14.  
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Table 7 
Memory Recognition for Traits by Target and Verticality 
Target                                                                Verticality 
                 Up                                Down                             Overall 
             M (SD)                           M (SD)                            M (SD) 
Competent                2.25 (0.51)                     2.33 (0.58)                        2.29 (0.54) 
Warm                        2.23 (0.73)                     2.04 (0.80)                       2.14 (0.76) 
Incompetent              1.93 (0.72)                     2.07 (0.74)                       2.00 (0.73) 
Cold                          2.22 (0.58)                     2.34 (0.53)                       2.28 (0.55) 
Overall                      2.16 (0.65)                     2.20 (0.68) 
 
Discussion 
The hypotheses were not supported by the results. That is, positive and negative traits 
were not better remembered when they appeared in metaphor-congruent spatial locations. 
Positive targets were not rated more positively when the traits appeared at the top of the 
projection compared to when they appeared at the bottom. Similarly, negative targets were 
not rated more negatively when the traits appeared at the bottom of the projection compared 
to when they appeared at the top.  
However, one characteristic of the current experiment notably differs from previous 
research on the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor. That is, the current experiment had a 
between-subjects design, such that each participant was only exposed to one opposite of the 
perceptual dimension (i.e., up or down) and one opposite of the conceptual dimension (i.e., 
positive or negative traits). A survey of previous research on the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor (see Table 8) reveals that no studies used a between-subjects design in which 
participants were exposed to one opposite only of either the conceptual or the perceptual 
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dimension. When between-subjects designs have been used, the participants were exposed to 
both opposites of at least one dimension. 
Table 8 
Experimental Designs and Manipulations 
Report                                                                Design                                         Manipulation 
Meier & Robinson (2004);                    Within-subjects                       Both opposites of the perceptual               
Crawford et al. (2006); Meier et al.                                                     and conceptual dimensions 
(Experiment 2, 2007)  
Meier & Robinson (Experiment 1,        Within-subjects or                  One opposite of the conceptual  
2006); Meier et al. (Experiment 4,        between-subjects                    dimension and both opposites of the  
2007)                                                                                                      perceptual dimension 
Meier & Robinson (Experiment 2,        Within-subjects                      Both opposites of both the perceptual  
2006)                                                                                                      and conceptual dimensions10 
Meier et al. (Experiment 4, 2011)         Between-subjects                   Both opposites of the conceptual                      
_______________________________________________________ dimension; the dependent variable 
_______________________________________________________ was both opposites of the perceptual 
______________________________________________________   dimension 
Palma et al. (2011)                                Mixed-designs                        Within-subjects factor was both 
______________________________________________________   opposites of the perceptual 
_______________________________________________________ dimension; between-subjects factor 
_____________________________________________________     was both opposites of the conceptual 
______________________________________________________   dimension 
 
The relevance of experimental design in the investigation of conceptual metaphor was 
																																								 																				
10	The inclusion of the opposites for the conceptual dimension did not relate to the hypotheses of the experiment. 
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explored by Lakens, Semin, and Foroni (2011). Research suggests that there is an automatic 
association between brightness and valence (Meier, Robinson, & Clore, 2004; Sherman & 
Clore, 2009). That is, bright objects are automatically associated with positivity and dark 
objects are automatically associated with negativity (Meier et al., 2004). In contrast, colour 
research suggests that white is affectively neutral (e.g., Burkitt, Barrett, & Davis, 2003; Götz 
& Götz, 1974). Due to this discrepancy, Lakens et al. (2011) examined the association 
between brightness (white and black) and valence (positive and negative) across several 
experiments that varied in design (i.e., within-subjects vs. between-subjects). The results 
across the six experiments indicated that black ideographs were consistently perceived to be 
representative of negative words, whereas white ideographs were only perceived to be 
representative of positive words when the negativity of black was also activated. That is, 
there was only an observed association between white and positivity in the initial experiment 
that had a within-subjects design. The same association between white and positivity was not 
observed across the experiments that had a between-subjects design. According to Lakens et 
al. (2011), these findings can be explained by what they refer to as a shared relational 
structures view. This view emphasises that the mapping or association between the white-
black and positive-negative opposites is due to their shared relational structures. For instance, 
the valence of brightness is context specific, such that white is only associated with positivity 
when co-activated with the association between black and negativity. The presence of both 
opposites of both dimensions increases the salience of the brightness-valence association. 
That is, the presence of both white and black increases the salience of the positive and 
negative associations. Therefore, when white is evaluated independently it is affectively 
neutral; however, when white is evaluated in opposition to black, it is more strongly 
associated with positivity.  
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The finding that the activation of both opposites of the perceptual and conceptual 
dimensions increases the saliency of the association is relevant for the current experiment. As 
noted above, previous research that supports the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor does not 
include an experiment with a between-subjects design, such that participants are only 
exposed to one opposite of each perceptual and conceptual dimension. The current 
experiment contributes such a study to the literature on the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor. 
The negative results of the current experiment could possibly be due to a decrease in saliency 
as a result of the absence of stimuli in the opposite perceptual dimension.   
The automatic association between valence and verticality may still exist when 
participants are randomly allocated to a between-subjects condition and expected to evaluate 
a target person whose positive traits only appear in upper space (for example); however, it 
may be that the size of the effect is smaller than if positive traits appeared in both upper and 
lower space. In contrast, when both opposites for both perceptual and conceptual dimensions 
are present, saliency of the association may be stronger and consequently may lead to an 
observable difference between conditions. The results of the experiments in the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor literature perhaps confirm this notion of increased saliency of the 
association when both opposites of both dimensions are co-activated (i.e., in a within-subjects 
design).  
The proposed increase in saliency of the association may be conditional on the up-
down opposition, such that participants must look both up and down in a given experiment. 
This explanation consequently leads to the possibility that the automatic association between 
good–up and bad–down may be activated by bodily movement rather than a fixed bodily 
state. This notion highlights another difference between the current experiment and those in 
the past literature. That is, in previous studies participants were always exposed to stimuli 
that were presented in both vertical locations. However, in the current experiment, 
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participants were exposed to stimuli that appeared in only one vertical location. 
Consequently, they remained in a fixed bodily state of looking up or looking down (although 
a fixation cross appeared before each trait, participants most likely continued to look up or 
down after the presentation of the first few traits). This question as to whether the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor is activated only by bodily movement, or whether it can also be 
activated during fixed bodily states, is worth further investigation.  
The selection of stimuli for future research can also be informed by the current 
experiment. The traits, and the combination of the traits, were suitably positive or negative. 
That is, the ratings for the traits and the targets were not at ceiling or floor, which was evident 
in the Pilot Study 2 results: Mcompetent = 7.42, SD = 1.18; Mwarm = 7.64, SD = 1.31; Mincompetent 
= 2.81, SD = 1.26; Mcold = 3.15, SD = 1.24. However, because the stimuli in the current 
experiment were identical to those used in Experiment 2A, since the aim was to use the same 
stimuli but investigate reaction time separately from memory and target evaluation, there was 
no control for word frequency. Research suggests that high frequency words are better	
recalled than low frequency words (Hall, 1954), whereas low frequency words are recognised 
better than high frequency words (Gorman, 1961; Shepard, 1967). However, when the list of 
words is a mix of high and low frequency words, the word frequency effect disappears such 
that low frequency words are recalled as well as and even slightly better than high frequency 
words (e.g., Gregg, 1976). Enhanced recognition memory for low frequency words is more 
consistent regardless of whether the list is a pure list (i.e., contains either high or low 
frequency words) or a mixed list (i.e., contains both high and low frequency words; Balota & 
Neely, 1980).  
Nevertheless, the current experiment has important methodological implications for 
future empirical investigations of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor. The results of the 
current experiment in comparison with previous research on the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
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metaphor suggest that perhaps the saliency of the association between valence and verticality 
is influenced by the co-activation of the opposite perceptual dimension. The current 
experiment also highlights the relevant question as to whether this conceptual metaphor is 
activated by bodily movement, fixed bodily states, or both.     
Given the negative results and despite various adjustments from Experiment 1 to 
Experiments 2A and 2B, the question arose as to the robustness of the original Meier and 
Robinson (2004) finding. It was decided, therefore, to revisit the original finding and conduct 
a close replication. 
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                                       Chapter Four: Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 
Overview 
 The aim of the current experiment was to conduct a close replication of Meier and 
Robinson’s (2004) Experiment 1. The term close replication refers to a replication that 
adheres as closely as possible to the method of the original study (Brandt et al., 2014). This 
experiment was the final step in the current project due primarily to the negative results of 
Experiments 1-2B. That is, the aim was to take a step back and attempt to replicate the 
original effect due to the failure of Experiments 1-2B to find a positive result for the GOOD IS 
UP conceptual metaphor. In hindsight, a close replication of Meier and Robinson (2004) 
could have served as a useful Experiment 1. However, the current climate in psychology that 
is now beginning to encourage replication was not as prominent at the beginning of this thesis 
project. Nevertheless, a close replication of Meier and Robinson (2004) could examine the 
tenets of the shared relational structures view by examining bodily movement (i.e., eye 
movement) rather than a fixed bodily state. Therefore, such a close replication would not only 
be relevant within the present series of experiments, but would be an important addition to 
the CMT literature insofar as it examines the processes	underlying the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor, it tests the robustness of an original effect, and contributes to an overall estimate of 
an original effect size.  
Meier and Robinson (2004) were the first to examine and explicitly hypothesise about 
the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor. According to Google Scholar, the Meier and Robinson 
(2004) article has been cited 374 times. In their first experiment, Meier and Robinson found 
that the categorisation of positive words was facilitated when they appeared at the top of the 
computer screen (vs. the bottom of the computer screen), whereas the categorisation of 
negative words was facilitated when they appeared at the bottom of the computer screen (vs. 
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the top of the computer screen). The notion of an automatic association between valence and 
verticality was supported by these results. The current experiment aimed to replicate this 
effect.    
For the current experiment, I requested and obtained the original instructions from the 
lead author of the 2004 publication (B. P. Meier, personal communication, July 30, 2014). 
Additional details such as stimuli presentation and screen resolution were also graciously 
provided. The procedure in the original publication provided the remaining details that were 
required to conduct a close replication. Consequently, the current experiment followed the 
method (i.e., procedure, participant recruitment, instructions, stimuli, dependent measures) 
and analyses of Meier and Robinson (2004) as closely as possible.  
It was predicted that positive words would be categorised faster when they appeared 
at the top of the computer screen (vs. the bottom of the computer screen), whereas it was 
predicted that negative words would be categorised faster when they appeared at the bottom 
of the computer screen (vs. the top of the computer screen).   
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-seven (46 female, 11 male) psychology students at the University of Western 
Sydney participated in exchange for course credit. The average age of participants was 21.11 
years (SD = 5.43, range = 17-47 years). A majority of participants identified as Caucasian 
(30%). Additionally, 28% were Middle Eastern, 21% were East and Southeast Asian, 7% 
were South Asian, 5% were from the Pacific Islands, 5% were Latin, 2% were African, and 
2% identified as Other. English was the first language of 67% of participants. The average 
self-rated English language proficiency of the remaining 33% of participants was 4.00 (SD = 
0.58; range = 1-5; 1 = poor, 5 = superior). The average time they had been speaking English 
was 13.79 years (SD = 5.05). Participants were recruited through the university’s research 
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participation system (SONA). There were no exclusion criteria for this experiment.   
Design 
The experiment had a 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (verticality: top vs. 
bottom) within-subjects design. Meier and Robinson’s original study had a sample size of 34 
and found a large effect size (ηp² = .16). A power analysis using G*Power 3.1 software (Faul 
et al., 2009) revealed that a sample size of 54 participants would be required in order to detect 
a medium effect size with an alpha set at .05 and power set at .95. Because initial estimates of 
effect sizes for new findings are typically biased large (Kepes, Banks, McDaniel, & Whetzel, 
2012), I elected to assume a medium effect size for the power analysis. Power was set at .95 
in order to adhere to recent guidelines for sufficient statistical power (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2012). 
Materials 
 The stimuli were presented using a standard desktop computer. Screen resolution was 
set at 1920 × 1080. Stimuli were presented using E-Prime software (Schneider et al., 2002). 
Questionnaires were presented using Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, 2013) on a University-
issued MacBook Pro. A drafting chair was used for the purpose of raising or lowering the 
chair in order to align participants’ eye level with the centre of the computer screen. 
 Stimuli. The stimuli consisted of 100 words: 50 had a positive meaning and 50 had a 
negative meaning (see Appendix P). As in the original study, each word was displayed 
individually (in 18-point white Arial font on a black background). The vertical spatial 
location of the words was counterbalanced. For example, ½ of participants viewed 25 of the 
50 positive words at the top of the screen, whereas ½ of the participants viewed the same 25 
positive words at the bottom of the screen. The order of the words was randomised. 
Responses during the practice phase and the experimental phase were made using a keyboard. 
The keys ‘z’ and ‘m’ were used to indicate positive or negative. These keys were 
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counterbalanced, such that the positive key was ‘z’ for half of the participants and ‘m’ for the 
other half of participants. 
 Dependent variables. Reaction time was recorded directly via the E-Prime software 
(Schneider et al., 2002) and was measured as the time between the presentation of the word 
until the onset of a key response. 
Procedure 
 The procedure was largely the same as in Experiment 2A, with the following 
differences. Participants were positioned in front of a standard desktop computer with the 
keyboard on the table. Participants read the instructions, which included information about 
the aim of the experiment and the task. The order of presentation was identical to the original 
2004 study, and was as follows. 
Prior to the presentation of each word, a fixation cue (+++) was presented at the 
center of the screen for 300 ms. Following this central cue, a subsequent fixation cue 
(+++) was flashed for 300 ms 1.5 in. either above or below (determined at random) 
the central cue. Then, so that participants would fixate near the location where the 
word would appear, a third fixation cue (+++) was flashed for 300 ms 3 in. either 
above or below the central cue (in the same vertical direction as the second cue). The 
word then appeared 4 in. above or below the central cue (in the same vertical direction 
as the third cue). The spatial cues were not intended to prime locations, although they 
may have done so. Rather, the spatial cues were intended to direct attention to the spot 
of the word’s appearance (thereby reducing random spatial exploration and its 
addition of error variance). Words appeared in white, centered horizontally on the 
screen. Participants were instructed to evaluate each word as quickly and as 
accurately as possible. (Meier & Robinson, 2004, p. 244) 
Following Meier and Robinson’s (2004) procedure, “[i]f the response was inaccurate, the 
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word ‘‘INCORRECT’’ appeared in a red font for 1.5 s. Accurate trials were separated by a 
blank screen for 500 ms.” (p. 244). 
 Participants first completed a practice phase to familiarise themselves with the task. 
The practice phase included 12 words (6 positive and 6 negative; see Appendix P) that did 
not appear in the experimental phase. After the practice phase, participants then completed 
the experimental phase, which consisted of 100 trials. Participants then provided 
demographic information including age, gender, and ethnicity. Next, participants completed 
the same suspicion probe as in the previous experiments. After completing the demographics 
and the suspicion probe, participants were debriefed. The experimenter verbally checked for 
suspicion and gave participants a debriefing form to read and take with them. Participants 
were then thanked for their participation and awarded their experimental credit. 
Results 
None of the participants reported any suspicions about the experiment. Data screening 
was undertaken to ensure the accuracy of the data and to check assumptions of analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). Trials with inaccurate responses were excluded from the analysis 
(8.00% of trials). In order to normalise the distribution of the reaction time data, these values 
were subjected to a log transformation (Ratcliff, 1993). Next, trials that were 2.5 SDs above 
or below the grand latency mean (2.00% of latencies) were replaced with the 2.5 SD value 
(e.g., Miller, 1991). All other available cases were retained for analysis. Assumptions of 
normality were satisfactory. A two-way valence (positive, negative) × verticality (up, down) 
repeated measures ANOVA with alpha at .05 was conducted to examine potential differences 
in reaction time.  
The analysis for reaction time revealed that the main effect of valence was significant, 
F(1, 56) = 44.39, p < .001, ηp² = .44. Sidak post hoc comparisons revealed that reaction times 
were faster for positive words than for negative words (MDiff = -51.23, Sidak 95%, CI: -66.64-
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35.83). The main effect of verticality was significant, F(1, 56) = 7.68, p = .008, ηp² = .12. 
Sidak post hoc comparisons revealed that reaction times were faster for words presented at 
the top of the screen than for words presented at the bottom of the screen (MDiff = -19.32, 
Sidak 95%, CI: -33.28-5.35). The predicted valence × verticality interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 56) = 0.69, p = .410, ηp² = .01, 95% CI [0.00-0.12]. Descriptive statistics are 
shown in Table 9. There was also no significant difference in reaction times for words 
presented in metaphor-congruent locations (M = 806.57, SD = 188.32) compared to words 
presented in metaphor-incongruent locations (M = 801.49, SD = 175.67), t(56) = 0.83, p = 
.410, d = .03. 
Table 9 
Reaction Time (ms) for Words by Valence and Verticality 
Valence                                                           Verticality 
                 Up                                 Down                               Overall 
             M (SD)                            M (SD)                              M (SD) 
Positive            771.30 (180.52)               785.53 (168.46)                 778.41a (174.49) 
Words 
Negative          817.45 (189.36)               841.85 (204.86)                 829.65b (197.11) 
Words 
Overall            794.37c (184.94)              813.69d (186.66) 
Note. Means with different subscripts within a given row or column are significantly different from one another 
(p < .05). 
 
Discussion 
The hypotheses were not supported by the results. That is, positive words were not 
categorised faster when they appeared at the top of the computer screen compared to when 
they appeared at the bottom of the computer screen. Similarly, negative words were not 
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categorised faster when they appeared at the bottom of the computer screen compared to 
when they appeared at the top of the computer screen. The results of this experiment 
consequently did not replicate the findings of Meier and Robinson (2004).  
The identification of the reasons as to why a close replication failed to find a 
‘positive’ effect can be a difficult process. The current close replication failed to replicate 
Meier and Robinson (2004) despite having desirably high power (.95) and as close as 
possible adherence to the original method and analyses. However, there are several common 
explanations for a failed replication (Open Science Collaboration, 2012). A first putative 
explanation is that the original effect is false. That is, perhaps Meier and Robinson’s (2004) 
original effect was due to a Type 1 error. Of course, the opposite could also be true, such that 
the current experiment’s results may have been due to a Type 2 error. Importantly, however, 
one ‘negative’ effect does not provide conclusive evidence that an effect does not exist, just 
as one ‘positive’ effect does not provide conclusive evidence that an effect does exist. Hence, 
there is no reason to question the legitimacy of the original study’s results purely on the basis 
of this failed replication attempt.  
Another possible explanation is that the actual effect size may be smaller than first 
reported, which would make it more difficult to detect. The effect size of Meier and 
Robinson’s (2004) original study was large (ηp² = .16), whereas the effect size for the current 
experiment was small (ηp² = .01, 95% CI [0.00-0.12]). The results of this experiment perhaps 
suggest that the effect size is smaller than originally reported, which would not be surprising 
due to the tendency for initial effect size estimates for new findings to be overestimated 
(Kepes et al., 2012). Additional close replications would be required to obtain a more precise 
estimate of the effect size.  
A third possible explanation is that the method of replication may not be identical. In 
the current study, the only difference (apart from the inevitable difference in samples) was 
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that a keyboard was used for participants’ responses instead of a response box as was used in 
the original study. A response box was not available for the replication. Keyboards are widely 
used for reaction time measurements; however, they can produce large variations and timing 
errors (Li, Liang, Kleiner, & Lu, 2010). The variability produced by a keyboard may 
subsequently make a small difference in reaction time undetectable. This type of discrepancy 
between Meier and Robinson’s (2004) original study and the current experiment would have 
to be further investigated to determine whether a method that includes a keyboard rather than 
a response box would systematically influence the results.  
Finally, the method or analysis of the original study or the replication study may be 
flawed. The only potential problem with the method of Meier and Robinson’s (2004) original 
study is that word frequency was not controlled. As already discussed for Experiments 2A-
2B, words that occur more frequently in everyday language are processed faster (Balota et al., 
2007; Howes & Solomon, 1951; Unkelbach et al., 2010). The words that were used in both 
the original study and Experiment 3 did vary in frequency (see Appendix Q; frequency range: 
114-187656, higher scores indicate greater frequency; Balota et al., 2007). Differences in 
word frequency may have led to additional variability across stimuli in both the original study 
and the current experiment. With respect to statistical analysis, both studies used the same 
type of analysis (repeated measures ANOVA) on log-transformed reaction time data after 
excluding inaccurate trials and replacing trials that were 2.5 SDs above or below the grand 
latency mean with the 2.5 SD value. However, although it is assumed that the analyses 
conducted for each experiment were performed accurately, there is always the possibility of 
errors in the analyses for either study.  
The current experiment contributes to the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor literature 
in numerous ways despite failing to replicate Meier and Robinson’s (2004) original study. 
For instance, this experiment examined the robustness of the original effect outside the 
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original laboratory. Additionally, a more accurate identification of the specific conditions 
(e.g., keyboard vs. response box) required to observe the original effect can be obtained by 
comparing the method of this replication and further replications with the method of the 
original study. Finally, a more precise estimate of the effect size can be obtained by 
comparing the original study to this replication and all subsequent close replications. It will 
be beneficial to the literature if this replication is compared, contrasted, and combined with 
additional close replications in order to generate a conclusion regarding the robustness and 
the size of the effect originally found by Meier and Robinson (2004).  
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Chapter Five: General Discussion 
 The overall aim of this project was to examine the influence of the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor on impression formation. To accomplish this aim, a series of four 
experiments were conducted investigating the influence of vertical location (i.e., up, centre, 
down) of stimuli (i.e., positive and negative behavioural descriptions, traits, and words) on 
reaction time, memory, and target evaluations. Across the four experiments, I hypothesised 
that metaphor-congruent material (positive-up, negative-down) would be more quickly 
processed, better recalled and recognised, and evaluated more positively or negatively, than 
metaphor-incongruent material (positive-down, negative-up). These hypotheses were not 
supported (i.e., all ps > .05; these are termed negative results). Nevertheless, despite the 
negative and inconclusive results, the four experiments considered together provide important 
information regarding the investigation of conceptual metaphor in general and of the GOOD IS 
UP conceptual metaphor in particular. The following discussion will include a review and 
interpretation of the findings of the current project, an outline of two important research 
methods issues (i.e., bias and replication) that helps situate the present findings, and a 
breakdown of the implications of this thesis for CMT.  
The Current Project 
Summary of results. The aim of Experiment 1 was to examine the influence of 
vertical location (i.e., up, centre, down) of positive and negative behavioural information on 
reaction time, memory, and target evaluations. The hypotheses were not supported by the 
results. However, the experiment contained a number of methodological limitations which 
are likely to have led to the negative results. That is, it was too ambitious to measure reaction 
time, memory, and target evaluations in the same experiment. After considering the memory 
load and the different instructions required for measuring reaction time versus assessing 
memory and target evaluations, I decided to separate the dependent measures that were used 
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in Experiment 1 into two independent experiments. The findings also led to the conclusion 
that when measuring reaction time it would perhaps be less problematic to use traits (i.e., 
single words) rather than behavioural descriptions (i.e., sentences) in order to limit variability 
caused by sentence length. Consequently, Experiment 1 provided valuable information that 
was used to simplify the design by (1) separating the measurement of the dependent variables 
into two experiments and (2) using less rich stimuli. 
The aim of Experiment 2A was to examine reaction time separately from memory and 
target evaluations. That is, the aim was to examine the influence of the vertical location of 
positive and negative traits on reaction time. Again, despite the unsupported hypotheses, the 
results were informative. For instance, variance in the data could have been due to the 
confounding variables of word length and word frequency. Therefore, researchers should 
strive to ensure consistency in both word length and word frequency if close or conceptual 
replications of Meier and Robinson’s (2004) original study on the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor are conducted in the future. In addition, variance in the data could have been 
increased due to the inclusion of target names with the traits, which could have distracted 
participants and slowed their reaction times.  
The fixation cue used in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2A to focus attention to the 
centre of the projection prior to the presentation of each sentence may have been insufficient. 
Meier and Robinson (2004) included in their original experiment three consecutive fixation 
cues before the presentation of each word. That is, prior to the presentation of a word that 
appeared at the top of the screen, a fixation cue appeared in the centre of the screen, followed 
by a fixation cue 1.5 inches above the central cue, and then finally a fixation cue 3 inches 
above the central cue. The aim of using three spatial cues was to direct attention to the 
vertical location of each word, thereby reducing random spatial exploration. In contrast, 
however, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2A employed only one fixation cue, which appeared 
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in the centre of the projection. This fixation cue would not have controlled random spatial 
exploration. Consequently, reaction time may have been slowed in both experiments due to 
error variance caused by random spatial exploration.  
The aim of Experiment 2B was to examine the influence of the vertical location of 
positive and negative traits on memory and target evaluations. The results did not support the 
hypotheses. However, the negative findings notably highlight that the design (within-subjects 
vs. between-subjects) of a GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor experiment could possibly 
influence the saliency of the association between valence and verticality. Experiment 2B adds 
to the psychological literature by hypothesising about the influence of the GOOD IS UP 
conceptual metaphor when participants are only exposed to one opposite of the perceptual 
dimension (e.g., up or down) and one opposite of the conceptual dimension (e.g., good or 
bad); that is, when the design used is a between-subjects design. The results of Experiment 
2B provide indirect support for the tenets of the shared relational structures view (Lakens et 
al., 2011). That is, it may be that the association between good and up and bad and down can 
only be observed when both opposites for the perceptual and conceptual dimensions of the 
association are co-activated, as in the design of a within-subjects study. Alternatively, the 
presentation of only one opposite of the perceptual dimension and one opposite of the 
conceptual dimension perhaps produces a weaker association and consequently a smaller 
effect size. 
The notion that the co-activation of both opposites could lead to a stronger association 
between valence and verticality highlights another notable difference between the current 
experiment and previous research. That is, participants in Experiment 2B only had to 
physically look up or down during exposure to the traits, whereas in previous research 
participants were required to look up and down to view the stimuli (e.g., Meier & Robinson, 
2004; Palma et al., 2011). Consequently, in Experiment 2B, participants were engaged in a 
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fixed bodily state, whereas in previous research, participants were engaged in bodily 
movement (i.e., eye movement) from trial to trial. These findings perhaps suggest that the 
nature of the physical experience could influence the strength of the association. Thus, a 
relevant question for future research is whether a fixed bodily state is enough to activate the 
GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor or whether bodily movement is fundamental to the 
association. Bodily movement was examined in the final experiment. 
The last step in this project was to conduct a close replication (Experiment 3) of 
Meier and Robinson (2004) due to the negative results obtained in Experiments 1-2B. That is, 
it was important to attempt to rule out alternative explanations for the negative results by 
examining whether the original effect would replicate. A close replication of Meier and 
Robinson (2004) could also examine the tenets of the shared relational structures view by 
examining bodily movement rather than a fixed bodily state. In hindsight, it would have been 
useful to begin this project with a close replication of Meier and Robinson (2004), and then 
proceed to extend that work in subsequent experiments. However, it was not until the later 
stages of this project that the importance of replication (re)surfaced in psychological science. 
Experiment 3 followed the method of the original study as closely as possible; however, the 
results did not support the hypotheses that positive and negative words would be categorised 
faster when they appeared in metaphor-congruent spatial locations. Nevertheless, a 
comparison between the original study and Experiment 3 yielded useful information about 
the empirical investigation of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor. For instance, the true 
effect size may be smaller than first reported (Kepes et al., 2012). If so, the current 
experiment may have lacked power to detect that smaller effect size. Therefore, perhaps 
sample size calculations for future research could include a smaller effect size value, rather 
than a conservative (i.e., medium) effect size as was used to calculate the sample size for the 
current experiment. Additionally, word frequency was not controlled in either the original 
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study or in Experiment 3, which used the same stimuli. The variability in word frequency 
may have produced variability in the data by reducing the association between the variables 
of interest, namely valence and verticality, such that the results may instead reflect an 
association between word frequency and verticality. A systematic comparison of the method 
of both experiments revealed that the only differences that could plausibly have accounted for 
the discrepant results were that Experiment 3 had a different sample and that a keyboard was 
used rather than a response box to capture participants’ responses. Evidently, Experiment 3 is 
informative because it allowed for a comparison between the original study and a close 
replication, which identified both word frequency and measurement device as possible factors 
that could account for the negative results. These factors should be controlled in future 
experiments. Ideally, the results of Experiment 3 should be combined with further close 
replications in order to examine the robustness of the effect and to obtain a more precise 
estimate of the effect. 
 Until recently, the present findings may have been dismissed and considered 
unimportant due to the negative results. However, substantial changes are now taking place in 
psychological science such that there has been a renewed emphasis on the importance of 
negative results and replication studies. Therefore, it is worthwhile to reconsider the present 
findings in the context of both bias (publication bias and reporting bias) and replication. 
Bias 
It is well known that there is a bias in the scientific literature for positive results 
(Csada, James, & Espie, 1996; Statzner & Resh, 2010). That is, there is a bias toward 
reporting results that reach statistical significance (i.e., p < .05; these are termed positive 
results). Journals typically publish novel findings and positive results because innovative 
research is regarded as an important key to advancing science. The current bias for positive 
results was investigated by Fanelli (2010) who examined 2434 papers published between 
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2000-2007 across a range of disciplines and found that positive results are more prevalent in 
psychology and psychiatry (91.5%) than in a hard science such as space science (70.2%). In a 
further study across 19 disciplines, Fanelli (2012) found that the frequency of papers 
reporting a positive result increased by 22% between 1990 and 2007. Novel and positive 
results are unquestionably important in the pursuit of truth and the accumulation of 
knowledge. However, the reluctance to publish negative results has led to numerous problems 
across many scientific disciplines including psychology. These problems include the file-
drawer problem, the threat to the notion of science as requiring both falsifiability and 
openness to self-correction, and more specific problems such as effect size overestimation.   
The most notable problem resulting from the publication bias against negative results 
is the file-drawer problem, a phenomenon in which studies that obtain negative results are 
recognised by researchers as unpublishable and consequently relegated to the bottom of the 
“file drawer”. Thirty-six years ago, Rosenthal (1979) noted that the extreme view of this 
problem is “that the journals are filled with the 5% of the studies that show Type I errors, 
while the file drawers back at the lab are filled with the 95% of the studies that show 
nonsignificant (e.g., p > .05) results” (p. 638). Evidently, the file drawer problem is not a 
recent phenomenon. In fact, the discussion of publication bias extends back at least 56 years 
(McNemar, 1960; Smart, 1964; Tullock, 1959). One notable study found that 97% of papers 
published in psychology in the mid-20th century included positive results (Sterling, 1959), 
which is higher than the percentage subsequently reported by Fanelli (2010). A consequence 
of this enduring trend of journals dismissing negative results is that researchers are less likely 
to even report negative results for fear that the entire paper will be rejected (Greenwald, 
1975). 
It is perhaps unsurprising that researchers are less likely to report negative results due 
to an awareness that such results are unlikely to be published. Typically, research practices 
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ultimately aim for positive results that confirm and support a priori hypotheses. The primary 
advantage of confirmatory and consistent results is that they are considered to provide a clear 
presentation of an investigation that can be communicated both to the scientific community 
and to the general public. Positive results are described as “neat”, “clean” and easy to 
interpret, whereas negative results are described as being “ugly”, “messy”, and hard to 
interpret (Giner-Sorolla, 2012). However, the dichotomous categorisation of results into 
“positive” and “negative” connotes that the two types of results possess either a positive 
quality or a negative quality. The reluctance of both researchers and journals to acknowledge 
the importance of negative results can lead to predictions and conclusions that are misguided. 
The problematic issue of positively-biased literature has implications for the idea that 
falsifiability is an important criterion for the scientific status of a theory.	 
Generally, psychology, like other scientific disciplines, follows a hypothetico-
deductive model (Popper, 1934; 1959). This model of science involves the generation of a 
hypothesis that can then be either supported or not supported by evidence that is collected via 
empirical research. The notion of the falsifiability of a theory is fundamental to science. 
According to Popper (1963), “the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its 
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability” (p. 37). One of the most important and crucial 
elements of falsification is negative results. The absence of negative results in the literature 
and their perceived unimportance reflects a misunderstanding of a fundamental aim of 
science which is to attempt falsifications. Instead, the literature reflects an overall aim to 
produce a “good story” rather than a “true story” (King, 2012). Investigators are consequently 
only aware of studies that support hypotheses and unaware of studies that do not support 
hypotheses. The question then arises as to how theories and hypotheses can be falsified and 
refuted if there is a bias toward publishing only positive results. 
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Another problem associated with publication bias is the loss of the notion that science 
is self-correcting (Merton, 1973). Self-correction is the idea that if a claim about a 
phenomenon is wrong, sooner or later it will be shown to be wrong by empirical evidence, 
and consequently an understanding of that phenomenon will be changed for the better. 
However, this does not mean that all science at this moment in time is correct or that there 
has been, is, or will be a trend that improves scientific credibility (Ioannidis, 2012). In fact, 
the notion that scientific practices do adhere to the principles of self-correction may be a 
myth due to the recognition that once a finding is published it is unlikely to be challenged in 
the literature by contradictory findings – that is, negative results (Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 
2012). In other words, publication bias ultimately impedes not only falsification, but also 
self-correction. In order for falsification and self-correction processes to occur in 
psychological science, a shift toward greater recognition of negative results is essential.  
There are also more specific problems with dismissing and/or neglecting negative 
results. These problems include: effect size overestimation in general, the inflation of effect 
size estimates in meta-analyses, the inability to identify possible false positives, the inability 
to identify boundary conditions, the exaggeration of the importance of effects, and the waste 
of time and resources that occurs after an attempt to replicate effects that have previously 
already failed to replicate (for further details see Ioannidis, 2005; Song et al., 2010). For 
instance, the results of meta-analytic reviews may overstimate mean effect sizes due to the 
possibility that they do not include negative results and/or do not correct for publication bias 
(Field, 2003). In sum, the problems that are associated with publication bias and an overall 
reluctance to report negative results affect many different aspects of research practices. 
Replication 
The avoidance of negative results in research practices is comparable to the avoidance 
of replication studies. Replication studies, like negative results, are fundamental to scientific 
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progress (Nosek & Lakens, 2014; Schmidt, 2009). Generally, replications aim to confirm or 
disconfirm findings by examining whether results can be reproduced by another researcher in 
another lab (Schmidt, 2009). The common goals of replication include: an investigation of 
the underlying processes of a theory, the refinement of a theory, a contribution to a more 
precise estimate of the effect size, a test of the robustness and reliability of the effect, and the 
identification and subsequent removal of artifacts and false positives (Brandt et al., 2014; 
Schmidt, 2009). Replication is typically viewed by researchers as an integral process of 
verification that is required to determine the validity of empirical results (Francis, 2012). 
Some researchers even consider replication to be the gold standard of science (Jasny, Chin, 
Chong, & Vignieri, 2011). Replication is undeniably important for building a cumulative 
science (for further details see Asendorpf et al., 2013). 
However, replications in the published psychological literature are extremely rare 
(Madden, Easley, & Dunn, 1995; Sterling, Rosenbaum, & Weinkam, 1995). For instance, 
across 100 of the most cited psychology journals since 1900, only 1.07% of all publications 
were replications (Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012). Only 14% of these replications were 
direct replications (also known as “close” replications) as opposed to 81.9% which were 
“conceptual” replications (see discussion below for the nature of this distinction). This low 
percentage of published replications in the psychological literature is perhaps owing to 
replications being undervalued by journals because they are viewed as lacking prestige, 
originality, and excitement (Lyndsay & Ehrenberg, 1993; Neuliep & Crandall, 1990, 1993). 
Consequently, replication studies, like negative results, are unlikely to be submitted by 
researchers to journals due to the awareness that they are unlikely to be published (Neuliep & 
Crandall, 1990).   
However, attitudes toward replications have recently begun to change as a 
consequence of the current replicability crisis in psychological science (Pashler & 
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Wagenmakers, 2012). Whether this crisis is overblown or not (Pashler & Harris, 2012), there 
is a perceived lack of confidence in psychological science due to recent concerns about 
questionable research practices and failed replications of high-profile studies (see Doyen, 
Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). However, the 
so-called ‘crisis’ is not a new phenomenon in psychological science (for an overview, see 
Sturm & Mülberger, 2012). The crisis that is comparable and most relevant to today’s crisis 
is that which occurred in psychology in the 1970s (Elms, 1975; Greenwald, 1975). During 
this time, psychology suffered from a crisis of confidence due to concerns about publication 
bias and the limitations of null-hypothesis significance testing. The solutions promoted in the 
1970s (e.g., the establishment of specialised journals that would publish replication studies), 
however, did not have the desired effect and ultimately failed (e.g., Representative Research 
in Social Psychology and Replications in Social Psychology). In contrast, the response to the 
current ‘crisis’ in psychology has seen a somewhat warmer embrace of replication studies. 
For instance, high impact psychology journals such as the Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology and Psychological Science are beginning to express willingness to publish both 
successful and failed replication studies (e.g., Ranehill et al., 2015). There are also projects 
such as the Reproducibility Project: Psychology, which was a large-scale collaborative effort 
with the aim of examining the rate of reproducibility in psychological science (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2012).  
The replications that were conducted in the Reproducibility Project were direct 
replications. Replications are divided into two categories: direct replications and conceptual 
replications (Schmidt, 2009). Here, direct replications will be referred to as ‘close 
replications’ due to the faulty assumption that an experiment can ever be an identical 
reproduction of an original study (Blandt et al., 2014; Rosenthal, 1991; Tsang & Kwan, 
1999). That is, inevitably, certain elements of an experiment, such as the participants, will 
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always differ across studies. Nevertheless, close replications aim to reproduce studies as 
closely as possible. In contrast, conceptual replications investigate the same hypotheses of the 
original studies by adopting different methods (Schmidt, 2009). It is important to distinguish 
between these two types of replication because their conclusions and implications are not the 
same. 
 For instance, a successful close replication will support both the reproducibility of an 
original finding and also the original hypothesis by using the same operationalised variables. 
In contrast, a successful conceptual replication validates only the hypothesis of an original 
study, because the same hypothesis is supported by two experiments with variables that have 
been operationalised differently. It has been argued that conceptual replications are more 
effective than close replications because they test both validity and generality (e.g., Stroebe & 
Strack, 2014). However, a failed conceptual replication is far from being effective due to the 
uncertain inferences that can be drawn from the results. That is, the negative results could be 
due to numerous factors such as the operationalised variables not having the hypothesised 
effect or even the historical context and the physical setting of the experiment (Hendrick, 
1991). It is therefore difficult to determine whether the lack of replicability is due to the 
original experiment or the conceptual replication. Although the results of failed close 
replications can also be difficult to interpret, stronger conclusions can be drawn about the 
original experiment and the replication study due to their similarities. Inferences can also be 
made about the likelihood that the original finding was due to a Type I error.  
 Close replications would appear to be the first logical step in an investigation of the 
replicability of an effect. The primary goal of the first step should be to examine whether a 
reliable and robust effect exists. The second step would then be to investigate the original 
effect’s generalisability and validity by manipulating the method (i.e., conduct a conceptual 
replication). However, researchers often bypass this first step; the second step is of greater 
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benefit to them as researchers because conceptual replications are more likely to be 
published. Consequently, conceptual replications interact with publication bias (Pashler & 
Harris, 2012). That is, successful conceptual replications are perceived as novel and more 
interesting than close replications and are therefore more likely to be published. Just as 
publication bias obscures the importance of negative results, so too does it obscure the 
importance of close replications. 
 The importance of replication is not limited to the specific goals (e.g., contribution to 
a more precise estimate of an effect size) that have already been mentioned. In a broader 
sense, the process of replication is fundamental to any experimental science. For instance, 
replication is assumed to be the principal mechanism of self-correction and is essential to 
establishing objective knowledge (Broad & Wade, 1982; Radder, 1996). Processes such as 
falsification and self-correction will continue to be impeded if the bias against replication 
studies in the psychological literature is not addressed and corrected. Notably, there are signs 
in the current climate that psychology is beginning to be more receptive and supportive of 
negative results and replication studies, which seems to be influencing research practices.  
The highlighted importance of both replication and negative results is relevant for 
interpreting and situating the present experiments. Taken together, the set of experiments has 
valuable implications for and can make a contribution both to future empirical investigations 
of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor and to the development of CMT.  
Future directions 
Overall, the current project highlights several issues that should be investigated 
further in future research. Notably, the experiments underline the importance of examining 
both the influence of the tenets of a shared relational structures view (i.e., within-subjects 
design vs. between-subjects design) and different bodily experiences (i.e., fixed bodily states 
vs. bodily movement) on the processing of abstract evaluative concepts. Although a solid 
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conclusion was not reached regarding the current project’s original hypothesis about the 
influence of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor on impression formation, the four 
experiments have led to the identification of several variables that may need to be considered 
in the design of future empirical investigations	of the metaphor (e.g., word frequency, word 
length, and the design of the experiment). Additionally, the findings can be used to inform 
and perhaps refine CMT. For instance, the context in which the GOOD IS UP conceptual 
metaphor influences cognitive processes may have to include the co-activation of both 
opposites of both dimensions of the association. Additionally, the context may also require 
specific bodily experiences such as bodily movement (e.g., eye movement, head movement), 
rather than fixed bodily states in order to observe an effect. The theoretical boundary 
conditions of CMT will become clearer with further empirical investigation of conceptual 
metaphor.   
Future research also has the potential to identify social processes that might be 
influenced by the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor. For instance, if successful experimental 
demonstrations of the metaphor’s influence on impression formation with unambiguous 
targets can be achieved (e.g., using the types of behavioural descriptions used in Experiment 
1, but in a way that avoids memory overload), then an important next step would be to 
investigate whether conceptual metaphor influences the interpretation and evaluation of 
ambiguous target persons. The conceptual dimension of morality (in which ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
are opposites) could be examined by using morally ambiguous targets. For instance, 
evaluating a morally-ambiguous description when it is presented in upper space may lead to a 
positive interpretation, whereas evaluating the same description when it is presented in lower 
space may lead to a negative interpretation. Such an investigation would further contribute to 
an understanding of the embodied processes underlying target evaluations.  
Further research could then investigate whether the embodied processes of evaluating 
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another individual flow on to influence the self via social comparison processes. Social 
comparisons occur when people evaluate themselves relative to another person on a given 
dimension and can happen spontaneously and effortlessly (e.g., Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 
1995). For instance, participants may rate a relevant target more positively when that target’s 
behavioural descriptions are presented up compared to when they are presented down. 
Consequently, self-evaluations of participants may shift up or down in parallel with target 
evaluations, such that self-evaluations will be more positive after reading the behavioural 
descriptions of the target whilst looking up compared to when looking down to read the same 
information. Thus, there are numerous avenues for future research investigating the influence 
of this conceptual metaphor on impression formation and social comparison, which will lead 
to the identification of the boundary conditions of the GOOD IS UP conceptual metaphor and 
CMT. 
This future research will not only have implications for CMT, but it can also have real 
world practical applications. For example, if politicians want to be evaluated more positively 
during an election campaign, perhaps they should have their billboards up high near 
motorways rather than down low on kerbside A-frame signs. Similarly, if supermarkets want 
consumers to purchase particular products, perhaps those products should be placed on higher 
shelves rather than lower shelves. Although eye level (“Eye level is buy level”) is important 
for product placement (Lantos, 2011), perhaps the subtle cues of up and down might play a 
role via the utilisation of digital media, which has become an important tool in the changing 
landscape of marketing and public relations. The possibilities for future research on the GOOD 
IS UP conceptual metaphor that have real-world applications are numerous. 
There are also many avenues for future research investigating CMT because 
conceptual metaphor has such a broad relevance in everyday life due to the countless social 
phenomena that involve the processing of abstract concepts (see Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, & 
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Bargh, 2012). A pattern in the literature has emerged whereby an individual metaphor is 
selected and hypotheses about its influence on certain cognitive processes are tested by using 
the metaphoric transfer strategy (Landau et al., 2010). Although this metaphor-focused 
approach is informative and does have implications for CMT, it is perhaps a somewhat 
limited approach; that is, it may ultimately lead to a collection of novel, albeit isolated 
findings that consequently do not provide a comprehensive account of the specific conditions, 
such as situations or contexts, in which cognition is more or less likely to be influenced by 
conceptual metaphor. This limitation and potential risk of researchers simply jumping from 
metaphor to metaphor has led to the recommendation that researchers should perhaps 
complement a metaphor-focused approach with a phenomenon-focused approach (Landau et 
al., 2010; Meier, Schnall, Schwarz, & Bargh, 2012). This approach involves selecting a 
phenomenon (e.g., romantic courtship), identifying the metaphors that are related to 
understanding the phenomenon (e.g., romantic courtship may be viewed as a dance, a game, 
or a conquest), and examining the influence of the different metaphors on the evaluation and 
interpretation of the phenomenon (e.g., people who view romantic courtship as a dance may 
be more sympathetic to potential romantic partners than people who view it as a conquest; 
Landau, Robinson, & Meier, 2014). Perhaps researchers can use the alternate source strategy, 
which relates back to the notion that people use more than one source domain (e.g., dance, 
game, conquest) to understand and think about a given target concept (e.g., romantic 
courtship; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Landau et al., 2010). This strategy can adopt the 
phenomenon-focused approach by priming different source domains to examine whether they 
influence the processing of target-relevant information in different ways (Landau et al., 
2010).  
It is important for research on conceptual metaphor to be theory driven and motivated 
by intentions to understand the phenomena. Consequently, the key ingredients of an empirical 
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investigation of CMT include the integration of both positive and negative results and 
successful and failed (close) replications. A relevant question that is often asked is what 
determines which effect needs replicating? Aside from the obvious answer that every effect 
should at some point be replicated, the next answer would certainly be to include important 
and influential experiments that have had an impact on theory. An empirical investigation of 
CMT that includes replication of seminal experiments will contribute to the important 
processes of self-correction and falsification.  
CMT is still in its infancy in terms of both robust and reliable empirical findings and a 
commitment to solid theoretical tenets. A distinctive quality of CMT is that it is not 
inherently connected to Computational Theory of Mind (representationalist). Seemingly, 
CMT would perhaps be more valuable if it were to be developed within a Direct realist/RECS 
framework (non-representationalist), rather than becoming a mechanism within a 
conservative embodied cognition approach or simply an extension of CTM. If CMT were to 
be developed within a Direct realist/RECS framework it would avoid the fundamental 
problems that are faced by representational accounts (including Perceptual Symbol Systems), 
such as the symbol grounding problem and the homunculus problem. Additionally, the 
development of CMT within such a framework has the potential to contribute to the 
establishment of a more comprehensive Direct realist/RECS account of cognition, which, to 
date, is somewhat limited in its theorising and empirical research on higher order cognition. 
A Direct realist/RECS approach could then develop a truly embodied account of cognition 
and consequently provide a new perspective that identifies and explains some of the 
processes that are fundamental to human behaviour. 
 
 
 
	
	
108 
References 
Allison, D. B., Gorman, B. S., & Primavera, L. H. (1993). Some of the most common 
questions asked of statistical consultants: Our favourite responses and recommended 
readings. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 119, 153-185. 
Retrieved from http://web.a.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au 
Anderson, J. (1962). Studies in empirical philosophy. Sydney, Australia: Angus and 
Robertson.  
Anderson, J. (1978). Arguments concerning representations for mental imagery. 
Psychological Review, 85, 249-277. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.85.4.249 
Anderson, M. L. (2006). Evolution, embodiment and the nature of the mind. In B. 
Hardy-Vallee & N. Payette (Eds.), Beyond the brain: Embodied, situated & 
distributed cognition (pp. 15-28). Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
Anderson, N. H. (1965). Adding versus averaging as a stimulus combination rule in 
impression formation. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 70, 394-400. doi: 
10.1037/h0022280  
Anderson, N. H. (1971). Integration theory and attitude change. Psychological 
Review, 78, 171-206. doi: 10.1037/h0030834  
Asch, S. E. (1946). Forming impressions of personality. The Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, 41, 258-290. doi: 10.1037/h0055756  
Asendorpf, J. B., Conner, M., De Fruyt, F., De Houwer, J., Denissen, J. J. A., Fiedler, 
K., . . . & Wicherts, J. M. (2013). Recommendations for increasing replicability in 
psychology. European Journal of Personality, 27, 108-119. doi: 10.1002/per.1919  
Audacity Team (2013). Audacity(R): Free Audio Editor and Recorder: Version 2.0.3 
[Computer software]. Retrieved from http://audacityteam.org 
Balota, D. A., & Neely, J. H. (1980). Test-expectancy and word-frequency effects in 
	
	
109 
recall and recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and 
Memory, 6, 576-587. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.6.5.576  
Balota, D. A., Yap, M. J., Cortese, M. J.,  Hutchison, K. A., Kessler, B., Loftis, B., . . 
. & Treiman, R. (2007). The English lexicon project. Behavior Research Methods, 39, 
445-459. Retrieved from http://elexicon.wustl.edu/userguide.pdf 
Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
22, 577-609. doi:10.1017/S0140525X99002149 
Barsalou, L. W., & Wiemer-Hastings, K. (2005). Situating abstract concepts. In D. Pecher & 
R. Zwaan (Eds.), Grounding cognition: The role of perception and action in memory, 
language, and thought (pp. 129–63). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.  
Baumeister, R. F.,  Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego 
depletion: Is the active self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74, 1252-1265. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1252 
Beck, A. T., Rush, A. J., Shaw, B. F., & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive therapy of 
depression. New York: Guilford Press.  
Berinsky, A. J., Huber, G. A., & Lenz, G. S. (2012). Evaluating online labor 
markets for experimental research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk. Political 
Analysis, 20, 351-368. doi:10.1093/pan/mpr057 
Bickhard, M. H. (1996). Troubles with computationalism. In W. O’Donohue & R. Kitcher 
(Eds.), The philosophy of psychology (pp. 173-184). London: Sage. 
Boucher, J., & Osgood, C. E. (1969). The Pollyanna Hypothesis. Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Behavior, 8, 1-8. doi: 10.1016/S0022-5371(69)80002-2 
Brandt, M. J., IJzerman, H., Dijksterhuis, A., Farach, F. J., Geller, J., Giner- Sorolla, 
	
	
110 
R., … & Veer, A. V. (2014). The replication recipe: What makes for a convincing 
replication? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 50, 217-224. doi: 
10.2139/ssrn.2283856  
Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual process model of impression formation. In T. K. Srull & R. S. 
Wyer (Eds.), Advances in social cognition: A dual process model of impression 
formation (Vol. 1, pp. 1-36). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Broad, W., & Wade, N. (1982). Betrayers of the truth. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster. 
Brooks, R. A. (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE Journal of 
Robotics and Automation, 2, 14-23. doi: 10.1109/JRA.1986.1087032 
Brooks, R. A. (1991a). New approaches to robotics. Science, 253, 1227-1232. doi: 
10.1126/science.253.5025.1227 
Brooks, R. A. (1991b). Intelligence without representation. Artificial Intelligence, 47, 
139–159. doi:10.1016/0004-3702(91)90053-M  
Buhrmester, M. D., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: 
A new source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 6, 3–5. doi: 10.1177/1745691610393980  
Burkitt, E., Barrett, M., & Davis, A. (2003). Children’s colour choices for completing 
drawings of affectively characterised topics. Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 44, 445–455. doi:10.1111/1469-7610.00134 
Burnstein, E., & Schul, Y. (1982). The informational basis of social judgments: The 
operations in forming an impression of another person. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 18, 217-234. doi: 10.1016/0022-1031(82)90051-8  
Carlston, D. E., & Skowronski, J. J. (1994). Savings in the relearning of trait 
information as evidence for spontaneous inference generation. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 66, 840–856. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.66.5.840   
	
	
111 
Carreiras, M., & Garling, T. (1990). Discrimination of cardinal compass directions. 
Acta Psychologica, 73, 3-11. doi: 10.1016/0001-6918(90)90055-K  
Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Chemero, A. (2013). Radical embodied cognitive science. Review of General 
Psychology, 17, 145-150. doi: 10.1037/a0032923  
Clark, A. (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press.  
Clark, A., & Toribio, J. (1994). Doing without representing? Synthese, 101, 401–431. 
doi: 10.1007/BF01063896  
Cowan, N. (2000). The magical number 4 in short-term memory: A reconsideration of 
mental storage capacity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 87-185. doi: 
10.1177/0963721409359277 
Crawford, L. E., Margolies, S. M., Drake, J. T., & Murphy, M. E. (2006). Affect 
biases memory of location: Evidence for the spatial representation of affect. Cognition 
& Emotion, 20, 1153-1169. doi: 10.1080/02699930500347794 
Csada, R. D., James, P. C., & Espie, R. H. M. (1996). The “file drawer problem” of 
non-significant results: Does it apply to biological research? Oikos, 76, 591-593. doi: 
10.2307/3546355 
Descartes, R. (1637). Discourse on the method [eBook]. Retrieved from 
https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/d/descartes/rene/d44dm/ 
Dewey, J. (1925/1929). Experience and nature. New York, NY: W W Norton & 
Company. 
Doyen, S., Klein, O., Pichon, C-L., & Cleeremans, A. (2012). Behavioral priming: 
It's all in the mind, but whose mind? PLoS ONE, 7, e29081. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029081 
	
	
112 
Elms, A. C. (1975). The crisis of confidence in social psychology. American 
Psychologist, 30, 967-976. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.30.10. 967 
Fanelli, D. (2010). ‘‘Positive’’ results increase down the hierarchy of the sciences. 
PLoS ONE, 5, e10068. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010068  
Fanelli, D. (2012). Negative results are disappearing from most disciplines and 
countries. Scientometrics, 90, 891-904. doi: 10.1007/s11192-011-0494-7  
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A. G. (2009). Statistical power analyses 
using G*Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. Behavioral 
Research Methods, 41, 1149-1160. doi: 10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149. 
Field, A. P. (2003). Can meta-analysis be trusted? The Psychologist, 16, 642-645. 
Retrieved from http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/714/1/CAN_META-
ANALYSIS_BE_TRUSTED.pdf  
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An 
introduction to theory und research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.  
Fisher, S. (1964). Depressive affect and perception of up-down. Journal of 
Psychiatric Research, 2, 25-30. doi: 10.1016/0022-3956(64)90026-3 
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., & Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of social 
cognition: Warmth and competence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 77-83. doi: 
10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.005  
Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of impression formation, 
from category-based to individuating processes: Influences of information and 
motivation on attention and interpretation. Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, 23, 1-74. Retrieved from 
https://psychology.clas.asu.edu/sites/default/files/fiske__neuberg_1990.pdf   
Fiske, S. T., & Pavelchak, M. A. (1986). Category-based versus piecemeal-based 
	
	
113 
affective responses: Developments in schema-triggered affect. In R. M. Sorrentino & 
E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social 
behavior (pp. 167-203). New York, NY: Guilford Press.  
Fodor, J. A. (1975). The language of thought. New York, NY: Crowell. 
Fodor, J. A. (1985). Fodor's guide to mental representation: The intelligent auntie's 
vade-mecum. Mind, 94, 76-100. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2254700  
Fodor, J. A. (2008). LOT2: The language of thought revisited. Oxford, UK: Clarendon 
Press. 
Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A 
critical analysis. Cognition, 28, 3-71. Retrieved from 
http://www.lscp.net/persons/dupoux/teaching/AT1_2014/papers/Fodor_Pylyshyn_198
8_Connectionism.Cognition.pdf 
Francis, G. (2012). Publication bias and the failure of replication in experimental 
  psychology. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 19, 975–991. doi: 
  10.3758/s13423-012-0322-y. 
Franklin, S. (1997). Autonomous agents as embodied AI. Cybernetics and Systems, 
25, 499-520. doi: 10.1080/019697297126029  
Freud, S. (1895/1954). Project for a scientific psychology. In M. Bonaparte, A. Freud, & E. 
Kris (Eds.), The origins of psycho-analysis: Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, drafts and 
notes: 1887-1902 (pp. 347-445). New York, NY: Basic Books.  
Gable, S. L., Reis, H. T., & Elliot, A. J. (2000). Behavioral activation and inhibition 
in everyday life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 1135-1149. doi: 
10.1037//0022-3514.78.6.1135  
Gibbs, R. W. (2006). Embodiment and cognitive science. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
	
	
114 
Gibbs, R. W. (2011). Evaluating conceptual metaphor theory. Discourse Processes, 
48, 529-562. doi: 10.1080/0163853X.2011.606103  
Gibson, J. J. (1966). The senses considered as perceptual systems. Boston, MA:  
Houghton Mifflin.  
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston, MA: 
Houghton Mifflin. 
Gilbert, D. T., Giesler, R. B., & Morris, K. A. (1995). When comparisons arise. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 227-236. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.69.2.227 
Giner-Sorolla, R. (2012). Science or art? How aesthetic standards grease the way 
through the publication bottleneck but undermine science. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 7, 562-571. doi:10.1177/1745691612457576 
Glenberg, A. M., & Kaschak, M. P. (2002). Grounding language in action. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9, 558-565. doi: 10.3758/BF03196313 
Goldberg, L. R. (1999). A broad-bandwidth, public domain, personality inventory 
measuring the lower-level facets of several five-factor models. In I. Mervielde, I. 
Deary, F. De Fruyt, & F. Ostendorf (Eds.), Personality psychology in Europe (Vol. 7, 
pp. 7-28). Tilburg, The Netherlands: Tilburg University Press. 
Gorman, A. M. (1961). Recognition memory for nouns as a function of abstractness 
and frequency. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61, 23-29. doi: 
10.1037/h0040561 
Götz, K. O., & Götz, K. (1974). Color attitudes of art students and university 
students: I. Imagined colors. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 38, 63-70. 
doi:10.2466/pms.1974.38.1.63 
Green D.M., & Swets, J.A. (1966). Signal detection theory and psychophysics. New 
	
	
115 
York, NY: Wiley.  
Greenwald, A. G. (1975). Consequences of prejudice against the null hypothesis. 
Psychological Bulletin, 82, 1-20. doi: 10.1037/h0076157  
Gregg, V. (1976). Word frequency, recognition and recall. In J. Brown (Ed.), Recall 
and recognition (pp. 183-216). Oxford, England: John Wiley and Sons. 
Griffiths, O., & Mitchell, C. J. (2008). Selective attention in human associative 
learning and recognition memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 137, 
626-648. doi: 10.1037/a0013685  
Hall, J. (1954). Learning as a function of word-frequency. American Journal of 
Psychology, 67, 138-140. doi: 10.2307/1418080 
Hamilton, D. L., Katz, L. B., & Leirer, V. O. (1980). Cognitive representation of 
personality impressions: Organizational processes in first impression formation. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 1050-1063. doi:10.1037/h0077711 
Hamilton, D. L., & Sherman, S. J. (1996). Perceiving persons and groups. 
Psychological Review, 103, 336-355. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.103.2.336 
Harnad, S. (1990). The symbol grounding problem. Physica D, 42, 335-346. doi: 
10.1016/0167-2789(90)90087-6 
Haugeland, J. (1978). The nature and plausibility of cognitivism. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 1, 215-226. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X00074148  
Hebb, D. O. (1949). The organization of behavior. New York, NY: Wiley. 
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. London, UK: SCM Press.  
Heil, J. (1981). Does cognitive psychology rest on a mistake? Mind, 90, 321-342. 
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253090  
Hendrick, C. (1991). Replications, strict replications, and conceptual replications: Are 
they important? In J. W. Neuliep (Ed.), Replication research in the social sciences 
	
	
116 
(pp. 41-49). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan. Memphis, TN: General Books.  
Howes, D. H., & Solomon, R. L. (1951). Visual duration threshold as a function of 
word-probability. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 41, 401-410. doi: 
10.1037/h0047217 
Hutto, D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2005). Why most published research findings are false. PLoS 
Medicine, 2, e124. doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124 
Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2012). Why science is not necessarily self-correcting. Perspectives 
on Psychological Science, 7, 645-654. doi: 10.1177/1745691612464056  
Jacobson, D. (1999), Impression Formation in Cyberspace: Online Expectations and Offline 
Experiences in Text-based Virtual Communities. Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, 5, 0. doi: 10.1111/j.1083-6101.1999.tb00333.x 
James, W. (1890/1983). The principles of psychology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Jasny, B. R., Chin, G., Chong, L., & Vignieri, S. (2011). Again, and again, and again... 
Science, 334, 1225. doi:10.1126/science.334.6060.1225 
Johnson, M. (1987). The body in the mind: The bodily basis of meaning, 
imagination, and reason. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Kensinger, E. A. (2009). Remembering the details: Effects of emotion. Emotion Review, 
1, 99-113. doi: 10.1177/1754073908100432   
Kepes, S., Banks, G. C., McDaniel, M. A., & Whetzel, D. L. (2012). Publication bias in the 
organizational sciences. Organizational Research Methods, 15, 624-662. 
doi:10.1177/1094428112452760 
	
	
117 
King, L. A. (2012). Science: A true story. Dialogue, 26, 6–8. 
Kövecses, Z. (2002). Metaphor: A practical introduction. Oxford, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kövecses, Z. (2005). Metaphor in culture: Universality and variation. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press.  
Kučera, H., & Francis, W. N. (1967). Computational analysis of present-day 
American English. Providence, RI: Brown University press.  
LaFrance, M., & Mayo, C. (1978). Cultural aspects of nonverbal communication. 
International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 2, 71–89. doi: 10.1016/0147-
1767(78)90029-9 
Lakens, D., Semin, G. R., & Foroni, F. (2011). But for the bad, there would not be 
good: Grounding valence in brightness through shared relational structures. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 141, 584-594. doi: 10.1037/a0026468  
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire, and dangerous things. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Lakoff, G. (1993). The contemporary theory of metaphor. In A. Ortony (Ed.), 
Metaphor and thought (2nd ed., pp. 202-251). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge  
University Press. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and 
its challenge to Western thought. New York, NY: Basic Books.  
Lakoff, G., & Turner, M. (1989). More than cool reason. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Landau, M. J., Meier, B. P., & Keefer, L. A. (2010). A metaphor-enriched social 
	
	
118 
cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 1045-1067. doi: 10.1037/a0020970 
Landau, M. J., Robinson, M. D., & Meier, B. P. (2014). Metaphor research in social- 
personality psychology: The road ahead. In M. J. Landau, M. D. 
Robinson & B. P. Meier (Eds.). The power of metaphor: Examining its influence on 
social life (pp. 269-286). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Lantos, G. P. (2011). Consumer behaviour in action: Real-life applications for 
marketing managers. New York, NY: Routledge.  
Lockwood, P., & Kunda, Z. (1997). Superstars and me: Predicting the impact of role 
models on the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 91-103. doi: 
10.1037/0022-3514.73.1.91 
Lundholm, H. (1921). The affective tone of lines: Experimental researches. 
Psychological Review, 28, 43-60. doi: 10.1037/h0072647 
Lyndsay, R. M., & Ehrenberg, A. S. C. (1993). The design of replicated studies. The 
American Statistician, 47, 217–228. doi:10.2307/ 2684982  
Macrae, C. N., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2000). Social cognition: Thinking 
categorically about others. Annual Review of Psychology, 51, 93-120. doi: 
10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.93 
Madden, C. S., Easley, R. W., & Dunn, M. G. (1995). How journal editors view 
replication research. Journal of Advertising, 24, 78-87. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/stable/4188990 
Makel, M. C., Plucker, J. A., & Hegarty, B. (2012). Replications in psychology 
research: How often do they really occur? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 
537-542. doi: 10.1177/1745691612460688 
Mandler, G. (1980). Recognizing: The judgement of previous occurrence. 
Psychological Review, 87, 252–271. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.87.3.252 
	
	
119 
Matlin, M. W., & Stang, D. J. (1978). The Pollyanna principle. Cambridge, MA: 
Schenkman. 
Maze, J. R. (1983). The meaning of behaviour. London, UK: George Allen & Unwin. 
McClelland, J. L., & Rumelhart, D. E. (1986). Parallel Distributed Processing.  
Explorations in the microstructure of cognition. Volume 2: Psychological and 
Biological Models. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
McCulloch, W. S., & Pitts, W. (1943). A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in 
nervous activity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 52, 99-115. Retrieved  from 
http://deeplearning.cs.cmu.edu/pdfs/McCulloch.and.Pitts.pdf 
McGlone, M. S. (2007). What is the explanatory value of a conceptual metaphor? 
Language & Communication, 27, 109-126. doi: 10.1016/j.langcom.2006.02.016 
McGlone, M. S. (2011). Hyperbole, homunculi, and hindsight bias: An alternative 
evaluation of Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Discourse Processes, 48, 563-574. doi: 
10.1080/0163853X.2011.606104 
McMullen, T. (2001). Getting rid of the homunculus: A direct realist approach. In J. 
E. Morss, N. Stephenson & H. V. Rappard (Eds.), Theoretical issues in psychology 
(pp. 159-167). Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
McNemar, Q. (1960). At random: Sense and nonsense. American Psychologist, 15, 
295-300. doi: 10.1037/h0049193  
Meier, B. P., Hauser, D. J., Robinson, M. D., Friesen, C. K., & Schjeldahl, K. (2007). 
What’s “up” with God? Vertical space as a representation of the divine. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 699-710. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.93.5.699 
Meier, B. P., Moller, A. C., Chen, J., & Riemer-Peltz, M. (2011). Spatial metaphor 
and real estate: North-south location biases housing preference. Social Psychological 
and Personality Science, 2, 547-553. doi: 10.1177/1948550611401042  
	
	
120 
Meier, B. P., & Robinson, M. D. (2004). Why the sunny side is up. Psychological 
Science, 15, 243-247. doi: 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00659.x 
Meier, B. P., & Robinson, M. D. (2006). Does “feeling down” mean seeing down? 
Depressive symptoms and vertical selective attention. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 40, 451-461. doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2005.03.001 
Meier, B. P., Robinson, M.D., & Clore, G. L. (2004). Why good guys wear white: 
Automatic inferences about stimulus valence based on color. Psychological Science, 
15, 82-87. doi: 10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.01502002.x 
Meier, B. P., Schnall, S., Schwarz, N., & Bargh, J. (2012). Embodiment in social psychology. 
Topics in Cognitive Science, 4, 705-716. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2012.01212.x  
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962), Phenomenology of perception. London, UK: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul.  
Merton, R. K. (1973). The sociology of science, Theoretical and empirical 
investigations. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.  
Michell, J. (1988). Maze’s direct realism and the character of cognition. Australian Journal 
of Psychology, 40, 227-249. doi: 10.1080/00049538808260045  
Miller, G. A. (1956) The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our 
capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 63, 81-97. doi: 
10.1037/h0043158  
Miller, J. (1991). Short report: Reaction time analysis with outlier exclusion: Bias varies with 
sample size. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A: Human 
Experimental Psychology, 43, 907-912, doi: 10.1080/14640749108400962  
Munakata, Y., & McClelland, J. L. (2003). Connectionist models of development. 
Developmental Science, 6, 413-429. doi: 10.1111/1467-7687.00296  
Murphy, G. L. (1996). On metaphoric representation. Cognition, 60, 173-204. doi: 
	
	
121 
10.1016/0010-0277(96)00711-1 
Neely, J. H., Keefe, D. E., & Ross, K. L. (1989). Semantic priming in the lexical decision 
task: Roles of prospective prime-generated expectancies and 
retrospective semantic matching. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 15, 1003-1019. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.15.6.1003 
Nelson, L. D., & Simmons, J. P. (2009). On southbound ease and northbound fees: 
Literal consequences of the metaphoric link between vertical position and cardinal 
direction. Journal of Marketing Research, 46, 715-726. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/stable/20618935 
Neuliep, J. W., & Crandall, R. (1990). Editorial bias against replication research. 
Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 5, 85-90. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1292299467?accountid=36155 
Neuliep, J. W., & Crandall, R. (1993). Reviewer bias against replication research. 
Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 8, 21-29. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1292304227?accountid=36155 
Newell, A. (1990). Unified theories of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall.  
Niedenthal, P. M., Barsalou, L. W., Winkielman, P., Krauth-Gruber, S., & Ric, F. 
(2005). Embodiment in attitudes, social perception, and emotion. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 9, 184-211. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0903_1  
Nosek, B. A., & Lakens, D. (2014). Registered reports: A method to increase the 
credibility of published results. Social Psychology, 45, 137-141. doi: 10.1027/1864-
9335/a000192 
	
	
122 
Nosek, B. A., Spies, J. R., & Motyl, M. (2012). Scientific utopia II: Restructuring 
incentives and practices to promote truth over publishability. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 7, 615-631. doi: 10.1177/1745691612459058 
Open Science Collaboration. (2012). An open, large-scale, collaborative effort to 
estimate the reproducibility of psychological science. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 7, 657–660. doi: 10.1177/1745691612462588 
Palma, T. A., Garrido, M. V., & Semin, G. R. (2011). Grounding person memory in 
space: Does spatial anchoring of behaviors improve recall? European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 41, 275-280. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.795 
Pashler, H., & Harris, C. R. (2012). Is the replicability crisis overblown? Three 
arguments examined. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 531-536. doi: 
10.1177/1745691612463401  
Pashler, H., & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2012). Editors’ introduction to the special section 
on replicability in psychological science: A crisis of confidence? Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 7, 528–530. doi:10.1177/1745691612465253  
Pavelchak, M. (1989). Forming impressions of others: A demonstration of two 
distinct processes using an idiographic measurement technique. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 354-363. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.56.3.354 
Pfeifer, R., & Scheier, C. (1999). Understanding intelligence. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.  
Pinker, S. (2007). The stuff of thought. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Popper, K. (1934/1959). The logic of scientific discovery. London, UK: Routledge. 
Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and refutations. New York, NY: Basic Books.  
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a ‘theory of mind’? 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 515-526. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X00076512 
	
	
123 
Prince, K., Litovsky, A., & Friedman-Wheeler, D. G.  (2012). Internet mediated 
research: Beware of bots. The Behavior Therapist, 35, 85-88. Retrieved from 
http://www.abct.org/Journals/?m=mJournal&fa=TBT 
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1973). What the mind’s eye tells the mind’s brain: A critique of 
mental imagery. Psychological Bulletin, 80, 1-24. doi:10.1037/h0034650 
Qualtrics (2013) [Computer software]. Provo, UT: Qualtrics.  
Radder, H. (1996). In and about the world: Philosophical studies of science and 
technology. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Ranehill, E., Dreber, A., Johannesson, M., Leiberg, S., Sul, S., & Weber, R. A. 
(2015). Assessing the robustness of power posing: No effect on hormones and risk 
tolerance in a large sample of men and women. Psychological Science, 26, 653-656. 
doi: 10.1177/0956797614553946  
Ratcliff, R. (1993). Methods for dealing with reaction time outliers. Psychological 
Bulletin, 114, 510-532. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.114.3.510 
Repovs, G. (2004). The mode of response and the Stroop effect: A reaction time 
analysis. Horizons of Psychology, 13, 105-144. Retrieved from http://psy.ff.uni-
lj.si/psiholoska_obzorja/arhiv_clanki/2004_2/repovs2.pdf 
Ritchie, L. D. (2003). “ARGUMENT IS WAR”– Or is it a game of chess? Multiple 
meanings in the analysis of implicit metaphors. Metaphor and Symbol, 18, 125-146. 
doi: 10.1207/S15327868MS1802_4 
Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Rosenberg, S., Nelson, C., & Vivekananthan, P. S. (1968). A multidimensional 
approach to the structure of personality impressions. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 9, 283-294. doi:10.1037/h0026086 
	
	
124 
Rosenblatt, F. (1962). Principles of neurodynamics. New York, NY: Spartan.  
Rosenthal, R. (1979). The file drawer problem and tolerance for null results. 
Psychological Bulletin, 86, 638-641. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.86.3.638 
Rosenthal, R. (1991). Replication in behavioral research. In J. W. Neuliep (Ed.), 
Replication research in the social sciences (pp. 1-30). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.  
Rozin, P., Berman, L., & Royzman, E. (2010). Biases in use of positive and negative 
words across twenty natural languages. Cognition and Emotion, 24, 536-548. doi: 
0.1080/02699930902793462  
Rumelhart, D. E., & McClelland, J. L. (1986). Parallel Distributed Processing: 
Explorations in the microstructure of cognition. Volume 1: Foundations. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.  
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. New York: Routledge.  
Schmidt, S. (2009). Shall we really do it again? The powerful concept of replication is 
neglected in the social sciences. Review of General Psychology, 13, 90–100. doi: 
10.1037/a0015108  
Schnall, S., Benton, J., & Harvey, S. (2008). With a clean conscience: Cleanliness 
reduces the severity of moral judgments. Psychological Science, 19, 1219- 
1222. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02227.x 
Schneider, D. J., Hastorf, A. H., & Ellsworth, P. (1979). Person perception. Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Schneider, W., Eschman, A., & Zuccolotto, A. (2002). E-Prime user's guide. 
Pittsburgh, PA: Psychology Software Tools, Inc. 
Searle, J. R. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. The Behavioural and Brain 
Science, 3, 417-457. Retrieved from 
http://www.class.uh.edu/phil/garson/MindsBrainsandPrograms.pdf 
	
	
125 
Shapiro, L. (2007). The embodied cognition research programme. Philosophy 
Compass, 2, 338-346. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00064.x  
Shapiro, L. (2011). Embodied cognition. New York, NY: Routledge.  
Shepard, R. N. (1967). Recognition memory for words, sentences, and pictures. 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 6, 156-163. doi: 10.1016/S0022-
5371(67)80067-7  
Sherman, G. D., & Clore, G. L. (2009). The color of sin: White and black are 
perceptual symbols of moral purity and pollution. Psychological Science, 20, 
1019-1025. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02403.x  
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-positive psychology 
undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as 
significant. Psychological Science, 22, 1359-1366. doi: 10.1177/0956797611417632 
Slepian, M. L., Young, S. G., Rule, N. O., Weisbuch, M., & Ambady, N. (2012). 
Embodied impression formation: Social judgments and motor cues to approach and 
avoidance. Social Cognition, 30, 232-240. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.uws.edu.au/101521soco2012302232 
Smart, R. G. (1964). The importance of negative results in psychological research. 
Canadian Psychologist, 5, 225-232. doi: 10.1037/h0083036   
Song, F., Parekh, S., Hooper, L., Loke, Y. K., Ryder, J., Sutton, A. J., . . . & Harvey, I. 
(2010). Dissemination and publication of research findings: An updated review of 
related biases. Health Technology Assessment, 14, 1-217. doi: 
10.3310/hta14080 
Spencer, H. (1855/1899). Principles of psychology: Vols I and II. London, UK: 
Williams and Norgate. 
Statzner, B., & Resh, V. H. (2010). Negative changes in the scientific publication 
	
	
126 
process in ecology: Potential causes and consequences. Freshwater Biology, 55, 
2639-2653. doi: 10.1111/j.1365-2427.2010.02484.x  
Sterling, T. D. (1959). Publication decisions and their possible effects on inferences 
drawn from tests of significance - or vice versa. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 54, 30-34. doi:10.2307/2282137 
Sterling, T. D., Rosenbaum, W. L., & Weinkam, J. J. (1995). Publication decisions 
revisited: The effect of the outcome of statistical tests on the decision to publish and 
vice versa. The American Statistician, 49, 108-112. doi: 
10.1080/00031305.1995.10476125 
Sternberg, S. (2004). Psychology 600-301 Proseminar in Psychological Methods, 
Spring Semester: Reaction-time experimentation [Handout]. Retrieved from 
http://www.psych.upenn.edu/~saul/rt.experimentation.pdf 
Stroebe, W., & Strack, F. (2014). The alleged crisis and the illusion of exact 
replication. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9, 59-71. doi: 
10.1177/1745691613514450  
Sturm, T., & Mülberger, A. (2012). Crisis discussions in psychology – New historical 
and philosophical perspectives. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C, 
43, 425-433. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2011.11.001 
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2013). Using multivariate statistics (6th 
ed). Boston, MA: Pearson. 
Thornton, G. R. (1944). The effect of wearing glasses upon judgments of personality 
traits of persons seen briefly. Journal of Applied Psychology, 28, 203-207. 
doi:10.1037/h0055862 
Tolaas, J. (1991). Notes on the origin of some spatialization metaphors. Metaphor & 
Symbolic Activity, 6, 203–218. Retrieved from 
	
	
127 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au 
Tsang, E. W., & Kwan, K. M. (1999). Replication and theory development in 
organizational science: A critical realist perspective. Academy of Management 
Review, 24, 759-780. doi: 10.5465/AMR.1999.2553252 
Tullock, G. (1959). Publication decisions and tests of significance: A comment. 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 54, 593. doi:10.2307/2282539  
Turner, M. (1987). Death is the mother of beauty: Mind, metaphor, criticism. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
Turvey, M. T., Shaw, R. E., Reed, E. S., & Mace, W. M. (1981). Ecological laws of 
perceiving and acting: In reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981). Cognition, 9, 237-304. 
Retrieved from http://www.trincoll.edu/~wmace/publications/fodor_pyl_reply-1.pdf 
Uleman, J. S., Rim, S., Saribay, S. A., & Kressel, L. M. (2012). Controversies, 
questions, and prospects for spontaneous social inferences. Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass, 6, 657-673. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2012.00452.x   
Unkelbach, C., Fiedler, K., Bayer, M., Stegmuller, M., & Danner, D. (2008). Why 
positive information is processed faster: The density hypothesis. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 36-49. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.36  
Unkelbach, C., von Hippel, W., Forgas, J. P., Robinson, M. D., Shakarchi, R. J., & 
Hawkins, C. (2010). Good things come easy: Subjective exposure frequency and the 
faster processing of positive information. Social Cognition, 28, 538-555. doi: 
10.1521/soco.2010.28.4.538  
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.  
Vervaeke, J., & Kennedy, J. M. (1996). Metaphors in language and thought: 
Falsification and multiple meanings. Metaphor and Symbolic Activity, 11, 273-284. 
	
	
128 
Retrieved from http://web.a.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au  
Walker, S. F. (1992) A brief history of connectionism and its psychological 
implications. In A. Clark & R. Lutz (Eds.), Connectionism in context (pp. 123-144). 
Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag.  
Wapner, S., Werner, H., & Krus, D. M. (1957). The effect of success and failure on 
space localization. Journal of Personality, 25, 752-756. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
6494.1957.tb01563.x 
Wheeler, M. (2005). Reconstructing the cognitive world: The next step. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.  
Williams, L. E., & Bargh, J. A. (2008). Experiencing physical warmth influences 
interpersonal warmth. Science, 322, 606-607. doi: 10.1126/science.1162548  
Williams, L. E., Huang, J. Y., & Bargh, J. A. (2009). The scaffolded mind: Higher 
mental processes are grounded in early experience of the physical world. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 39, 1257-1267. doi: 
10.1002/ejsp.665  
Wilson, A. D., & Golonka, S. (2013). Embodied cognition is not what you think it is. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 1-13. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00058  
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 9,625-636. doi: 10.3758/BF03196322 
Winter, L., & Uleman, J. S. (1984). When are social judgments made? Evidence for 
the spontaneousness of trait inferences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
47, 237-252. Retrieved from http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.uws.edu.au 
Zhong, C., & Liljenquist, K. (2006). Washing away your sins: Threatened morality 
and physical cleansing. Science, 313, 1451-1452. doi: 
10.1126/science.1130726  
	
	
129 
Appendix A  
Ethics Approval Letter, Amendment Request Approval Letters, Information Sheets, 
Consent Forms, and Debrief Forms 
Ethics Approval Letter 
Our Reference:  H10044 | 13/001183 
 
HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
 
 
15 February 2013 
 
 
 
Doctor Rebecca Pinkus 
School of Social Sciences and Psychology 
 
 
 
Dear Rebecca 
 
I wish to formally advise you that the Human Research Ethics Committee has approved your research 
proposal H10044 “Vertical Space as an Embodied Representation of “Good” and “Bad”: An 
Investigation of Conceptual Metaphor in Impression Formation and Social Comparison”, until 25 
February 2015 with the provision of a progress report annually and a final report on completion.  
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Experiment 1 Information Sheet 
 
 
 
Page 1 of 2
Human Research Ethics Committee 
Office of Research Services  
Participant Information Sheet (General)
Project Title: Effects of Distraction on Visual and Auditory Perception
  
Who is carrying out the study?
Ryan McMullan, PhD candidate 
Dr Rebecca Pinkus, PhD (supervisor) 
Dr Agnes Petocz, PhD (co-supervisor)
 
You are invited to participate in a study conducted by Ryan McMullan. This study will form the basis for 
Ryan's thesis as part of his Doctor of Philosophy degree at the University of Western Sydney under the 
supervision of Dr Rebecca Pinkus, Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences and Psychology, and Dr 
Agnes Petocz, Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences and Psychology.
  
What is the study about?
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether particular forms of distraction can affect visual and 
auditory perception.  
  
What does the study involve?
You will be asked to view material on a large projector screen and then answer questions about this 
material on a computer. You will also be asked some questions about your personal characteristics.  
  
How much time will the study take?
The study will take about 30 minutes to complete, and you will receive half an hour of experimental credit 
from the School of Social Sciences and Psychology for your participation.
  
Will the study benefit me?
You may benefit from the opportunity to actively participate in the psychological research process.
  
Will the study involve any discomfort for me?
No. You will be given breaks throughout the experiment. If at any point you do not wish to continue, you 
may simply inform the experimenter.
  
How is this study being paid for?
The study is being paid for via a School of Social Sciences and Psychology research stipend to Ryan 
McMullan.
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Page 2 of 2
  
Will anyone else know the results? How will the results be disseminated?
All aspects of the study, including the results, will be confidential and only the researchers will have 
access to information on participants. A summary of the final results will be placed on the SONA site for 
participants to view (accessible by clicking on the study name). The results will also be reported in Ryan 
McMullan's thesis for a Doctor of Philosophy degree. The research results may also form the basis of an 
academic manuscript in collaboration with Dr Rebecca Pinkus and Dr Agnes Petocz, to be submitted to a 
peer-reviewed journal.
  
Can I withdraw from the study?
Participation is entirely voluntary: you are not obliged to be involved and  - if you do participate  -you can 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without any penalty of prejudice.
  
Can I tell other people about the study? 
Yes, you can tell other people about the study by providing them with the chief investigator's contact 
details. They can contact the chief investigator to discuss their participation in the research project and 
obtain an information sheet.
  
What if I require further information?
When you have read this information, Ryan will discuss it with you further and answer any questions you 
may have. If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact Dr Rebecca Pinkus,   
02 9772 6729.
  
What if I have a complaint?
This study has been approved by the University of Western Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee. 
The Approval number is H10044.
  
If you have any complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research, you may contact the  
Ethics Committee through the Office of Research Services on Tel +61 2 4736 0229 Fax +61 2 4736 0013 
or email humanethics@uws.edu.au.  
  
Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully, and you will be informed of the 
outcome.  
  
If you agree to participate in this study, you may be asked to sign the Participant Consent Form.
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Experiment 2A and Experiment 2B Information Sheet 
 
 
 
Page 1 of 2
Human Research Ethics Committee 
Office of Research Services  
Participant Information Sheet (General)
Project Title: Effects of Distraction on Visual and Auditory Perception
  
Who is carrying out the study?
Ryan McMullan, PhD candidate 
Dr Rebecca Pinkus, PhD (supervisor) 
Dr Agnes Petocz, PhD (co-supervisor)
 
You are invited to participate in a study conducted by Ryan McMullan. This study will form the basis for 
Ryan's thesis as part of his Doctor of Philosophy degree at the University of Western Sydney under the 
supervision of Dr Rebecca Pinkus, Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences and Psychology, and Dr 
Agnes Petocz, Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences and Psychology.
  
What is the study about?
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether particular forms of distraction can affect visual and 
auditory perception.  
  
What does the study involve?
You will be asked to view material on a large projector screen and then answer questions about this 
material on a computer. You will also be asked some questions about your personal characteristics.  
  
How much time will the study take?
The study will take about 20 minutes to complete, and you will receive 20 minutes of experimental credit 
from the School of Social Sciences and Psychology for your participation.
  
Will the study benefit me?
You may benefit from the opportunity to actively participate in the psychological research process.
  
Will the study involve any discomfort for me?
No. You will be given breaks throughout the experiment. If at any point you do not wish to continue, you 
may simply inform the experimenter.
  
How is this study being paid for?
The study is being paid for via a School of Social Sciences and Psychology research stipend to Ryan 
McMullan.
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Page 2 of 2
  
Will anyone else know the results? How will the results be disseminated?
All aspects of the study, including the results, will be confidential and only the researchers will have 
access to information on participants. A summary of the final results will be placed on the SONA site for 
participants to view (accessible by clicking on the study name). The results will also be reported in Ryan 
McMullan's thesis for a Doctor of Philosophy degree. The research results may also form the basis of an 
academic manuscript in collaboration with Dr Rebecca Pinkus and Dr Agnes Petocz, to be submitted to a 
peer-reviewed journal.
  
Can I withdraw from the study?
Participation is entirely voluntary: you are not obliged to be involved and  - if you do participate  -you can 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without any penalty of prejudice.
  
Can I tell other people about the study? 
Yes, you can tell other people about the study by providing them with the chief investigator's contact 
details. They can contact the chief investigator to discuss their participation in the research project and 
obtain an information sheet.
  
What if I require further information?
When you have read this information, Ryan will discuss it with you further and answer any questions you 
may have. If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact Dr Rebecca Pinkus,   
02 9772 6729.
  
What if I have a complaint?
This study has been approved by the University of Western Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee. 
The Approval number is H10044.
  
If you have any complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research, you may contact the  
Ethics Committee through the Office of Research Services on Tel +61 2 4736 0229 Fax +61 2 4736 0013 
or email humanethics@uws.edu.au.  
  
Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully, and you will be informed of the 
outcome.  
  
If you agree to participate in this study, you may be asked to sign the Participant Consent Form.
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Experiment 2B Draw Information Sheet 
 
 
Page 1 of 2
Human Research Ethics Committee 
Office of Research Services  
Participant Information Sheet (General)
Project Title: Effects of Distraction on Visual and Auditory Perception
  
Who is carrying out the study?
Ryan McMullan, PhD candidate 
Dr Rebecca Pinkus, PhD (supervisor) 
Dr Agnes Petocz, PhD (co-supervisor)
 
You are invited to participate in a study conducted by Ryan McMullan. This study will form the basis for 
Ryan's thesis as part of his Doctor of Philosophy degree at the University of Western Sydney under the 
supervision of Dr Rebecca Pinkus, Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences and Psychology, and Dr 
Agnes Petocz, Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences and Psychology.
  
What is the study about?
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether particular forms of distraction can affect visual and 
auditory perception.  
  
What does the study involve?
You will be asked to view material on a large projector screen and then answer questions about this 
material on a computer. You will also be asked some questions about your personal characteristics.  
  
How much time will the study take?
The study will take about 20 minutes to complete. You will subsequently be entered into a draw with the 
chance to win one of two $50 Coles/Myer gift cards. The odds of winning the drawing depend on the 
number of participants who take part in the study, but will be no greater than 1 in 50. 
  
Will the study benefit me?
You may benefit from the opportunity to actively participate in the psychological research process.
  
Will the study involve any discomfort for me?
No. You will be given breaks throughout the experiment. If at any point you do not wish to continue, you 
may simply inform the experimenter.
  
How is this study being paid for?
The study is being paid for via a School of Social Sciences and Psychology research stipend to Ryan 
McMullan.
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Experiment 3 Information Sheet 
 
 
 
Page 1 of 2
Human Research Ethics Committee 
Office of Research Services  
Participant Information Sheet (General)
Project Title: Effects of Distraction on Visual Perception
  
Who is carrying out the study?
Ryan McMullan, PhD candidate 
Dr Rebecca Pinkus, PhD (supervisor) 
Dr Agnes Petocz, PhD (co-supervisor)
 
You are invited to participate in a study conducted by Ryan McMullan. This study will form the basis for 
Ryan's thesis as part of his Doctor of Philosophy degree at the University of Western Sydney under the 
supervision of Dr Rebecca Pinkus, Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences and Psychology, and Dr 
Agnes Petocz, Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences and Psychology.
  
What is the study about?
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether particular forms of distraction can affect visual and 
auditory perception.  
  
What does the study involve?
You will be asked to view and respond to material on a computer screen. You will also be asked some 
questions about your personal characteristics.  
  
How much time will the study take?
The study will take about 20 minutes to complete, and you will receive 20 minutes of experimental credit 
from the School of Social Sciences and Psychology for your participation.
  
Will the study benefit me?
You may benefit from the opportunity to actively participate in the psychological research process.
  
Will the study involve any discomfort for me?
No. You will be given breaks throughout the experiment. If at any point you do not wish to continue, you 
may simply inform the experimenter.
  
How is this study being paid for?
The study is being paid for via a School of Social Sciences and Psychology research stipend to Ryan 
McMullan.
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Page 2 of 2
  
Will anyone else know the results? How will the results be disseminated?
All aspects of the study, including the results, will be confidential and only the researchers will have 
access to information on participants. A summary of the final results will be placed on the SONA site for 
participants to view (accessible by clicking on the study name). The results will also be reported in Ryan 
McMullan's thesis for a Doctor of Philosophy degree. The research results may also form the basis of an 
academic manuscript in collaboration with Dr Rebecca Pinkus and Dr Agnes Petocz, to be submitted to a 
peer-reviewed journal.
  
Can I withdraw from the study?
Participation is entirely voluntary: you are not obliged to be involved and  - if you do participate  -you can 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without any penalty of prejudice.
  
Can I tell other people about the study? 
Yes, you can tell other people about the study by providing them with the chief investigator's contact 
details. They can contact the chief investigator to discuss their participation in the research project and 
obtain an information sheet.
  
What if I require further information?
When you have read this information, Ryan will discuss it with you further and answer any questions you 
may have. If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact Dr Rebecca Pinkus,   
02 9772 6729.
  
What if I have a complaint?
This study has been approved by the University of Western Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee. 
The Approval number is H10044.
  
If you have any complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research, you may contact the  
Ethics Committee through the Office of Research Services on Tel +61 2 4736 0229 Fax +61 2 4736 0013 
or email humanethics@uws.edu.au.  
  
Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully, and you will be informed of the 
outcome.  
  
If you agree to participate in this study, you may be asked to sign the Participant Consent Form.
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Experiment 1, Experiment 2A, and Experiment 2B Consent Form 
 
 
Human Research Ethics Committee 
Office of Research Services 
Participant Consent Form
Project Title: Effects of Distraction on Visual and Auditory Perception
I,          , consent to participate in the research project titled Effects of Distraction on 
Visual and Auditory Perception. 
 
I acknowledge that: 
 
I have read the participant information sheet and have been given the opportunity to discuss the 
information and my involvement in the project with the researcher/s. 
 
The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been explained to me, and any 
questions I have about the project have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 
I consent to viewing material on a large projector screen and answering questions about this material, as 
well as answering questionnaires about myself. 
 
I understand that my involvement is confidential and that the information gained during the study may be 
published but no information about me will be used in any way that reveals my identity. 
 
I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without affecting my relationship with the 
researcher/s now or in the future.
Signed:  
Name:  
Date:
Return Address:
Dr Rebecca Pinkus 
School of Social Sciences and Psychology 
University of Western Sydney 
Locked Bag 1797 
Penrith NSW 2751 
Australia
  
This study has been approved by the University of Western Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee.
The Approval number is: H10044
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If you have any complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research, you may contact the 
Ethics Committee through the Office of Research Services on Tel +61 2 4736 0229 Fax +61 2 4736 0013 
or email humanethics@uws.edu.au. Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated 
fully, and you will be informed of the outcome.
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Experiment 3 Consent Form 
 
 
 
Human Research Ethics Committee 
Office of Research Services 
Participant Consent Form
Project Title: Effects of Distraction on Visual Perception
I,          , consent to participate in the research project titled Effects of Distraction on 
Visual and Auditory Perception. 
 
I acknowledge that: 
 
I have read the participant information sheet and have been given the opportunity to discuss the 
information and my involvement in the project with the researcher/s. 
 
The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been explained to me, and any 
questions I have about the project have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 
I consent to viewing and responding to material on a computer screen, as well as answering 
questionnaires about myself. 
 
I understand that my involvement is confidential and that the information gained during the study may be 
published but no information about me will be used in any way that reveals my identity. 
 
I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without affecting my relationship with the 
researcher/s now or in the future.
Signed:  
Name:  
Date:
Return Address:
Dr Rebecca Pinkus 
School of Social Sciences and Psychology 
University of Western Sydney 
Locked Bag 1797 
Penrith NSW 2751 
Australia
  
This study has been approved by the University of Western Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee.
The Approval number is: H10044
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If you have any complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research, you may contact the 
Ethics Committee through the Office of Research Services on Tel +61 2 4736 0229 Fax +61 2 4736 0013 
or email humanethics@uws.edu.au. Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated 
fully, and you will be informed of the outcome.
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Experiment 1 Debrief Form 
Debrief form 
(Effects of Distraction on Visual and Auditory Perception) 
 
• As you may know, scientific methods sometimes require that participants in research 
studies not be given complete information until after the experiment is finished. 
Although we can’t always tell you everything before you begin your participation, we 
do want to tell you everything when the research is completed. However, even now 
we cannot yet tell you everything, because we are still in the process of testing 
participants, and we want to minimise any possible contamination of results. 
Therefore, a complete explanation of the aims of this research will have to wait until 
the whole study has finished, at which point I will make available not only the more 
specific aims of this research, but also a summary of the findings. I can, however, 
give you a better understanding of what exactly we were doing here today. 
 
• Before I tell you about all of the goals of this study, however, I want to explain why it 
is necessary in some kinds of research to not tell people all about the purpose of the 
study before they begin. Discovering how people would naturally feel and react in 
everyday situations is what we are really trying to find out in psychology experiments. 
We don’t always tell people everything at the beginning of a study because we do not 
want to influence their responses. 
 
• Today, as you are aware, we asked you to read about several people. The target 
person descriptions were presented at various locations on the large projector screen. 
After exposure to the target you completed a free recall task, multiple choice task, and 
target evaluations. 
 
• We are trying to assess whether differences in the location of the target person 
descriptions affect how people process the information. 
 
• Because other participants in this experiment may experience different conditions 
from those you just had, we ask that you do not discuss your participation with other 
potential participants. If participants expect certain conditions but experience 
something which they are not expecting, or even if they get exactly what they are 
expecting, their responses may be less valid than if they had no forewarning at all, and 
the research results may be biased. Therefore, it is very important that people’s 
responses are natural and not biased by expectations provided by others who have 
already participated. We would really appreciate your cooperation in this. 
 
• I hope you enjoyed your experience and I hope that you learned some things today. If 
you have any questions later please feel free to contact either me or my supervisor – 
our contact details are on the information sheet. 
 
 
• Thank you again for your participation. It is very much appreciated. 
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Experiment 2A Debrief Form 
Debrief form 
(Effects of Distraction on Visual and Auditory Perception) 
 
• As you may know, scientific methods sometimes require that participants in research 
studies not be given complete information until after the experiment is finished. 
Although we can’t always tell you everything before you begin your participation, we 
do want to tell you everything when the research is completed. However, even now 
we cannot yet tell you everything, because we are still in the process of testing 
participants, and we want to minimise any possible contamination of results. 
Therefore, a complete explanation of the aims of this research will have to wait until 
the whole study has finished, at which point I will make available not only the more 
specific aims of this research, but also a summary of the findings. I can, however, 
give you a better understanding of what exactly we were doing here today. 
 
• Before I tell you about all of the goals of this study, however, I want to explain why it 
is necessary in some kinds of research to not tell people all about the purpose of the 
study before they begin. Discovering how people would naturally feel and react in 
everyday situations is what we are really trying to find out in psychology experiments. 
We don’t always tell people everything at the beginning of a study because we do not 
want to influence their responses. 
 
• Today, as you are aware, we asked you to read and respond to a number of words. 
These words were presented at various locations on the large projector screen. After 
exposure to the target you completed a demographics questionnaire. 
 
• We are trying to assess whether differences in the location of the target person 
descriptions affect how people process the information. 
 
• Because other participants in this experiment may experience different conditions 
from those you just had, we ask that you do not discuss your participation with other 
potential participants. If participants expect certain conditions but experience 
something which they are not expecting, or even if they get exactly what they are 
expecting, their responses may be less valid than if they had no forewarning at all, and 
the research results may be biased. Therefore, it is very important that people’s 
responses are natural and not biased by expectations provided by others who have 
already participated. We would really appreciate your cooperation in this. 
 
• I hope you enjoyed your experience and I hope that you learned some things today. If 
you have any questions later please feel free to contact either me or my supervisor – 
our contact details are on the information sheet. 
 
• Thank you again for your participation. It is very much appreciated. 
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Experiment 2B Debrief Form 
Debrief form 
(Effects of Distraction on Visual and Auditory Perception) 
 
• As you may know, scientific methods sometimes require that participants in research 
studies not be given complete information until after the experiment is finished. 
Although we can’t always tell you everything before you begin your participation, we 
do want to tell you everything when the research is completed. However, even now 
we cannot yet tell you everything, because we are still in the process of testing 
participants, and we want to minimise any possible contamination of results. 
Therefore, a complete explanation of the aims of this research will have to wait until 
the whole study has finished, at which point I will make available not only the more 
specific aims of this research, but also a summary of the findings. I can, however, 
give you a better understanding of what exactly we were doing here today. 
 
• Before I tell you about all of the goals of this study, however, I want to explain why it 
is necessary in some kinds of research to not tell people all about the purpose of the 
study before they begin. Discovering how people would naturally feel and react in 
everyday situations is what we are really trying to find out in psychology experiments. 
We don’t always tell people everything at the beginning of a study because we do not 
want to influence their responses. 
 
• Today, as you are aware, we asked you to read about a person. The target person 
descriptions were were presented at the top or the bottom of the large projector 
screen. After exposure to the target you completed a free recall task, a sliding scale 
recognition task, and target evaluations.   
 
• We are trying to assess whether differences in the location of the target person 
descriptions affect how people process the information. 
 
• Because other participants in this experiment may experience different conditions 
from those you just had, we ask that you do not discuss your participation with other 
potential participants. If participants expect certain conditions but experience 
something which they are not expecting, or even if they get exactly what they are 
expecting, their responses may be less valid than if they had no forewarning at all, and 
the research results may be biased. Therefore, it is very important that people’s 
responses are natural and not biased by expectations provided by others who have 
already participated. We would really appreciate your cooperation in this. 
 
• I hope you enjoyed your experience and I hope that you learned some things today. If 
you have any questions later please feel free to contact either me or my supervisor – 
our contact details are on the information sheet. 
 
 
• Thank you again for your participation. It is very much appreciated. 
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Experiment 3 Debrief Form 
Debrief form 
(Effects of Distraction on Visual and Auditory Perception) 
 
• As you may know, scientific methods sometimes require that participants in research 
studies not be given complete information until after the experiment is finished. 
Although we can’t always tell you everything before you begin your participation, we 
do want to tell you everything when the research is completed. However, even now 
we cannot yet tell you everything, because we are still in the process of testing 
participants, and we want to minimise any possible contamination of results. 
Therefore, a complete explanation of the aims of this research will have to wait until 
the whole study has finished, at which point I will make available not only the more 
specific aims of this research, but also a summary of the findings. I can, however, 
give you a better understanding of what exactly we were doing here today. 
 
• Before I tell you about all of the goals of this study, however, I want to explain why it 
is necessary in some kinds of research to not tell people all about the purpose of the 
study before they begin. Discovering how people would naturally feel and react in 
everyday situations is what we are really trying to find out in psychology experiments. 
We don’t always tell people everything at the beginning of a study because we do not 
want to influence their responses. 
 
• Today, as you are aware, we asked you to read and respond to a number of words. 
These words were presented at various locations on the computer screen. After 
exposure to the words you completed a demographics questionnaire.  
 
• We are trying to assess whether differences in the location of the target person 
descriptions affect how people process the information. 
 
• Because other participants in this experiment may experience different conditions 
from those you just had, we ask that you do not discuss your participation with other 
potential participants. If participants expect certain conditions but experience 
something which they are not expecting, or even if they get exactly what they are 
expecting, their responses may be less valid than if they had no forewarning at all, and 
the research results may be biased. Therefore, it is very important that people’s 
responses are natural and not biased by expectations provided by others who have 
already participated. We would really appreciate your cooperation in this. 
 
• I hope you enjoyed your experience and I hope that you learned some things today. If 
you have any questions later please feel free to contact either me or my supervisor – 
our contact details are on the information sheet. 
 
• Thank you again for your participation. It is very much appreciated. 
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Appendix B  
Pilot Study 1 Instructions and Behavioural Descriptions 
Instructions 
                    
Please rate how positive or negative each of the following behaviors and actions are on the 
corresponding scale. 
Extremely 
Negative 
   Neutral    Extremely 
Positive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Positive Behavioural Descriptions 
 
Alex has been successful at motivating students all year. 
Alex is employed at an inner city primary school. 
Alex has been described by the principal as a talented teacher. 
Alex has conquered difficult challenges with enthusiasm. 
Alex successfully taught students how to use a new math computer program. 
Alex was awarded an Outstanding Young Teachers Award. 
Alex is engaged to be married. 
Alex coached the school’s basketball team to the finals. 
Alex proposed an environmental management program to be undertaken at the school. 
Jamie had two psychology papers published in 6 months. 
Jamie obtained a research position at a top university. 
Jamie sticks by colleagues, even when they make mistakes. 
Jamie relates well to colleagues. 
Jamie was invited to give a lecture on vision in Switzerland. 
Jamie is a reviewer for several psychology journals. 
Jamie moved into a new two bedroom apartment. 
Jamie purchased a new car. 
Jamie won a department tennis tournament despite having played only a few times in the past. 
Sam travelled to England to visit relatives. 
Sam travelled to various destinations in Europe whilst taking a year off. 
Sam volunteered at a holiday camp for 100 children with disabilities in Belarus. 
Sam had several small jobs in Europe to pay for living and travel expenses. 
Sam made several new friends at a Swiss hostel. 
Sam was offered a job at a leading marketing agency in Sydney. 
Sam learnt to speak French during time spent in Paris. 
Sam sailed a yacht to various islands in the Mediterranean Sea. 
Sam travelled through Romania alone for 20 days. 
Sam witnessed the running of the bulls in Spain. 
 
Negative Behavioural Descriptions 
 
Casey hasn’t been able to find a good job. 
Casey is unsure about the future. 
	
	
149 
Casey has attended nine unsuccessful job interviews. 
Casey has admitted to fabricating resume details.   
Casey has found the search for a job overwhelming. 
Casey can’t afford to go back to university. 
Casey’s partner of 3 years ended their relationship. 
Casey has difficulty sleeping at night due to stress. 
Casey constantly argues with other family members. 
Ashley finds it difficult to understand other people’s opinions in the workplace. 
Ashley has difficulty in explaining various concepts to colleagues. 
Ashley has a credit card debt due to a desire for expensive clothing. 
Ashley could not understand the instructions for a new computer program. 
Ashley has been warned by a supervisor about conflicts with colleagues. 
Ashley used a colleague's work laptop without their permission. 
Ashley rarely goes out with friends.  
Ashley has been warned by a supervisor about arriving late to work.  
Ashley rarely attends meetings because they are boring.  
Charlie treats co-workers very dismissively. 
Charlie once hit a co-worker in anger. 
Charlie’s drivers licence was suspended due to an outstanding fine. 
Charlie makes no effort to deliver important messages to co-workers. 
Charlie stacks shelves at a local Walmart. 
Charlie is often rude to customers. 
Charlie relies on roommates to pay the rent. 
Charlie on average loses $200 a week due to gambling. 
Charlie lost control of a forklift and damaged a number of goods. 
Charlie wears a digital wrist watch. 
 
Neutral Behavioural Descriptions 
 
Alex has breakfast at 7am every morning. 
Alex has a 19 inch plasma television. 
 Casey buys the newspaper on the way to work. 
Jamie’s favorite television show is on every Tuesday night. 
Ashley checks the mailbox after arriving home from work each day. 
Ashley drives a white car. 
Charlie waits for the bus at the bus stop each morning. 
Alex catches the train each morning. 
Jamie buys groceries at the local supermarket each Thursday. 
Casey cooks dinner each night. 
Alex uses a cell phone to call friends. 
Sam takes photographs of birds. 
Sam occasionally listens to the radio. 
Ashley purchased a 12 month subscription to a football magazine. 
Jamie stores data and files on a mobile phone. 
Charlie supports the local football team. 
Alex wears black shoes to work. 
Casey eats two sandwiches for lunch each day. 
Charlie gets a haircut each month.  
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Appendix C 
Experiment 1 Practice Phase and Experimental Phase Behavioural Descriptions 
Practice Phase Behavioural Descriptions 
 
Ronald Weasley broke his leg after crashing his broomstick. 
Bugs Bunny was captured by Elma Fudd. 
Superman lifted a semi-trailer to save a mother and child. 
Sherlock Holmes solved three murder cases in one day. 
Fred Flintstone took his pet dinosaur Dino for a walk.  
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Experimental Phase Behavioural Descriptions 
 
Positive Target Behavioural Descriptions 
 
Alex has been successful at motivating students all year. 
Alex is employed at one of the top primary schools in Sydney. 
Alex has been described by the principal as a talented teacher. 
Alex has conquered difficult challenges with enthusiasm. 
Alex was awarded an Outstanding Young Teachers Award. 
Alex coached the school’s basketball team to the finals. 
Alex’s favourite television show is on every Tuesday night. 
Alex checks the mailbox after arriving home from work each day. 
 
Jamie had two psychology papers published in 6 months. 
Jamie obtained a research position at a top university. 
Jamie provides support for a colleague who has depression.  
Jamie works effectively with colleagues.  
Jamie was invited to be the main speaker at an international conference in Switzerland. 
Jamie saved enough money to buy a new car. 
Jamie waits for the bus at the bus stop each morning. 
Jamie purchased a 12 month subscription to a magazine. 
 
Sam volunteered at a holiday camp for 100 children with disabilities. 
Sam made many new friends when travelling through Europe.  
Sam was offered a job at a leading marketing agency. 
Sam successfully sailed a yacht to a number of islands in the Mediterranean Sea. 
Sam can afford to travel to Milan due to careful budgeting.  
Sam administered first aid to a person involved in a car crash.  
Sam drives a white car. 
Sam wears a digital watch.   
 
Negative Target Behavioural Descriptions 
 
Casey hasn’t been able to find a good job. 
Casey has attended nine unsuccessful job interviews. 
Casey has repeatedly fabricated resume details.  
Casey gave up looking for a job because it was overwhelming. 
Casey’s partner of 3 years ended their relationship. 
Casey constantly argues with other family members. 
Casey stores data and files on a mobile phone. 
Casey buys groceries at the local supermarket each Thursday. 
 
Ashley failed to listen to important instructions.  
Ashley never assists colleagues when asked for help.  
Ashley has a credit card debt due to a desire for expensive clothing. 
Ashley has been warned by a supervisor about conflicts with colleagues. 
Ashley used a colleague's work laptop without their permission. 
Ashley arrives late to work everyday.  
Ashley occasionally listens to the radio.  
Ashley gets a haircut every month.  
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Charlie treats co-workers very dismissively. 
Charlie once hit a co-worker in anger. 
Charlie’s drivers licence was suspended due to an outstanding fine. 
Charlie makes no effort to deliver important messages to co-workers. 
Charlie is often rude to customers. 
Charlie loses $200 a week on average in gambling debt. 
Charlie buys the newspaper on the way to work. 
Charlie eats a sandwich for lunch everyday.  
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Appendix D 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2B Filler Task 
INSTRUCTIONS:  
Please read this text and cross off all instances of the letter e.  
Nearly all eucalyptus are evergreen but some tropical species lose their leaves at the 
end of the dry season. As in other members of the myrtle family, eucalyptus leaves 
are covered with oil glands. The copious oils produced are an important feature of 
the genus. Although mature Eucalyptus trees are usually towering and fully leafed, 
their shade is characteristically patchy because the leaves usually hang downwards.  
The leaves on a mature eucalyptus plant are commonly lanceolate, petiolate, 
apparently alternate and waxy or glossy green. In contrast, the leaves of seedlings 
are often opposite, sessile and glaucous. But there are many exceptions to this 
pattern. Many species such as E. melanophloia and E. setosa retain the juvenile leaf 
form even when the plant is reproductively mature. Some species, such as E. 
macrocarpa, E. rhodantha and E. crucis, are sought-after ornamentals due to this 
lifelong juvenile leaf form. A few species, such as E. petraea, E. dundasii and E. 
lansdowneana, have shiny green leaves throughout their life cycle. E. caesia exhibits 
the opposite pattern of leaf development to most eucalyptus, with shiny green leaves 
in the seedling stage and dull, glaucous leaves in mature crowns. The contrast 
between juvenile and adult leaf phases is valuable in field identification. 
Four leaf phases are recognised in the development of a eucalyptus plant: the 
‘seedling’, ‘juvenile’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘adult’ phases. However there is no definite 
transitional point between the phases. The intermediate phase, when the largest 
leaves are often formed, links the juvenile and adult phases. 
In all except a few species, the leaves form in pairs on opposite sides of a square 
stem, consecutive pairs being at right angles to each other (decussate). In some 
narrow-leaved species, for example E. oleosa, the seedling leaves after the second 
leaf pair are often clustered in a detectable spiral arrangement about a five-sided 
stem. After the spiral phase, which may last from several to many nodes, the 
arrangement reverts to decussate by the absorption of some of the leaf-bearing 
faces of the stem. In those species with opposite adult foliage the leaf pairs, which 
have been formed opposite at the stem apex, become separated at their bases by 
unequal elongation of the stem to produce the apparently alternate adult leaves. 
The most readily recognisable characteristics of eucalyptus species are the 
distinctive flowers and fruit (capsules or "gumnuts"). Flowers have numerous fluffy 
stamens which may be white, cream, yellow, pink or red; in bud, the stamens are 
enclosed in a cap known as an operculum which is composed of the fused sepals or 
petals or both. Thus flowers have no petals, but instead decorate themselves with 
the many showy stamens. As the stamens expand, the operculum is forced off, 
splitting away from the cup-like base of the flower; this is one of the features that 
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unites the genus. The name Eucalyptus, from the Greek words eu-, well, and 
kaluptos, cover, meaning "well-covered", describes the operculum. The woody fruits 
or capsules are roughly cone-shaped and have valves at the end which open to 
release the seeds, which are waxy, rod-shaped, about 1mm in length, and yellow-
brown in colour. Most species do not flower until adult foliage starts to appear; 
Eucalyptus cinerea and Eucalyptus perriniana are notable exceptions. 
The appearance of eucalyptus bark varies with the age of the plant, the manner of 
bark shed, the length of the bark fibres, the degree of furrowing, the thickness, the 
hardness and the colour. All mature eucalypts put on an annual layer of bark, which 
contributes to the increasing diameter of the stems. In some species, the outermost 
layer dies and is annually deciduous, either in long strips (as in Eucalyptus 
sheathiana) or in variably sized flakes (E. diversicolor, E. cosmophylla or E. 
cladocalyx). These are the gums or smooth-barked species. The gum bark may be 
dull, shiny or satiny (as in E. ornata) or matte (E. cosmophylla). In many species, the 
dead bark is retained. Its outermost layer gradually fragments with weathering and 
sheds without altering the essentially rough-barked nature of the trunks or stems — 
for example E. marginata, E. jacksonii, E. obliqua and E. porosa. 
Many species are ‘half-barks’ or ‘blackbutts’ in which the dead bark is retained in the 
lower half of the trunks or stems — for example, E. brachycalyx, E. ochrophloia and 
E. occidentalis — or only in a thick, black accumulation at the base, as in E. clelandii. 
In some species in this category, for example E. youngiana and E. viminalis, the 
rough basal bark is very ribbony at the top, where it gives way to the smooth upper 
stems. The smooth upper bark of the half-barks and that of the completely smooth-
barked trees and mallees can produce remarkable colour and interest, for example 
E. deglupta. 
Eucalypts originated between 35 and 50 million years ago, not long after Australia-
New Guinea separated from Gondwana, their rise coinciding with an increase in 
fossil charcoal deposits (suggesting that fire was a factor even then), but they 
remained a minor component of the Tertiary rainforest until about 20 million years 
ago, when the gradual drying of the continent and depletion of soil nutrients led to 
the development of a more open forest type, predominantly Casuarina and Acacia 
species. 
The aridification of Australia during the mid-tertiary period (25-40 million years ago), 
combined with the annual penetration of tropical convection storms, and associated 
lightning, deep into the continental interior stimulated the gradual evolution, 
diversification and geographic expansion of the flammable biota. The absence of 
great rivers or mountain chains meant that there were no geographic barriers to 
check the spread of fires. From the monsoonal 'cradle', fire-promoting species 
expanded into higher rainfall environments, where lightning was less frequent, 
gradually displacing the Gondwanan rainforest from all but the most fire-sheltered 
habitats.[15] 
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The two valuable timber trees, alpine ash E. delegatensis and Australian mountain 
ash E. regnans, are killed by fire and only regenerate from seed. The same 2003 
bushfire that had little impact on forests around Canberra resulted in thousands of 
hectares of dead ash forests. However, a small amount of ash survived and put out 
new ash trees as well. There has been some debate as to whether to leave the 
stands or attempt to harvest the mostly undamaged timber, which is increasingly 
recognised as a damaging practice. 
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Appendix E 
Experiment 1 Memory Measure (free recall task) 
Take a minute to think back about the people you read about. In the spaces provided list as 
many of each person’s behaviours as possible. Please don't spend longer than 1 minute on 
each person. 
 
Alex 
 
 
 
 
 
Jamie 
 
 
 
 
 
Sam 
 
 
 
 
 
Reese 
 
 
 
 
 
Kelly 
 
 
 
 
 
Charlie 
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Appendix F 
Experiment 1 Recognition Memory Measure (multiple choice task) 
Take a minute to think back about the people you read about in the descriptions. Which of the 
6 people that you learned about performed each of these behaviours? Please select the name 
of the person that corresponds to each behaviour. 
 
Alex Charlie Jamie Kelly Reese Sam None 
       
 
 
_____ has been successful at motivating students all year. 
_____ is employed at one of the top primary schools in Sydney. 
_____ has been described by the principal as a talented teacher. 
_____ has conquered difficult challenges with enthusiasm. 
_____ was awarded an Outstanding Young Teachers Award. 
_____ coached the school’s basketball team to the final. 
_____ checks the mailbox after arriving home from work each day. 
_____ favourite television show is on every Tuesday night. 
_____ had two psychology papers published in 6 months. 
_____ obtained a research position at a top university. 
_____ provides support for a colleague who has depression. 
_____ works effectively with colleagues. 
_____ was invited to be the main speaker at an international conference in Switzerland. 
_____ saved enough money to buy a new car. 
_____ waits for the bus at the bus stop each morning. 
_____ purchased a 12 month subscription to a magazine. 
_____ volunteered at a holiday camp for 100 children with disabilities. 
_____ made many friends when travelling through Europe. 
_____ was offered a job at a leading marketing agency. 
_____ successfully navigated a yacht to a number of islands in the Mediterranean Sea. 
_____ can afford to fly to Milan due to careful budgeting. 
_____ administered first aid to a person involved in a car crash. 
_____ wears a digital watch. 
_____ drives a white car. 
_____ hasn’t been able to find a good job. 
_____ has had nine unsuccessful job interviews. 
_____ has repeatedly fabricated resume details. 
_____ gave up looking for a job because it was overwhelming. 
_____ partner of 3 years ended their relationship. 
_____ constantly argues with other family members. 
_____ stores data and files on a mobile phone. 
_____ buys groceries at the local supermarket each Thursday. 
_____ failed to listen to important instructions. 
_____ never assists colleagues when asked for help. 
_____ has a credit card debt due to a desire for expensive clothing. 
_____ has been warned by a supervisor about having conflicts with colleagues. 
_____ took a colleagues work laptop home without their permission. 
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_____ arrives late to work every day.  
_____ occasionally listens to the radio. 
_____ gets a haircut each month. 
_____ treats co-workers very dismissively. 
_____ once hit a co-worker in anger. 
_____ driver’s licence was suspended due to an outstanding fine. 
_____ makes no effort to deliver important messages to co-workers. 
_____ is often rude to customers. 
_____ loses $200 a week on average in gambling debt.  
_____ buys the newspaper on the way to work. 
_____ eats a sandwich for lunch each day. 
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Appendix G 
Experiment 1 Target Evaluations Measure 
Take a minute to think back about the people you read about in the descriptions. We would 
like to ask you about your perceptions of these people. Using the corresponding scale, please 
rate what you think each person is like on the traits that follow. 
 
Not 
at all 
     Very 
much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
[Target name] 
 
[Target name] is: successful 
[Target name] is: ambitious 
[Target name] is: bright 
[Target name] is: argumentative 
[Target name] is: insecure 
[Target name] is: skillful 
[Target name] is: lazy 
[Target name] is: self-doubting 
[Target name] is: accomplished 
[Target name] is: effective 
[Target name] is: flexible 
[Target name] is: selfish 
[Target name] is: career-oriented 
[Target name] is: a strong leader 
[Target name] is: incompetent 
[Target name] is: inferior 
[Target name] is: capable 
[Target name] is: inefficient 
[Target name] is: organised 
[Target name] is: unintelligent 
[Target name] is: fearful about future 
[Target name] is: helpful 
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Appendix H 
Verbal Instructions for Experiment 1, Experiment 2A, Experiment 2B, and Experiment 
3 
Experiment 1 Verbal Instructions 
• “Thanks for coming in. If you have a mobile phone or mp3 player, please turn it off at 
this time. Just so you know, I’ll be reading the instructions so they are exactly the 
same for everyone who participates.  
 
• Today you will be participating in a study about the effects of distraction on visual 
and auditory perception. You will be asked to view descriptions that will be presented 
on the wall and then answer questions about these descriptions, and you will also be 
asked to complete several questionnaires. This study will be completed firstly by 
viewing and responding to the projected descriptions and then by answering questions 
on the computer.” 
 
• “Before you begin, I’ll have you read over the information sheet and sign two copies 
of the consent form. One of these copies is yours to keep.  Please take as much time as 
you need to think about participating before signing the consent form.” 
 
• “Thanks.  Now I’m going to get you started on the study. You will be seated in the 
chair and you will be facing the wall. You will then read through some information 
and instructions. You will complete a practice phase and then an experimental phase. 
To complete each phase you will use a keyboard. On this, there are clearly marked 
keys that indicate ‘positive’, ‘neutral’, and ‘negative’.  
 
• Once you finish both phases please let me know and I will the direct you to the laptop. 
On the laptop, you’ll be asked to answer questions about the description and then you 
will complete several questionnaires about what you read.” 
 
• “You’ll read some instructions before beginning each questionnaire.  It’s important 
that you read these instructions carefully. Please be sure of your answer before you 
click on it and continue.” 
 
• “Many of the questions may seem similar to one another, but there are subtle 
differences between them, so please read each question carefully before responding to 
it.” 
 
• “If at any time the instructions are unclear or you have any questions, please let me 
know and I’ll be happy to help you.  You are free to skip questions you do not want to 
answer, and you are free to withdraw at any time without penalty.” 
 
• “After you’ve finished the study, let me know so that I can explain what the study was 
about in more detail.  Do you have any questions so far?” 
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• “Alright, let’s get started.” 
 
DEBRIEF 
 
• “Was there anything about the study that seemed unusual or unexpected?”  
• “Was there anything about the study that surprised you?”  
• “Do you have any questions about the study?” 
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Experiment 2A Verbal Instructions 
• “Thanks for coming in. If you have a mobile phone or mp3 player, please turn it off at 
this time. Just so you know, I’ll be reading the instructions so they are exactly the 
same for everyone who participates.  
 
• Today you will be participating in a study about the effects of distraction on visual 
and auditory perception. You will be asked to view descriptions that will be presented 
on the wall and then answer questions about these descriptions. This study will be 
completed firstly by viewing and responding to the projected descriptions and then by 
answering questions on the laptop.” 
 
• “Before you begin, I’ll have you read over the information sheet and sign two copies 
of the consent form. One of these copies is yours to keep.  Please take as much time as 
you need to think about participating before signing the consent form.” 
 
• “Thanks.  Now I’m going to get you started on the study. You will be seated in this 
chair and you will be facing the wall. You will then read through some information 
and instructions. You will complete a practice phase and then an experimental phase. 
To complete each phase you will respond verbally. The microphone will be placed 
onto your shirt, close to your mouth and will capture your responses.  
 
• In this experiment a fixation cross will be presented in the centre of the screen, which 
will then be followed by the presentation of a name and a description. The 
presentation of a fixation cross followed by a name and description will be repeated 
throughout this experiment. Each description will be individually presented. Please 
read each name and description at your own pace.  
 
• Your task is to indicate whether the description is positive, neutral, or negative. 
 
• To indicate that the description is POSITIVE please verbally respond by saying 
"GOOD" 
• To indicate that the description is NEUTRAL please verbally respond by saying 
"NEUTRAL" 
• To indicate that the description is NEGATIVE please verbally respond by saying 
"BAD" 
 
• First, you will begin by completing a practice phase so you can familiarise yourself 
with the display and how to respond. And then you will complete the experimental 
phase.  
 
• Once you finish both phases I will then direct you to the laptop. On the laptop, you’ll 
be asked to answer questions about the descriptions and then you will complete 
several questionnaires” 
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• “If at any time the instructions are unclear or you have any questions, please let me 
know and I’ll be happy to help you.  You are free to skip questions you do not want to 
answer, and you are free to withdraw at any time without penalty.” 
 
• “After you’ve finished the study, let me know so that I can explain what the study was 
about in more detail.  Do you have any questions so far?” 
 
• “Alright, let’s get started.” 
 
 
DEBRIEF 
 
• “Was there anything about the study that seemed unusual or unexpected?”  
• “Was there anything about the study that surprised you?”  
• “Do you have any questions about the study?” 
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Experiment 2B Verbal Instructions 
• “Thanks for coming in. If you have a mobile phone or mp3 player, please turn it off at 
this time. Just so you know, I’ll be reading the instructions so they are exactly the 
same for everyone who participates.  
 
• Today you will be participating in a study about the effects of distraction on visual 
and auditory perception. You will be asked to view descriptions that will be presented 
on the wall and then answer questions about these descriptions. This study will be 
completed firstly by viewing the projected descriptions and then by answering 
questions on the laptop.” 
 
• “Before you begin, I’ll have you read over the information sheet and sign two copies 
of the consent form. One of these copies is yours to keep.  Please take as much time as 
you need to think about participating before signing the consent form.” 
 
• “Thanks.  Now I’m going to get you started on the study. You will be seated in this 
chair and you will be facing the wall. You will then read through some information 
and instructions.” 
 
• In this experiment a fixation cross will be presented in the centre of the screen, which 
will then be followed by the presentation of a name and a description. The 
presentation of a fixation cross followed by a name and description will be repeated 
throughout this experiment. Each description will be individually presented. Please 
read each name and description carefully and at your own pace, so you can form an 
impression of the person that you read about.  
 
• Each name and description will be presented for a fixed time. Please maintain focus 
on the name and description for the time it is displayed. You DO NOT have to 
respond. 
 
• Once you finish viewing the descriptions I will then direct you to the laptop. On the 
laptop, you’ll be asked to answer questions about the descriptions and then you will 
complete several questionnaires” 
 
• “If at any time the instructions are unclear or you have any questions, please let me 
know and I’ll be happy to help you.  You are free to skip questions you do not want to 
answer, and you are free to withdraw at any time without penalty.” 
 
• “After you’ve finished the study, let me know so that I can explain what the study was 
about in more detail.  Do you have any questions so far?” 
 
• “Alright, let’s get started.” 
 
• (FILLER TASK) – Okay, just before you go onto the laptop I’ll have you complete 
this task. Past research suggests that impressions of people become solidified after 
several minutes. Okay, so I’ll get you to work through this task for 5 minutes.  
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DEBRIEF 
  
• “Was there anything about the study that seemed unusual or unexpected?”  
• “Was there anything about the study that surprised you?”  
• “Do you have any questions about the study?” 
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Experiment 3 Verbal Instructions 
• “Thanks for coming in. If you have a mobile phone or mp3 player, please turn it off at 
this time. Just so you know, I’ll be reading the instructions so they are exactly the 
same for everyone who participates.  
 
• Today you will be participating in a study about the effects of distraction on visual  
perception. You will be asked to complete a computerised task, and you will also be 
asked to complete several questionnaires. 
 
• “Before you begin, I’ll have you read over the information sheet and sign two copies 
of the consent form. One of these copies is yours to keep.  Please take as much time as 
you need to think about participating before signing the consent form.” 
 
• “Thanks. Now I’m going to get you started on the study. You will be using this 
computer. You will first read through some instructions. You will complete a practice 
phase to familiarise yourself with the task and then you will complete the 
experimental phase. To complete each phase you will use the keyboard.  
 
• Once you finish both phases please let me know and I will then open the 
questionnaires for you to complete.” 
 
• You’ll read some instructions before beginning each questionnaire. It’s important that 
you read these instructions carefully. Please be sure of your answer before you click 
on it and continue.” 
 
• If at any time the instructions are unclear or you have any questions, please let me 
know and I’ll be happy to help you. You are free to skip questions you do not want to 
answer, and you are free to withdraw at any time without penalty.” 
 
• After you’ve finished the study, let me know so that I can explain what the study was 
about in more detail. Do you have any questions so far? 
 
• “Alright, let’s get started.” 
 
DEBRIEF 
  
• “Was there anything about the study that seemed unusual or unexpected?”  
• “Was there anything about the study that surprised you?”  
• “Do you have any questions about the study?” 
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Appendix I 
Demographic Information11 
What is your age (in years)? 
 
What is your gender? 
m Male 
m Female 
 
Please indicate your ethnic origin by selecting one of the 10 categories listed below. 
m Caucasian 
m East and Southeast Asian (e.g., China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam) 
m South Asian (e.g., India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka) 
m Middle Eastern 
m African 
m Latin, Central, and South American 
m Caribbean 
m Pacific Islands 
m Indigenous Australian (i.e., Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islander) 
m Another Group (please specify): ____________________ 
 
Please indicate your current employment status: 
m not currently employed 
m casual employment 
m part-time employment 
m full-time employment 
 
Please indicate your current student status: 
m not a student 
m full-time student 
m part-time student 
 
Please indicate your highest obtained educational level: 
m high school 
m TAFE 
m tertiary level undergraduate 
m tertiary level postgraduate 
m other (please specify): ____________________ 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
11 These demographic information questions were included in all of the experiments. 
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Appendix J 
Suspicion probe12 
Is English your native language? 
m Yes 
m No 
 
Answer If Is English your native language? No Is Selected 
How long (in years) have you been speaking English? 
 
Answer If Is English your native language? No Is Selected 
How would you describe your fluency in the English language? 
m poor 
m 2 
m adequate 
m 4 
m superior 
 
Had you heard anything about the study before today? 
m Yes 
m No 
 
Answer If    Had you heard anything about the study before today? Yes Is Selected 
What did you hear? 
 
Was there anything about the study that seemed unusual or unexpected? 
m Yes 
m No 
 
Answer If    Was there anything about the study that seemed unusual ...  Yes Is Selected 
What seemed unusual? 
 
Was there anything about the study that surprised you? 
m Yes 
m No 
 
Answer If    Was there anything about the study that surprised you? Yes Is Selected 
What surprised you? 
 
What do you think this study is about? 
 
																																								 																				
12 These suspicion probe questions were included in all of the experiments.  
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Appendix K 
Pilot Study 2 Instructions and Trait Words 
Instructions 
 
You will now read some traits about several recent university graduates. Please rate how 
positive or negative each of the following traits are on the corresponding scale. At the same 
time please form an overall impression of each person that you read about. 
 
Extremely 
Negative 
   Neutral    Extremely 
Positive 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
 
For the next two questions, we'd like you to consider your overall impression of (Target 
name). 
 
How likeable do you consider (Target name)? 
 
not at all 
likeable 
  neither likeable 
nor unlikeable 
  extremely 
likeable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
How much would you like to spend time with (Target name)? 
 
not at all   neutral   very much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Trait words 
 
Positive Trait Words Negative Trait Words 
determined  
skillful 
practical  
intelligent  
persistent  
industrious  
helpful  
sincere  
sociable  
tolerant  
warm  
humorous  
inefficient  
irresponsible  
incompetent  
wasteful  
impulsive  
foolish  
pessimistic  
dominating  
moody  
unpopular    
critical  
irritable  
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Appendix L 
Experiment 2A Practice Trait Words and Experiment 2A and Experiment 2B Targets 
and Trait Words 
Experiment 2A Practice Trait Words 
Fred Flintstone: silly 
Superman: strong 
Ronald Weasley: obsessive 
Sherlock Holmes: eccentric 
Bugs Bunny: witty 
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Experiment 2A and Experiment 2B Targets and Trait Words 
Positive targets 
Competent (Alex) Warm (Jamie) 
determined 
skillful 
practical 
intelligent 
persistent 
industrious 
helpful 
sincere 
sociable 
tolerant 
warm 
humorous 
 
 
Negative targets 
Incompetent (Reese) Cold (Charlie) 
inefficient 
irresponsible 
incompetent 
wasteful 
impulsive 
foolish 
pessimistic 
dominating 
moody 
unpopular 
critical 
irritable 
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Appendix M 
Word Frequency for Experiment 2A Trait Words 
Word frequency norms were obtained from the English Lexicon Project (see Balota et al., 
2007).  
Competent (Alex) 
Trait Frequency 
determined 
skillful 
practical 
intelligent 
persistent 
industrious 
16292 
494 
18212 
20769 
2736 
193 
 
Warm (Jamie) 
Trait Frequency 
helpful 
sincere 
sociable 
tolerant 
warm 
humorous 
26425 
4659 
231 
2573 
21018 
2866 
 
Incompetent (Reese) 
Trait Frequency 
inefficient 
irresponsible 
incompetent 
wasteful 
impulsive 
foolish 
2315 
3036 
2224 
1059 
282 
5757 
 
Cold (Charlie) 
Trait Frequency 
pessimistic 
dominating 
moody 
unpopular 
critical 
irritable 
742 
843 
1563 
1496 
20425 
364 
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Appendix N 
Experiment 2B Memory (free recall) Measure 
 
Take a minute to think back about [Target name]. In the space provided list as many 
of [Target name]’s descriptors as possible. 
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Appendix O 
Experiment 2B Recognition Memory Measure 
 
Take a minute to think back about [Target name]. Do you remember seeing each of these 
descriptors earlier? To make your response click your mouse over the blue line and drag it to 
the left or to the right.13 
  
																																								 																				
13 This list of traits appeared for participants who read about Alex or Jamie (i.e., the positive targets). 
Participants who read about either Reese or Charlie viewed a list that consisted of the 12 negative traits (i.e., 
incompetent and socially cold traits) 
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Appendix P 
Experiment 3 Practice Phase Words and Experimental Phase Words 
Practice Phase Words 
Fail 
Calm 
Respect 
Cheery 
Rotten 
Brilliant 
Boring 
Hurtful 
Inventive 
Stinky 
Success 
Distress 
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Experimental Phase Words 
Positive Words Negative Words 
active 
agile 
ambitious 
baby 
brave 
candy 
champion 
clean 
cordially 
devotion 
dream 
earnest 
ethical 
faith 
festival 
garden 
generous 
genius 
gentle 
gracious 
heaven 
hero 
justice 
kiss 
leisure 
love 
loyal 
mature 
mercy 
neat 
nurse 
polite 
power 
pretty 
prompt 
radiant 
reliable 
righteous 
satisfying 
sensible 
sincere 
sleep 
studious 
sweet 
aimless 
argue 
beggar 
bitter 
cancer 
cheat 
clumsy 
crime 
critical 
crooked 
crude 
cruel 
danger 
dead 
defeat 
delay 
devil 
diseased 
divorce 
enemy 
fickle 
foolish 
fraud 
greedy 
hostile 
insane 
insolent 
liar 
mediocre 
mosquito 
nasty 
neurotic 
obnoxious 
poison 
pompous 
profane 
rude 
sarcastic 
shallow 
sloppy 
sour 
spider 
steal 
stingy 
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talented 
trust 
truthful 
victory 
wise 
witty 
theft 
touchy 
ugly 
unfair 
vain 
vulgar  
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Appendix Q 
Word Frequency for Experiment 3 Words 
Word frequency norms were obtained from the English Lexicon Project (see Balota et al., 
2007).  
Positive words 
Word Frequency 
Active  
Agile  
Ambitious  
Baby  
Brave  
Candy  
Champion  
Clean 
Cordially  
Devotion  
Dream  
Earnest  
Ethical  
Faith  
Festival  
Garden  
Generous  
Genius  
Gentle  
Gracious  
Heaven  
Hero  
Justice  
Kiss  
Leisure  
Love  
Loyal  
Mature  
Mercy  
Neat  
Nurse  
Polite  
Power  
Pretty  
Prompt  
Radiant  
Reliable  
35565 
631 
1803 
35810 
5524 
4887 
8243 
36257 
NA 
2010 
32423 
1435 
5840 
29740 
9122 
11220 
4648 
6437 
6694 
1146 
16257 
15998 
31679 
12848 
2555 
165830 
3861 
6245 
5983 
11901 
6640 
5981 
187656 
129994 
14839 
623 
16975 
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Righteous  
Satisfying  
Sensible  
Sincere  
Sleep  
Studious  
Sweet  
Talented  
Trust  
Truthful  
Victory  
Wise  
Witty 
4143 
2767 
4936 
4659 
25606 
114 
15494 
5612 
29358 
1203 
11304 
13444 
2411 
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Negative words 
Word Frequency 
Aimless  
Argue  
Beggar  
Bitter  
Cancer  
Cheat  
Clumsy  
Crime  
Critical  
Crooked  
Crude 
Cruel  
Danger   
Dead  
Defeat  
Delay  
Devil   
Diseased  
Divorce  
Enemy  
Fickle  
Foolish  
Fraud  
Greedy  
Hostile  
Insane  
Insolent 
Liar  
Mediocre  
Mosquito  
Nasty 
Neurotic 
Obnoxious  
Poison  
Pompous  
Profane  
Rude  
Sarcastic  
Shallow  
Sloppy  
Sour  
Spider  
148 
20857 
682 
5910 
18210 
6137 
1382 
33496 
20425 
1452 
3351 
5177 
12703 
72864 
7657 
13068 
8234 
464 
5809 
16802 
291 
5757 
7665 
3000 
4648 
6598 
118 
6138 
2673 
812 
14007 
666 
2903 
5095 
1043 
426 
7346 
2826 
3761 
2425 
2340 
6953 
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Steal  
Stingy  
Theft  
Touchy  
Ugly  
Unfair  
Vain  
Vulgar  
11268 
320 
4875 
810 
11466 
6396 
2677 
1098 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
